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THE WAR OFFICE

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THE FOREIGN OFFICE

# THE WAR OFFICE

*By*

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*Assistant Secretary at the War Office*

*With an Introduction by*

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PUTNAM  
COVENT GARDEN LONDON

*First Published April 1935*

Printed in Great Britain at  
The Westminster Press  
411a Harrow Road  
London, W.9

## INTRODUCTION

It is recorded of the late Marshal Foch that when taking part in the great Victory Procession through London in July, 1919, he expressed to his friend, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, his surprise at finding that a procession in celebration of the triumph of the nation's military forces should be headed by a policeman. "But, my dear Marshal," Wilson replied, "there you have the British Constitution in a nutshell—the subordination of the military power to the civil authority."

The problem of reconciling military efficiency with civilian control is the key to the story of the War Office; the existence of that problem affords the explanation of many of the essential differences which distinguish the War Office from the great civilian departments, and which cannot fail to strike any reader of the preceding volumes of this series. The civilian departments are staffed entirely by permanent Civil Servants who normally spend the whole of their career of some 40 years in the same office. A large part of the War Office, on the other hand, is staffed by military officers who vacate their appointments after four years. There is thus a constant infusion of new blood, a continuous impact of fresh minds on military problems, and a perpetual interchange between the War Office and the Army

outside. The result is an alertness and keenness and freshness of outlook which make the War Office a very live department. It used to be feared that there was friction between the civilian and the military element, and that the permanence of the former gave it a preponderating influence. Whether or not there was any foundation for that fear in the past, nothing could be less true to-day. Nowhere will you find better team work or closer co-operation than exist between all the various sections in the War Office of the present day. Everyone, soldier and civilian alike, is imbued with one common purpose, that of giving the British taxpayer the best possible Army for the money provided by Parliament in the Annual Estimates; for it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the size and the distribution of the British Army depend on questions of policy which rest with the Government of the day and for which the War Office has no responsibility.

Another point which cannot fail to strike the reader of the following pages is the enormous range and variety of the duties which the War Office is called upon to perform. Apart altogether from purely military problems, questions of health, of education, of training for civilian employment, the construction and repair of roads and buildings, the maintenance of communications, and the administration of a code of law are only some of the matters which fall within its purview.

Mr. Gordon's book, which brilliantly maintains the high standard set by its predecessors in the series, appears at an opportune moment. At a time when, as the result of a prolonged period of unilateral

disarmament, the country is compelled to overhaul its Defences, it is well that the public should be given an insight into the work of the Department of Government which controls our small Regular Army and our Territorial Forces, upon whose devotion and efficiency we depend so largely for the security of our Empire and for the maintenance of the peace of the world.

HAILSHAM

THE WAR OFFICE

*February 14th, 1935*



## AUTHOR'S NOTE

THIS book is an attempt to set forth for the general reader what the War Office exists to do, with some account of bygone times and the almost incredible omissions and errors which marked the slow process of evolution from past chaos to present order. For the benefit of those who are not well acquainted with the subtle beauties of military language, technical phrases have been used sparingly; and a table of dates has been placed at the beginning for the refreshment of that rare reader whose memory of school history is as comfortably vague as the author's own.

On matters of fact and of legal theory free use has been made of the standard works on military and constitutional history. These are mentioned in the Notes at the end, together with some modern books which deal in detail with particular subjects. To compress the history and work of the War Office within the limits of a volume of modest size is necessarily a task of selection; and the writer is conscious that gaps may be found. Any expressions of opinion are the author's own, and must not be assumed to be endorsed officially.

The author is indebted to Sir Herbert Creedy, the present Permanent Under-Secretary of State, for kind help and encouragement, and to many colleagues, military and civilian, for generous and willing assistance.

H. G.



## TABLE OF DATES

1066-1154. *The Norman Reigns.*  
1154-1399. *The Plantagenet Reigns.*  
1181. The Assize of Arms.  
1215. Magna Carta.  
1285. The Statute of Winchester.  
1327. Parliament resists “commissions of array.”  
1399-1485. *The Lancastrian and Yorkist Reigns.*  
1483. Definite creation of an Ordnance Office.  
1485-1603. *The Tudor Reigns.*

### *17th Century:*

1620-1621. Appearance of a “Council of War.”  
1628. Petition of Right presented to Charles I.  
1645. Cromwell creates the New Model Army.  
1660. The Restoration. “Guards and Garrisons” allowed to Charles II.  
1661. Sir W. Clarke appointed “Secretary-at-War.”

1688- 1689. The Revolution. The Declaration of Right. The first Mutiny Act.

1697. Peace of Ryswick ends William III's campaigns against Louis XIV.

*18th Century:*

1704. The post of "Secretary-at-War" is made political.

1707. Union of the military establishments of England and Scotland.

1713. Treaty of Utrecht ends Marlborough's campaigns in the War of the Spanish Succession.

1715 & 1745. Jacobite risings.

1748. Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ends the War of the Austrian Succession.

1756. Seven Years' War begins.

1757. Clive and the battle of Plassey.

1759. Wolfe at Quebec.

1763. Peace of Paris ends the Seven Years' War.

1775. War with the American Colonies begins.

1783. Burke's Act for Economical Reform. Secretary-at-War made responsible to Parliament.

1793. War declared by the French Republic. Office of Commander-in-Chief revived.

1794. A Secretary of State for War appointed.  
1795. The Duke of York becomes Commander-in-Chief.

*19th Century:*

1800. Military establishments of Great Britain and Ireland united.  
1801. The Secretary of State for War becomes Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.  
1815. The battle of Waterloo.  
1837. Accession of Queen Victoria. Lord Howick's commission on centralisation of offices.  
1842-1852. The Duke of Wellington Commander-in-Chief.  
1846 & 1852. Sidney Herbert Secretary-at-War.  
1854-1856. The Crimean War. A Secretary of State for War absorbs the Secretary-at-War. Abolition of the Board of Ordnance.  
1856. The Duke of Cambridge appointed General Commanding-in-Chief.  
1857. The War Department becomes the "War Office."  
1859. Revival of the Volunteer Movement.  
1864-1866. Prussian military successes against Denmark and Austria.

1868-1874. The Cardwell reforms.  
1870. The Franco-Prussian War.  
The War Office and the Horse  
Guards placed under one roof.  
Re-organisation in three divisions.  
1881. Mr. Childers's "territorial" Act.  
1882. Egyptian War and Tel-el-Kebir.  
1884-1885. The Nile campaign against the  
Mahdi.  
1889. Hartington Commission appointed.  
1899. South African War, 1899-1902.

*20th Century:*

1904. Esher Committee. Creation of the  
Army Council.  
1905-1912. Lord Haldane Secretary of State for  
War.  
1906. The War Office leaves Pall Mall.  
1907. Territorial and Reserve Forces Act.  
1914-1918. The Great War.

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*The references in the text to [C. —], [Cd. —] or [Cmd. —] are to the official numbers of Command Papers, i.e., reports or Memoranda presented to Parliament.*

THE WAR OFFICE



## Chapter I

### LARGELY CONCERNING ORIGINS

A CERTAIN mistiness confronts the author whose task is to trace the early development of a central office for Army affairs. He is tempted to ignore the periods of mist and to plunge at once into the nineteenth century where the light is clear and the records abound; or at least to start from the Restoration of King Charles II, when a standing army came into being. But he cannot escape so easily. He is well aware that the intelligent reader, however little he may remember clearly of "1066 and all that," will recollect such names as Crécy and Agincourt, will have memories of early pages of history which bristled with battles and picturesque details of warring barons and fighting kings, and may expect to be told how military affairs were conducted in those far-off days. Nor would such a demand be unreasonable: for the administration of an army, the day-to-day provision of food and forage, arms, transport, clothing and so on, must at all times be an intricate business, and the existence of some crude form of a "war office" at an early stage in our military history might not be altogether surprising.

Certainly there is no escape from the haze, admittedly very much thinner in texture, which pervades the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries:

for here is a story of past things which is essential to an understanding of the present—a story of fears and political jealousies, of unheeded chaos and recurrent panics interspersed with military successes: a patchwork of failures, neglects and triumphs through which runs, like a thread in the pattern of the centuries, the development of a theory of government which was destined to shape the modern War Office and to affect every aspect of its present-day work.

It is clear that the search must start at the beginning, braving even the mists of that earlier period when details concerning military administration are, to quote one authority, “scarce and obscure.” But it may be useful, if only by way of contrast, to glance first at existing conditions.

The War Office is the department of the Civil Government which administers the military forces of the Crown which claim the proud title “The British Army.” The head of the Army is His Majesty the King, and the management of Army affairs forms the special charge of a Secretary of State. The department of the Secretary of State for War received the general form of its present organisation thirty years ago (1904)—and thirty years of escape from reform of the War Office must be hailed as a notable breach of tradition. Appropriately to this regeneration the Department received a new environment, for its nineteenth-century home in Pall Mall and sundry other dispersed quarters had been picturesque but not highly convenient. Accordingly in December, 1906, it entered the duly imposing building whose western cupolas of white stone, perched high above

the traffic of Whitehall, look down, a trifle disparagingly no doubt, on the Georgian plainness of the historic "Horse Guards."

In this new home was centred in the Great War the vast and widespread organisation which equipped and maintained the citizen armies which followed the Regular "Expeditionary Force" across the Channel and overseas. In this building is centred to-day a peace-time task of a size and complexity which "the man in the street" may be slow to believe. One may write of the shaping of military policy, of the problems of modern organisation, of the direction of research in its military aspects—but such phrases, taken alone, mean little. The work would be described better, perhaps, as the central direction of a great business which includes in its varied and non-stop programme the recruiting and training, the equipment and housing, the maintenance and movement, and the organisation as a fighting force of a highly trained professional army of which parts are scattered across the world in widely distributed garrisons, from the West Indies to the Mediterranean, from Aden to Malaya and Hong Kong. Nor does this scattered Regular Army of about 150,000 men stand alone in its daily needs. There are also the reserves and the auxiliary forces. The Army Reserve must be regulated in size; the Supplementary Reserve must be recruited and trained; and the Territorial Army of 14 Divisions must be organised, trained and equipped with weapons, and requires its share of administrative work through the medium of County Associations. The effective strength of the three latter forces (the

Reserves and the Territorial Army) amounted in January, 1934, to 274,000 men. The total "establishment" of all the forces, exclusive of British troops in India, is, in round figures, 465,000.

The range of the task is obvious: its complexity is, perhaps, not so easily realised. Modern science with its new weapons and means of transport, its wireless signalling and its Air co-operation, has rendered organisation intricate and training a highly specialised art. Twelve schools of instruction for the fighting arms, three educational colleges for officers, twelve establishments for research and experiment, a college of science, a medical college and a host of other institutions such as hospitals, workshops, laundries and bakeries, are under the central control of the War Office. Further, its work is affected throughout by a multiplicity of civil contacts. The Department is the largest employer in the country: it is probably the largest owner of land. Its great factories are well known. So catholic are its interests that it maintains three large schools for boys, it has churches, police and prisons of its own, and it possesses a fleet—though it is but a little one. Finally, its task is necessarily increased by an elaborate system of control by Parliament. There is scarcely a single activity of the War Office which is not complicated by civil aspects, legal, financial and parliamentary.

The detailed work of administration is decentralised to a large extent: that is to say, it is carried out locally. For this purpose, and that of training, the Army is divided up between a number of separate "commands." There are six large Commands at home (Aldershot, Southern, Eastern, Western

## LARGELY CONCERNING ORIGINS 7

Northern and Scottish) and two smaller Commands, the Northern Ireland and the London districts. The garrisons abroad number thirteen, and vary in size from the Egypt "command," where approximately 10,000 troops are in charge of a General Officer Commanding, to Mauritius where a tiny garrison is commanded by a Lieut.-Colonel. The number of Regulars quoted above (roughly 150,000) does not, of course, include India; for the troops composing the British Army in India (some 60,000 of all ranks) pass into the charge of the Government of India from the time of embarkation for Indian stations to the time of their return to the "British establishment." Much work, however, falls on the War Office in connection with their recruitment and training, their transport by sea, the business of posting, and the adjustment with the Government of India of the charges due for the services so rendered. Close touch must be kept on questions of pay; and the War Office is also largely involved in matters of promotion and of discipline. (The Indian Army is quite distinct from the British Army in India. It is a force raised by the Government of India, and its native personnel is governed by Indian military law.)

The Department which forms the controlling centre of this large and growing sphere of work is governed by an Army Council, which now\* consists of eight members. At the head is the Secretary of State for War who is "responsible to His Majesty and Parliament for all the business of the Army Council." There are two other ministerial officers, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and the

\* Note 1, page 339.

Financial Secretary of the War Office. The Military Members are four in number; and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, in addition to being the eighth member, is also Secretary of the Army Council. The Secretary of State and the two other political members change normally with a change of Government: the four Military Members change periodically as the tenures of their appointments come to an end—the normal period is four years: the Permanent Under-Secretary of State is, as his title suggests, a permanent civil servant.

The Secretary of State has a general control, and all departments report to him through the medium of a member of Council. Exceptionally, there is one branch which reports to the Secretary of State direct. This is the branch of the Military Secretary to the Secretary of State, whose duties are concerned with the promotion of officers, their selection for Staff and other special work, and with the grant to officers of rewards and honours.

Perhaps some idea of the area of work may be gathered from the main headings of business allotted, under the Secretary of State, to the seven other Members of Council.

The First Military Member, whose title is Chief of the Imperial General Staff, is concerned with military policy. He is responsible for advice on the military aspect of the defence of the Empire; and consequently for the collection of military information, for the organisation and training of the forces for war, and for policy regarding the provision of officers.

The Second Military Member, the Adjutant-

General to the Forces, is principally concerned with "personnel." He is responsible for recruiting and discipline; for the peace-organisation of the forces and for administrative arrangements for their mobilisation. The supervision of the Medical Services is another important part of his functions.

The Third Military Member, the Quarter-Master-General to the Forces, is responsible for the policy of the housing of the Army; for the movement of troops and stores; and for food, animals and transport generally. His duties include the construction and maintenance of barracks, hospitals and all other buildings.

The Fourth Military Member, the Master-General of the Ordnance, is principally concerned with stores. He is responsible for the scientific development of war material of all kinds: a duty which covers research, design, experiment and manufacture. He is responsible for the provision, the storage and the repair of all stores and clothing, and for the administration of the personnel, the depots, the factories and the scientific establishments which have to be maintained for these purposes.

Of the two political members, who assist the Secretary of State to represent the Department in Parliament, the first, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, who is Vice-President of the Army Council, is charged, as his special sphere of business, with advice on all questions (other than training) affecting the Territorial Army and its administration by the County Associations, and all questions affecting Lands. The second, the Financial Secretary of the War Office, apart from being

concerned with Army Finance in its general and ministerial aspects, has as his special sphere of control the policy aspects of Army Contracts.

Finally, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, who is also the Secretary of the Army Council, forms the co-ordinating link between the Secretary of State and the office in general. He has in his charge both the secretariat and the finance branches; and his duties embrace the general control of the procedure and conduct of the business of the office, and include parliamentary and legal matters, the production of War Office publications, and control of all civilian staffs; while, in his capacity as "Accounting Officer of Army Votes, Funds and Accounts," he is responsible for the control of expenditure and for advice to the Secretary of State and to the administrative offices on all questions of Army finance.

From this rapid sketch two points may be noted which, to modern ears, are the obvious product of common sense rather than, as is actually the case, the result of long and bitter struggles. In the War Office as it exists to-day all the military functions of Army administration are concentrated in a single office: and not the military functions only. We find here an office for Army affairs which includes in its scope all the civil functions involved in maintaining national forces and in controlling military expenditure on behalf of Parliament and the public purse. In groping in the mists of the past we must look for the germ of a central office charged with the conduct of Army affairs, and for the development of the principle which is summed up in the well-worn phrase "responsibility to Parliament."

As we start hopefully with those "Middle Ages" between the Conquest and the Tudor Kings in which arms and battles loom so large, the quest does not look very promising. Some mental adjustment is needed at once to picture the military conditions of the times. Scotland was an alien enemy to be feared: England possessed no standing army. Armies were collected for the service of the King as each particular occasion demanded. They were raised by a combination of methods. The great landlords brought their own retainers; the sheriffs of counties were called upon by royal writ to produce a fixed quota of men and horses. But such service was restricted by recognised conditions either as to its duration or its place of employment, whereas a King might require a more mobile force which would fight against Scotland as long as he wished, or even serve overseas against France. Accordingly we find that from early days onwards many citizens who were called to arms lost, as it were, their amateur status by accepting hire to continue serving; while numbers, at a later date, definitely adopted the profession of arms and banded together as soldiers of fortune. Thus for anything more than a brief campaign the armies were composed mainly of "mercenaries," and of these large numbers were hired from abroad; but such foreign imports were not popular and came to be reserved for expeditions overseas.

The forces, having been duly arrayed, were controlled, under chief command of the King, by certain officers of the Royal Household—the "Marshall" and the "High Constable," whose titles dated from Norman times. The perquisites

of these officers were clearly defined, but exact information is sadly lacking as to what they did and how they did it, apart from assembling and leading the troops. Chivalry, crusades, the panoply of war, the bowmen of England, the grey-goose feather—romance and colour fill the picture and leave little room for prosaic details. The student who seeks an administrative system, who enquires precisely how campaigns were managed, how the soldiers were organised and trained (if at all), or what central arrangements were made for their maintenance, will arrive at the position of the student of philosophy who by patient perusal of all the authorities progresses to the knowledge of how little he can know.

We learn, indeed, how the forces were raised and how their initial equipment was managed. All freemen had arms of a kind immediately on “mobilisation”; for these they were bound by law to possess. The Assize of Arms of 1181 laid down that even the poorest class should have a chaplet of iron, a lance and a wambais, the last being a quilted garment. The Statute of Winchester of 1285 set forth six classes according to means: men, for example, whose annual rental was from 40 to 100 shillings were to own a bow, arrows and knife, and those who were blessed with very few chattels were at least to possess a sword or dagger. These arms were reviewed twice in the year. The limited few had coats of mail, while the rank and file wore their peasant's dress. The central figure was the mail-clad knight, but the mass of the troops were unarmoured peasantry whose chief weapons were

the bow, the spear and the bill. As to transport, carts were obtained by the Crown by the simple process of seizing such things under powers known as the right of "purveyance."

We can picture the way in which the forces were raised; but even an army of small size cannot be maintained in the field without a measure of organisation. Clothing must be renewed, arms replaced, vehicles repaired, food and forage collected, the injured disposed of, pay issued (or embezzled) and booty roughly checked and divided. As to these things we know that from early times the elementary needs of large parts of the forces were left to the zeal and financial enterprise of leaders who might be described as "contractors." The latter were usually men of position who entered into "indentures" with the King to provide detachments at so much a head; and probably the care which the forces received was little more than casual attention to a few not unreasonable demands of warriors such as arms, food and a modicum of loot. At the end of a campaign the armies were dispersed, except the King's own personal guard.

Indeed, one point emerges clearly—that up to the end of the Tudor reigns and the early decades of the seventeenth century there did not exist any forces of the Crown, other than a small royal body-guard, which called for continuous central administration. Throughout the war-filled centuries which precede the Commonwealth and the Restoration, armies are mustered and led to battle as the particular occasion demands, and are dispersed again when the fighting is over. The military functions

of the high controlling officers are only in evidence when a war is being waged. It is no matter for surprise, therefore, that administration in the larger sense of central direction or co-ordination of method remains in the region of mist and conjecture. Much as we may regret the omission, no embryo "war office" makes its appearance to bequeath more detailed information in a neat array of "registered files." No necessity existed to mother the invention.

But the search for origins does not fail entirely. The King's wardrobe included an armoury, and his wardrobe of arms was situated at the Tower of London at least as early as 1323, consisting of a stock of bows, cross-bows, battering-rams and weapons generally. Apart from arms for the hired troops, a central store for siege weapons was a thing that a King would be wise to possess; and we definitely discern in the fifteenth century, arising out of this royal establishment, the genesis of one of the great departments of modern military administration. Dating from the years 1414-18 an appointment is recorded of a "clerk of the Ordnance," who was probably a development of the earlier official with the attractive title of "*attiliator balistarum*"—the gentleman who provided the catapults. Later, in 1483, a Master was appointed for life, together with a Clerk and a Yeoman: so that here we have a board of the "Ordonnance," with quarters in the Tower of London. This board was charged on behalf of the King with the provision and issue of the kinds of equipment which would now be termed Artillery and Engineer stores; and the growing importance to the royal armies of an adequate supply of gunpowder

weapons explains, as we may safely assume, the growth in the status of the provision office. From this time onwards this Board of Ordnance succeeded in preserving an unbroken existence for four eventful centuries, maintaining throughout a sturdy independence of the rest of a host of military offices until it was merged itself, in 1855, in a newly created central administration.

Next, as the seventeenth century begins, we encounter traces of other bodies whose names are suggestive of modern developments. The first of these is the "Council for War" which appears in the State Papers of 1620-1: a standing committee appointed by King James I "whereof the Earls of Oxford, Leicester and Essex are," we read, "the most eminent persons." It was probably a committee of the King's Privy Council. The second is the office of "Secretary-at-War" to which a gentleman called Edward Walker was appointed by King Charles I in the year 1642. Here again information is not explicit: we can only say that the Secretary-at-War may originally have been secretary to the "council for war." During the long struggle between Charles and Parliament each side possessed its council of war, and each council possessed its secretary. The duties, one gathers, were hardly comfortable, consisting in a very un-modern combination of sitting as clerk to an Army committee and posting urgently round the country as private secretary to the commander in the field. But later the post of Secretary-at-War assumes a very much greater interest.

For the six years prior to the Restoration one William Clarke had acted as secretary to General

Monk (or Monck), the all-powerful commander of the Commonwealth army. At the Restoration of 1660 the latter, now the Duke of Albemarle, was appointed Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of all that was left of the Parliamentary and Royalist forces; and in January of the following year his secretary, then Sir William Clarke, received a commission as "Secretary-at-War to all the forces raised or to be raised in England and Wales." At first this post was practically personal. The secretary accompanied the Commander-in-Chief, and when the Duke—an amphibian warrior—commanded the navy against the Dutch Fleet, Clarke lost his life in a naval action in the year of the Great Fire of London. In 1670 the Duke himself died, and no Commander-in-Chief was appointed to succeed him, so that Clarke's successor as Secretary-at-War had some opportunity for increasing his duties, of which he clearly took full advantage. Admittedly his office was not a large one, for the office disbursements of Matthew Locke, "His Majesty's Secretary at Warre," from "ye 25th of March 1673 to ye 10th of December following" amounted to £14 19s.—and that in spite of a burst of activity such as to require seven "best penknives" and thirteen hundred "large Dutch quills," not to speak of four "duble bottles of inke" and six "rullers" at fourpence each. But the importance attached to the office by the King is shown by a Warrant\* of 1676 in which the following words occur:—

"And, considering that We continue to issue from Ourselves some kinds of warrants and military orders which did belong to the office of Our late General,

\* Note 2, page 340.

. . . We, being desirous to distinguish such warrants and orders from other affairs of Our Crown passing Our Signet and Sign Manual, have thought fit . . . that all such warrants and orders as formerly issued from George, duke of Albemarle, the late General, deceased, in regard to that office, and which We continue to issue from Ourself, shall pass Our Sign Manual only and shall be countersigned by the *Secretary to Our Forces* as by Our Command."

The "Secretary to Our Forces" mentioned here is, of course, the Secretary-at-War. His duties appear to have included particularly the arrangement of "reliefs" between the various garrisons, the "removal of quarters" and the provision of convoys.

Briefly, then, the Secretary-at-War, from being private secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, became an official clerk to the King, who prepared and countersigned the royal orders as to certain administrative needs of the forces. His office was not an emergency creation: it was intended to be a "standing" secretariat: and here we find the first step in the laboured growth of a War Office. But the first step does not go very far; for the "standing army" of the Restoration, though a *de facto* standing army, was not a constitutional force. Its existence as a standing army had no consent from Parliament. The forces which had been raised by Parliament for the purposes of the Civil War were disbanded at once in 1660; but under the Acts which disbanded them Charles II was enabled to keep certain troops, and from these he created an army of his own which, in spite of all the remonstrance of Parliament, he managed not merely to maintain but to increase. Built up from

“the Lord General’s Life-Guard of Horse” and Monk’s old regiment raised at Coldstream, which afterwards became the Coldstream Guards, it was certainly only a small affair; for a powerful force in the hands of a despot, whether a King or a Commonwealth, was a thing that all parties had come to dread. A force comprising “Guards and Garrisons” was all that the King was intended to possess, and no more than this was legalised until the Revolution some thirty years later.

But when as a result of that great crisis the Army became a constitutional force, the Secretary-at-War survived the upheaval. There was no great change in his status or functions: he remained, as before, responsible only to his master the King, but the King was the only Commander-in-Chief and the work was increased in scope and importance. He accompanied the King on campaigns overseas and was busy transmitting the royal orders regarding the transportation of troops, the contracts for food, clothing and horses, and the distribution of subsidies to Allies.\* At home he was responsible for the movement of troops and their quartering on the victualling houses; he drafted the “articles of War”; he prepared the forms of commissions for officers; he obtained rulings on points of precedence; he countersigned the warrants for pay, and he drew up the list of the forces required for signature by Ministers. The great change lay in the fact that his duties were concerned with forces of the Crown the existence of which had the sanction of Parliament, and with the use of funds which Parliament was

\* Note 3, page 340.

voting for the specific purpose of maintaining those forces. In the Secretary-at-War of King Charles II a sturdy plant had made its appearance in the field of Army administration: with the coming of parliamentary control the ground was prepared for its further growth. The office was soon to be changed very greatly. We advance in triumph from mists to chaos.

## Chapter II

### PARLIAMENT GIVES CONSENT

THE subject of the Royal Prerogative is one which the layman approaches with caution: it is also a subject which cannot be avoided in tracing the growth of control by Parliament in the matter of the military forces of the Crown. For the Prerogative in this connection means certain powers in relation to the Army which belong to the traditional rights of the Sovereign.

The people of England display fitfully a certain resentment of despotism. It blossoms to-day in sporadic indictments of the "New Despotism"—a real or supposed invasion of liberty by the "bureaucracy of Whitehall." The burden of the modern charge is the overriding of the people's rights as expressed in the law or the constitution. In earlier days the point in dispute was to get those rights expressed and secured by a formal recognition of the limits set to the traditional Prerogative rights of the Crown. From the earliest times the particular occasion for the outburst of resentment was often connected with military claims.

The retrospect will be very brief.

Before the Norman Conquest any freeman between the ages of 15 and 60 who was capable of bearing arms could be summoned by the King to the "host" or general levy of his county. The county force was

liable to serve only within the kingdom and, except in case of invasion, only within its own county. The feudal levy was at first quite distinct. The military service of the knights and retainers of the feudal lords was limited by custom to forty days: it was this fact that led to the forces so raised being induced by high pay to continue to serve as mercenaries. In the case of both levies the practice arose of the Crown accepting a money payment in commutation of personal service; and hence, of course, arose two kinds of taxes, the one levied on the county at large and the other on the individual citizen.

The arbitrary nature of the feudal tax was challenged as early as Magna Carta; and when, about a century later, "Commissions of Array" (as the writs from the Crown had come to be called) demanded county forces for *foreign* service, resentment once more took definite shape and Acts were passed by Parliament, beginning in 1327, to set a limit to the Crown's claims. These statutes affirmed the principle that no man should be compelled to serve out of his shire "but when necessity requireth and the sudden coming of strange enemies into the realm"; nor should it be compulsory to provide soldiers except by grant in Parliament; and further, if men should volunteer to serve the King on foreign campaigns, payment should be made by the Crown for their services. As a consequence the great French wars which spread over the next hundred years were mainly fought by "mercenary" troops.

Constitutional rights in the matter of service seem, however, to have been ignored or forgotten in the general confusion of the Wars of the Roses;

and during the following Tudor reigns the claims of the Crown were extended by Acts which assumed all sorts of arbitrary powers to be part of the Royal Prerogative. Henry VIII increased the liability to provide horses and arms in proportion to property. He also ordered the practice of archery and forbade indulgence in bowls and tennis. To venture a quiet game of quoits was to run the risk of penalties. The practice of "impressing" soldiers, which had been employed since the wars of the barons, was now an ordinary occurrence. Citizens were dragged compulsorily to arms with so fine a disregard for constitutional propriety that in the great days of Queen Elizabeth "impressment" had come to be regarded commonly as a natural, if uncomfortable, right of the Crown. "I have misused the King's press damnably," says Falstaff; and Shakespeare was voicing the experience of his time. But the days of these despotic powers were nearing their end with the coming of the Stuarts. A new era when military claims formed a prime occasion for popular resentment began in the reign of King Charles I.

One point of dispute concerned the "trained bands."

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth the writs formerly known as "Commissions of Array" had assumed a quasi-permanent form under the title of "Commissions of Musters." Selected persons in each county were formed into bands, trained at the charge of the several parishes, and mustered annually by Lieutenants of counties. These commissions for mustering the trained bands (which now began to

be called the “militia”) were employed by Charles for his own ends. The King was always in need of money, and found here a most useful means of exacting money and arms from the counties. This formed one of the many issues on which a challenge was raised to the “martyr King’s” overwhelming belief in his sovereign rights. Indeed, there was a new spirit abroad: the legality of the despotic powers so long invoked for the governing of the country began to be debated and called in question. Besides the exactions of the “Commissions of Musters” other military abuses formed grounds of attack. A second grievance related to the “pressing” of citizens to serve in the forces against their will. A third was the free use of “martial law” in time of peace for the summary punishment not only of soldiers but of “dissolute persons joining with them.” Parliament held that the commissions which were issued to officers by the Crown to impose this special military law were plainly contrary to the law of the land. A fourth ground of complaint was the billeting of soldiers. In the Petition of Right of 1628 the Commons recited that

“of late great companies of soldiers and mariners have been dispersed into divers counties of the Realm, and the inhabitants, against their wills, have been compelled to receive them into their houses, and there to suffer them to sojourn, against the laws and customs of this Realm, and to the great grievance and vexation of the people.”

The Commons prayed that the King would “be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners.”

They prayed also that the commissions of martial law might be revoked and annulled, and that "hereafter no Commissions of like nature may issue forth" . . . "lest by colour of them any of your Majesty's subjects be destroyed or put to death contrary to the laws and franchise of the land."

More significant still, in the light of events, was the later demand made of the King that the command of the forces—that is, of the militia—should be in the hands of Parliament. It is not surprising that the King refused this: it was contrary to all tradition; but it illustrates a growing fear—the awakened dread of military power when held in irresponsible hands. That fear became deeply ingrained in the people. The army which Parliament itself created for the purpose of abolishing royal despotism took matters into its own hands and became in its turn an engine of tyranny; and two hundred years hardly sufficed to wipe out the memory of that bitter experience. At the Restoration, as noted already, the army was disbanded at once. Men of all classes might well be afraid that a standing force would be used once more as an instrument of despotism. The militia was considered to be safe: indeed, steps were taken to make it so by vesting control in the Lieutenants of counties. The Crown's right of command was acknowledged, but the King was not trusted with anything more, except his "Guards and Garrisons."

Soon again, when the Court party went too far in their efforts to keep a standing force, resentment blazed out dangerously. The Chancellor, Clarendon, was impeached for that he "hath designed a standing

army to be raised." In 1672-3 two further remonstrances were made by the Commons; and a few years later the Lord Treasurer, Danby, was accused of high treason "for that he did," among other things, "design the raising of an army upon a pretence of war against the French King, and to continue the same as a standing army within this kingdom." But Charles II was tactful and wary, in contrast to his brother James. The latter showed his intentions too plainly. He planned to govern the country by means of the army, tried with his troops to overawe London and lost his throne in the foolish experiment.

We thus come once more to the Revolution, the first Mutiny Act, and the Bill of Rights.

The first Mutiny Act was passed hurriedly in April, 1689, to deal with a mutiny which broke out at Ipswich among troops who declared that James was their King and that they would "live and die by him." It was the forerunner of the complete code of discipline, now called the Army Act, which legalises the punishment of military offences by military law. Two particular points about it are interesting—first, that it was passed for a period only (actually about seven months), and, second, that it declared in its preamble that the raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, was against the law.

Similarly the Bill of Rights, which received the assent of William and Mary on 16th December, 1689, set forth the offer and acceptance of the Crown on the basis of certain constitutional principles, of which one was that the raising or keeping of a stand-

ing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against the law. Meanwhile the Commons on 5th April had resolved to agree with its Committee of Supply that the sum of £200,000 "is necessary to be allowed for the annual charge of guards and garrisons by land in time of peace." Further, for 1692 the Committee voted the number of men that should form the "establishment" of the forces at home.

Thus was established a new era. From this time forward no army could exist unless Parliament had voted supplies for its cost; and the fact was explicitly recognised by the Crown that its discipline would have no legal basis unless Parliament passed a special Act for that purpose. This remains the position to-day. The maximum numbers allowed to be kept up, the discipline necessary for the government of that army, and the expenses involved in keeping it must always be sanctioned expressly by Parliament, and are sanctioned only for twelve months at a time. To that extent the Army is a statutory force. Its numbers, its cost, and the discipline applied to it are limited and controlled by the votes of Parliament; and although, apart from these limitations, the "government, command and disposition" of the army fall within the Royal Prerogative, the annual renewal of Parliament's consent is necessary for its maintenance.

Meanwhile, as regards the Prerogative, Parliament had proceeded as follows. At the restoration of Charles II, in an Act of 1661 (13 Car. II. cap. 6), Parliament had used the following words:—

“Forasmuch as within all His Majesty’s realms and dominions the sole supreme government, command and disposition of the militia and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, is, and by the law of England ever was, the undoubted right of His Majesty . . .”

But the Parliament of the Revolution was more cautious. It did not mention the Prerogative powers, but it took certain definite steps in the matter. In one direction it extended and strengthened the powers of the Crown, since by the first Mutiny Act it legalised “Martial Law” as the means of enforcing the discipline of the Army. In restricting carefully both the scope and the duration of this new law so that it required periodic revision and re-enactment, and in other directions already noted, it rehearsed what the Crown could *not* do, and secured to itself control of the means of keeping a standing army in being. But all the old Prerogatives remained, except in so far as by these methods Parliament had imposed express limitations.

Time has not changed this age-old doctrine of the special relations of the King to the Army. Just as the work of Army administration is conditioned by the theory of Parliament’s control, so from the doctrine of Crown Prerogative flow many elements in War Office practice. The granting or withholding of a soldier’s pay lies with the King. Its issue is governed by a “Royal Warrant for the Pay, Appointment, Promotion and Non-Effective Pay of the Army.” The Army Council administer the Warrant, but any amendment must go to the King. The regulations

for the Army are the King's Regulations, and similarly require the royal approval. The commissions of officers are given by the King and bear His Majesty's signature on them. The Crown, equipped with the Army Act—the code developed from the Mutiny Acts—is the source of the Army's discipline: courts-martial can only be convened by the King or by officers holding special powers directly conferred by the King for that purpose; and the findings and sentences of certain courts-martial are reserved for His Majesty's personal approval. An officer can appeal, if he thinks himself wronged, from the Army Council to the King himself.

What time has changed are the methods by which certain Prerogative powers are exercised. One effect of reforms of Army government has been to transfer the exercise of those powers from representatives of the Crown not responsible to Parliament to ministers who are responsible to Parliament, and so to secure parliamentary approval for the way in which those powers are used.

\* \* \* \*

In this connection a point has been raised which may be of interest to some readers. Under the Bill of Rights, as stated above, the keeping of a standing army requires the prior consent of Parliament, which has to be renewed each year; but if a reader should enquire by what instrument Parliament proceeds to renew that consent, the question would not be simple to answer. The new year with which Parliament deals begins on April 1st as regards money and on April 30th as regards the Army Act, and if it be argued that the consent required is the

consent of both the Houses of Parliament given before the beginning of the year, the only instrument which fulfils these conditions is the Army and Air Force Annual Act. But does that Act legalise the existence of the Army? It is the Act which brings into force for the ensuing year the complete code of military law well known as the Army Act. It is true that it contains a preamble which repeats the provision of the Bill of Rights concerning the keeping of a standing Army, and alludes to the numbers required for the Army; but a critic could argue that a mere preamble, not being one of the sections of the Act, cannot make those numbers law. The subject is somewhat painfully technical and further details are reserved for a note.\* It is also purely academic, and may well be left to the mercy of jurists, for "consent," if not given by any one instrument, is certainly given by the series of instruments by which numbers and money are voted for the Army and its discipline is legalised.

The main point is clear enough—that Parliament's control of the size of the Army, of its discipline, and of its very existence is a basic principle of the Constitution. Nor are the Resolutions and Acts which deal with numbers, money and discipline the only weapons which Parliament possesses. Since the days of the Revolution its powers of control have been greatly elaborated in ways which future chapters will show.

\* \* \* \*

Another development of the seventeenth century provides a lighter theme.

\* Note 4, page 340.

The second half of that century saw the beginning of many names that are still familiar, or even famous, in modern London. Immediately after the Restoration fashion reached out to Piccadilly. The “drie ditche banks about Pickadilla” of Gerarde’s *Herbal* (1633) gave place to a crop of streets and mansions. At the north end of St. James’s Street the King’s Lord Chancellor built a house which on Clarendon’s death was called “Albemarle House”—for the purchaser was Monk’s son. Its remains were bought—it was soon pulled down—by one Sir Thomas Bond of Peckham, and new streets came into being, Bond Street and Albemarle Street. Nearby a mansion, whose later name was “Devonshire House,” was built for the Lord Berkeley of Stratton whose wife made the streets which bear those names. Further east rose Burlington House. The church of St. James in Piccadilly designed by Wren (except its steeple—the substitute can still be seen) was built on the grounds of Harry Jermyn, who presented the site to Charles II and gave his name to Jermyn Street. But among the many familiar titles first heard in this era of new creation, our particular theme is the name “The Horse Guards.”

The ground now known as “The Horse Guards Parade” was part of a space then called the Tiltyard. In Tudor times it was a real tilt-yard, where the Court could step from the Palace of Whitehall to applaud the exploits of nobles and gentry in various contests of skill-at-arms. Long years before the Restoration all such jousting had ceased to be held; and here was a space where the King’s guard could

be housed conveniently near to the Palace. Quarters were required for the mounted troops which Charles II had been allowed to keep, and barracks and stables were built in the Tiltyard, henceforth to be known as "The Horse Guards, Whitehall." It was here, before the end of the century, that the Secretary-at-War had his modest office.

"The Horse Guards, Whitehall" of those days was not, of course, the present building. After a hundred years of use the old buildings were pulled down and their place was taken by William Kent's unpretentious but pleasing edifice. For long "The Horse Guards" was the War Office, or at least was so regarded by all. At a later stage the name was used to refer to the office of the Commander-in-Chief as opposed to the civil control of the Army. The Horse Guards building is now the headquarters of the Eastern Command, and also of the London District; but its greater claims to modern renown reside in the splendour of its mounted sentries and the ceremony known as "Trooping the Colour."

### Chapter III

## FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CRIMEA (1689 TO 1854)

A CERTAIN letter received at the present-day War Office was addressed as follows:—

“The Secretary,  
or any of the Admirals,  
Ware Office, Pall Mall.”

It would seem that even under modern conditions the writer was a prey to uneasy doubts as to which particular group of His Majesty’s officers would deal with a matter concerning soldiers. In the year 1734, or again in the year 1834, such doubts would have been amply justified, for the multiplication of Army authorities was certainly the most striking feature of the machinery for administering the business of the forces during the century and a half which followed the Revolution.

Thus, in the year 1815, at the close of the Napoleonic wars, there were no less than thirteen distinct offices concerned with some aspect of Army administration, not to mention a special department of the Treasury or the functions of the Home Office touching the Militia. Even in March, 1854, at the outbreak of the Crimean War, there still remained six important authorities each of which

claimed independent powers. Two sturdy growths in this generous crop were the Board of Ordnance and the Secretary-at-War, whose first appearance has been mentioned already. Of the rest some sprang up only to die; while two were destined, as the story will show, to absorb between them the whole of the field.

The span of a hundred and sixty-five years which separates the Revolution from the Crimean War was a period of great names. The figures of Marlborough, Walpole and Pitt, Clive and Wolfe and Wellington, are seen in a pageant of stirring events. William III's successful campaigns, Marlborough's famous victories, the suppression of the Jacobite risings at home, the building up of the Indian Empire, the wresting of Canada from French domination, Wellington's achievements in the Peninsular War, the final defeat of Napoleon's power—these are but some of the scenes that we witness. Military successes fill the story of Britain's rise to a great supremacy. We might expect, therefore, to find large advances in the administration of Army affairs. We might hope to find vastly improved conditions, not only planned for the sake of efficiency but designed also by a grateful nation for the betterment of the soldier's lot. But the efficiency which produced the long tale of successes was efficiency of command and courage: it was not the result of alert preparation. The long list of departments with Army interests was not the product of interest in the Army. The plain truth is that between the wars the needs of the Army were openly and deliberately neglected.

A prime cause of this state of affairs lay plainly

in the old fear. The country, not without reason perhaps, remained in dread of a standing Army. If trouble seemed imminent Parliament would vote an increase of numbers: when the trouble was over Parliament was prompt to reduce them again. No sooner had peace been signed with France at the close of William III's campaigns than a flood of pamphlets demanded reductions. We note that the author of *Robinson Crusoe* joined in the fray with the opposite view in an "Argument showing that a Standing Army, with consent of Parliament, is not Inconsistent with a Free Government." But the Army was reduced in spite of Defoe, and had to be increased again three years later on the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. At the Treaty of Utrecht which ended that war, the numbers were promptly reduced to a minimum. Dean Swift wrote that a standing Army was one of the "Public Absurdities." During Walpole's "reign of peace" the old cry was raised constantly. The Treaty of 1748 which closed the War of the Austrian Succession, the Peace of 1763 which terminated the Seven Years' War, and the Treaty of 1783 which ended the struggle with the American colonies, were followed in turn by hasty reductions. An outcry against the building of barracks was a frequent symptom of the general temper. The fortifying of ports was opposed on the ground of danger to liberty. In 1814, when Napoleon abdicated, our armies were reduced with premature speed, and when peace came after Waterloo the same old arguments were heard. When the formation of a club for officers was mooted in the year 1816, the Prime Minister regarded the measure as

“most ill-advised”: he feared the effects of such an establishment on “the general feelings of Englishmen respecting military interference.”

Throughout this era Parliament, garbed in a well-worn Liberty dress, appears as the villain of the Army piece. Dislike of the Army was openly fostered. One reason, of course, was that Whig policy was definitely commercial and therefore pacific. Another was the fact that in the eighteenth century the patronage of the Army was used freely as a pawn in the political game. Promotions were given for political support, and many instances can be quoted where officers were actually deprived of commissions on account of their political “colour.”

It is clear that the existence of the Army in peace and its power for interference in civil affairs were regarded askance by Parliament. On each and every recurrence of peace Army affairs were thrust into the background, and the old cry was raised once more, reinforced by a real and growing need for the pursuit of economy in public expenditure. There is a modern ring about some of the arguments: Great Britain does not require an Army; Great Britain’s interest is trade; no need to be entangled in military commitments. The armies took the field ill equipped and ill trained. When France, in the throes of her great revolution, declared war on England in 1793, the British Army was, to say the least, short of ammunition, lacking in medicines and medical appliances, and most inadequately furnished with transport. A shocking waste of blood and treasure was involved in the improvisation of forces to meet each crisis as it arose,

but the waste did not carry sufficient weight with those who feared a large permanent force to result in really effective reforms. Critics may point to a lack of vision: we are here concerned only with the fact of neglect and the striking dispersal of powers and duties which produced a quite unworkable system, or lack of system, of administration.

We have mentioned the crop of separate authorities all of which dealt with military affairs. At the beginning of the period, in 1703, the list included, besides the Secretary-at-War, at least the following departments: The Board of Ordnance provided stores; the Commissariat provided provisions and fuel; two Paymasters-General disbursed pay; an Apothecary provided drugs; and a little later there was a Board of General Officers whose approval was required for clothing contracts. There was also a Commissary-General of Musters; and two Controllers of Army Accounts to watch expenditure on behalf of the Treasury. Finally, and above all these, a responsibility for Army affairs lay upon one of the Secretaries of State. In the course of the era under review this list grew longer and then was reduced. Afterwards, as a result of the extensive reforms which followed on the Crimean crisis, two great departments only survived. Our chief concern is with the survivors; but the story of the earlier stages is pertinent to the main subject, for the organisation of the modern War Office can only be seen in true perspective in the light of the conditions that hindered its coming. It is a story, to use an official meiosis, not wholly devoid of confusing features, and the first confusion to be cleared up is that between the Secretary-at-War

and the Secretary of State who was responsible for the conduct of war as one of his ministerial functions.

The high office of "Secretary of State" makes its first appearance in English history in the reign of King Henry VIII. It developed from the post of "Secretarius" or confidential clerk to the Plantagenet Kings.\* This secretary, the Keeper of the King's Great Seal, became a high office at an early date: next, a private seal was invented and the Keeper of the Privy Seal grew into an important officer of State: and finally, a third seal, or "signet," came to be employed for the King's private use, and the post of Secretarius, as keeper of the signet, became in its turn a definite office. In the fifteenth century the holder of this post was known officially as "the King's Secretary"; but it was left to Henry VIII's ministers to raise the appointment to the great importance which attaches to the title of "Secretary of State." In James I's reign the practice began of dividing the office between two Secretaries; and in 1640 foreign business was formally separated into two spheres, each Secretary of State taking charge of relations with a distinct group of the powers of Europe, and domestic affairs falling to one of them. William III found it very annoying that the division of spheres of his Secretaries of State was made on such a basis so inconvenient: thus a war against France might concern one minister while responsibility for the forces in England might rest (as part of domestic affairs) on the shoulders of the other Secretary of State. William insisted on his *Secretary-at-War* accompanying him when he went on cam-

\* Note 5, page 341.

paigns, and treated him as a Secretary of State, to the chagrin of his ministers proper.

Thus at the dawn of the eighteenth century there did not exist a Secretary of State with military affairs as his sole province, and this led to a change of status and an increase of power for the Secretary-at-War.

Under Queen Anne and the first Georges the King's ministers were busily engaged in gathering into their own hands as many as possible of the powers of government, and here, in the Secretary-at-War, was an office through which were exercised the Royal Prerogatives of the command, government and disposition of the Army. Accordingly in 1704 the office is made a political post—a stepping-stone for rising politicians. The Secretary-at-War, from being clerk to the King as Commander-in-Chief, becomes an instrument of political power. The post possessed peculiar facilities for the exercise of political patronage, and the tiny office of the Secretary-at-War (which in 1720 possessed 9 clerks) was allowed to control, as adviser to the Crown, all matters bearing on Army finance, the relations of the Army to the civil community, and indeed its government generally. "Our armies here," said the Duke of Argyll in 1718, "know no other power but that of the Secretary-at-War, who directs all their motions and fills up all vacancies without opposition and without appeal." There was even a "Secretary-at-War's leave" which was granted to officers without reference to any military authority whatever.

This powerful civilian official spoke for military affairs in the Commons, but was *not* responsible to

Parliament. He was bound, said Pulteney who held the office in 1717, to carry out the orders of the Crown, but was *not* bound to account to Parliament. The holder of the post in 1779 informed the House that he could not be expected, not being a minister, "to have a competent knowledge of the destination of the army, and how the war was to be carried on." His position was convenient to the King. The Secretaries of State were responsible to Parliament, and the Crown, as Sir William Anson\* points out, was not anxious to see the military Prerogatives brought under the supervision of Parliament. Besides, the Secretaries of State in whose provinces "war" fell were full of their wider responsibilities, and as far as Army administration was concerned were content to remain very much in the background, while the Secretary-at-War did the necessary work and handled the patronage on behalf of the Crown. Meanwhile in the eyes of Parliament also the position possibly had certain advantages; for the House of Commons may well have felt that a Secretary-at-War who was accountable to Parliament would lend colour to the horrid idea of a standing Army as a permanent evil. So the Secretary-at-War waxed strong in the land.

But as military expenditure grew apace, Parliament's desire to control it increased; and by Burke's Act for Economical Reform (1782-3) changes were made which vitally affected the position and the functions of the Secretary-at-War. The payment of the troops and the expenditure on recruiting, which had hitherto remained in the hands of the regiments,

\* Note 6, page 341.

was placed in the charge of the Secretary-at-War, and that official was made responsible to Parliament, and specifically responsible for the spending of Supply. He was there to control the expenditure of the Army in the interests of the public purse, not merely to announce what numbers were required. He was there to see that the money which Parliament had voted was used only for the purposes which Parliament intended, not merely to see that the agents of the Crown did not encroach too far on the civil law. He became a minister for Army affairs, and he stood and acted still more than before as a *de facto* Secretary of State.

Then, with the coming of the French revolution and the declaration of war between England and France, another important change was made. In the year 1793 the office of Commander-in-Chief was revived.

Since the death of Albemarle in 1670 no Commander-in-Chief had been appointed except for the duration of temporary emergencies. The King had retained the command himself. The establishment of the permanent post meant that the King gave up personal command, and in matters relating to the internal discipline and regulation of the Army the royal pleasure would now be communicated by the holder of the office of Commander-in-Chief, and not, as before, by the Secretary-at-War. (The actual title of the appointment varied—"Field-Marshal on the Staff," for instance—but the position was that of Commander-in-Chief.) A further change in the following year, the appointment of a Secretary of State for War, is important as a historical fact rather

than for any results in practice. From the constitutional aspect it marks a stage; because now for the first time, as Anson points out, the general policy of the government of the Army was placed in the hands of a definite person who not only was responsible to Parliament but also held office of the highest rank. He was charged with the control of military policy, the strength of the forces to be maintained, and the general conduct of operations; while the Secretary-at-War remained independent, and shared with the office of Commander-in-Chief the duty of providing the forces required.

Unfortunately, however, in the making of this change, the relative powers of the three appointments were nowhere defined with any precision, and the powers of the Secretary of State for War were left as a vague and partial control, with the result that the ground was now left open for a long and paralysing struggle between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary-at-War.

The Commander-in-Chief was quick to claim that the entire control of military administration rested with himself as the King's representative. The Secretary-at-War, as Parliament's man, responsible for Army finance and the civil aspect of Army government, claimed the duty of issuing orders and regulations which the Commander-in-Chief was bound to obey. The Duke of York, famous in song for marching men up to the top of the hill and forthwith marching them down again, was Commander-in-Chief during this period (1795-1809) and entrenched himself in a strong position. He created a headquarters staff, and insisted on the observance

by all officers of proper channels of communication. Gone were the days when a place-hunting officer could bring pressure to bear on the Secretary-at-War through influential friends in the House. All promotions and all questions of discipline were now in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. He claimed control of finance as well, but naturally without success. This royal officer is ranked by Fortescue as a fine type of Commander-in-Chief.

In 1811 the quarrel waxed strong, though at this date the Duke himself had resigned as a result of a notorious and unhappy scandal in the matter of Mary Ann Clarke, a lady who surpassed her previous efforts in the matter of bribery and corruption by obtaining for her own footman a commission as a lieutenant-colonel. The relative position of the two offices gave rise to a stiff and prolonged discussion, and Palmerston, then the Secretary-at-War, penned an exhaustive memorandum on the subject which the curious may read in Clode.\* It was settled temporarily in May 1812, by a warrant signed by the Prince Regent, of which a copy was given to each of the disputants. The financial control of "the War Office" was upheld, but the Secretary-at-War received instructions that he must not issue any new order until it had been shown to the Commander-in-Chief: if the latter objected, the matter was to be settled by one or all of three officials—the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer or "the Secretary of State for the Colonies." The last-named, be it noted, is the same person as the Secretary of State for War, whose concern with the details

\* Note 7, page 341.

of Army management had receded still further into the background when, in 1801, he was given the charge of the Colonies as well. So, for the time, the matter rested.

Meanwhile the tide of war dragged on. British troops fought in the West Indies, in India, Egypt, the Cape and America as well as on the continent of Europe; Wellington won renown in the Peninsula; Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo; and at the end of these heroic efforts the offices concerned with Army affairs had attained the grand total of fifteen. These offices were independent, and approached each other by formal letter. "The gentlemen of the War Department," in the biting phrase of a modern historian, "led an administrative life of exquisite confusion."

The system was hopelessly inefficient; but the fact that nothing was done to remedy it when the French peril was finally averted is hardly a matter to cause surprise. The country was exhausted and sick of war; the state of trade was deplorable; the condition of agriculture was grave; statesmen were absorbed in more urgent affairs than thinking of hypothetical wars that were surely a very long distance ahead. But the disconnection of Army offices did eventually come very much to the fore. In 1833 a Commission was appointed to consider the possibility of consolidation, and four years later its proposals were endorsed by a second Commission under Lord Howick which included five members of Cabinet rank.

These Commissioners were fully alive to the unfortunate results of "absence of connection." With

a system of authorities "mutually independent and only connected together by their common subordination to the supreme authority of the Government" the Commissioners said that they were much deceived if the practical results were not to be traced in "conflicts of opinion, diversities of system, and delays exceedingly injurious to the public service"; while they ventured to think that there had been "some unnecessary expense of establishment, and a good deal of multiplication of correspondence, and of needless formalities in the transaction of business." They deplored the dualism inherent in the positions of the Secretary-at-War and the Commander-in-Chief, and recommended that the former should be a Cabinet Minister responsible to Parliament for the efficiency of the Army. He, they proposed, should be the Minister "by whom the advice of the Cabinet as to the amount of the military establishments should be laid before the King, and the person to communicate on all points with the Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Administration." They further explained that the *Secretary of State* was necessarily far too busy with the Colonies to give due attention to the efficiency and economy of the system of conducting military affairs, and that since it was the established practice to exclude the Commander-in-Chief officially from the Cabinet, the proper person to whom "should be committed the important duty of watching over the whole military administration of the country" appeared to them to be the Secretary-at-War.

This bold report then went on to propose that the Secretary-at-War in his new status should be

given control over the provision of stores at present carried out by the Board of Ordnance, and likewise over the furnishing of supplies at present managed by the Commissariat.

Despite the status of the Con. commissioners, however, these recommendations were not carried out. Sir Henry Hardinge, who later became Commander-in-Chief, and the Duke of Wellington who also gave evidence, were both anxious to protect the Army from what they considered to be a dangerous move. The Secretary-at-War was supreme in finance, but they feared the encroachment on the Royal Prerogative if the powers of the Commander-in-Chief were diminished in respect of command and discipline. It was unsound, in their view, that patronage and discipline, recently delivered from political influence, should pass to the control of a Cabinet Minister with the power of the House of Commons behind him. The proposals for the consolidation of offices were opposed by the Duke on similar grounds. The Secretary-at-War would become too powerful: the Commander-in-Chief would be a mere instrument helpless in the hands of this "new Leviathan." In fine, these measures, the Duke concluded, would "transfer the effective command of the Army from the King to the House of Commons," and he added in a letter addressed to Lord Melbourne: "It has hitherto been understood that, the Army once voted, Parliament ought not to interfere with its arrangements."

So the dualism remained unsolved, and the disconnection of departments continued. There seemed to be no prospect of progress until a new crisis should

compel a change. On the question of control the young Queen Victoria was imbued with the fear of civil interference: in the general question of the efficiency of the Army the Prince Consort was much interested: Wellington, now Commander-in-Chief, expressed grave concern about the defence of the country: while Parliament was busy with other affairs, and the Radical Party poured scorn on the Duke. As a matter of fact the whole military system was in a truly parlous condition. Ever since the Napoleonic wars the Army had been cut down to the lowest point compatible with keeping the garrisons abroad—some thirty thousand men in India and between thirty and forty thousand in the colonies; the Militia had been disembodied instantly, and no reserves existed at all.

However, in 1852 the disturbed state of foreign affairs led to at least one step being taken. A Bill was passed to re-establish the Militia, and a large part of the control of that force which previously had been the charge of the Home Secretary was transferred to the Secretary-at-War.

In September of that year Wellington died, and Lord Hardinge, the new Commander-in-Chief, found a keen and able Secretary-at-War in the person of Mr. Sidney Herbert. Moreover the Queen was pressing her ministers to consider the position of the national defences, and there was just time before the storm broke for certain reforms to be taken in hand. The field guns in the possession of the British Army had been found to number less than seventy, and those were of the kind used at Waterloo. Hardinge had taken this matter up,

and now, with Herbert's energetic assistance, a camp was established at Chobham Common where training was given to Artillery drivers. At the same time the old smooth-bore musket popularly known as "Brown Bess" was in process of being superseded—not a premature step if the tales be true, for its accuracy was such that a critic undertook to sit in a chair (so the story goes) and be fired at for the whole day at a distance of a hundred yards, provided that the musket was aimed at him carefully. The French had adopted the Minié rifle, and experiments at Enfield were now pushed on for re-arming the infantry with a rifled musket. We are told that the death of Wellington had removed an obstacle in the way of reforms, but the fact should be added that the great Duke, when a very old man, had approved the idea of the new rifle—a fact which is notable in the light of his view that it was absurd to suppose that armies could fight at so great a distance as 500 yards.

Unfortunately the departmental machine had not received a like attention. The general lines of Army administration were the same as existed at the time of Waterloo when on March 28th, 1854, the country was faced with the Crimean War.

## Chapter IV

### THE TIDE OF REFORM (1854 TO 1904)

THE appointment of committees is an art in itself, and at times requires a delicate touch. On a famous occasion in the present century a letter was drafted to "My dear . . . ." inviting that very distinguished peer to take the chair of a War Office committee which was about to be set up by the Secretary of State. The letter, a personal invitation, stressed his lordship's peculiar fitness to assist the Department in this way; but a private (and non-official) secretary despatched the invitation to an eminent divine who bore the same name as the eminent peer. The eminent divine accepted with pleasure, and it seemed for the moment that the situation could only be decently met by the setting up of two committees to investigate the same subject. However, the delicate touch prevailed, and the chair was left clear for the eminent peer.

The student of post-Crimean days encounters a tide of committees so strong that it carries right up to the high-water mark of the Esher Committee of 1904. It is difficult to mention an important aspect of Army administration which was not thus formally and hopefully reviewed in those fifty years of persistent sitting. The list of committees and Royal Commissions reaches the formidable total of 567. Addressing the Lords in 1867 the Earl of Longford

drew attention to the fact that 17 Royal Commissions and 18 Select Committees, besides 19 committees of officers within the War Office and 35 committees of military officers, had considered points of military policy in the twelve years that had just passed. We shall here touch only on the main changes which were actually made in the half century.

The Crimean campaign shed a glaring light on the many defects of the existing system. Their effects were seen at the seat of war in the condition of the troops, the lack of trained staff, the shortage of reserves, and distressing deficiencies in transport arrangements, supplies and medicines. Similarly at home, with so many authorities who were almost independent, each claiming a province of ill-defined limits, the conduct of any important affair was inevitably attended with delay and confusion. The war showed up the fatal results of long disputes on trifling points, of competition in the same market, and the absence of any one central authority having power to impose a final decision. Such a machine was doomed to failure. Sidney Herbert, whose support of Miss Florence Nightingale should alone entitle his name to respect, summed up the results in a few words. "We had," he said, "to create an army and to use it at the same time."

The position deserves to be recapitulated. The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was responsible for the size of the force to be maintained, and for controlling operations in time of war. At this time his function as Minister for War had been so far forgotten in the public mind that he was

spoken of always as the Secretary for the Colonies. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the discipline of the Cavalry and the Infantry, and, as representative of the Sovereign, he held the command of the Army at home. He had no control over the supply of their arms or of any stores or fortifications, nor could he order the movement of troops without the previous sanction of the Secretary-at-War. Over troops abroad he possessed no control. The Secretary-at-War was responsible to Parliament for everything relating to the finance of the Army and the contact of the Army with the civil population. With respect to the Cavalry, the Infantry and the Staff he fixed the rates of pay and allowances, and dealt with all questions of half-pay and pensions. He in turn, like the Commander-in-Chief, had no control over the Artillery and the Engineers, nor any concern with the provision of material. The Board of Ordnance provided all arms and stores except the clothing of the Cavalry and the Infantry, and was responsible also for barracks and fortifications. Its head, the Master-General of the Ordnance, had charge of the discipline and the pay and allowances of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers. Provisions were the business of an off-shoot of the Treasury known as the Commissariat Department. For general military questions relating to Great Britain the Home Secretary was still responsible. The inspection of clothing for the Cavalry and the Infantry was the function of a Board of General Officers. Finally, the provision of medical stores remained in the hands of a Medical Department responsible financially to the Secretary-at-War and

in matters of discipline to the Commander-in-Chief.

Then came the shock of the Crimean War, and the changes made were swift and sweeping. In June, 1854, three months after the outbreak of hostilities, a Secretary of State for War was appointed, thus breaking up the unwieldy arrangement dating from 1801 under which the business of War and the Colonies had fallen to the same Secretary of State. In December the Commissariat office was transferred from the Treasury to the War Department. In February, 1855, Lord Panmure was appointed Secretary-at-War as well as Secretary of State for War, thus amalgamating the two offices. In March the general control of the Militia was removed at last from the care of the Home Office. Next followed the abolition of the Board of Ordnance, that ancient body whose independence had lasted some four hundred years. Its military functions of administration were now transferred to the Commander-in-Chief and its civil duties to the Secretary of State. The Board of General Officers for the inspection of clothing, and the Army and Ordnance Medical Department, soon found themselves absorbed in turn; and lastly, in 1856, to facilitate the audit of military expenditure, it was decided that the main part of that duty should be carried out in the War Department under auditors responsible to the Secretary of State.

In consequence of these amalgamations the clerical staffs of the various branches were merged in a single list for promotion in the new consolidated War Department; and this, in 1857, assumes the title of "the War Office"—a name which indeed had

been used before, but in reference principally to the Secretary-at-War. Finally, in 1858, the year which saw the end of the Indian Mutiny, the new department was housed in Pall Mall. It discharged all the civil administrative functions, and consisted of thirteen branches as follows: Central, Fortifications, Stores and Clothing, Contracts, Commissariat, Solicitor's, Ordnance Services, Artillery, Accounts, Audit, Chaplain-General's, Medical, and Purveyors. The military functions of command and discipline remained in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, and included now the command and discipline of the Artillery and the Engineers, hitherto the concern of the Board of Ordnance. Thus only one Army department was left which possessed a control distinct from the sphere of the civil department in Pall Mall. The Horse Guards possessed the military control; but the Secretary of State was responsible to Parliament for the way in which that control was exercised. The historic office of Secretary-at-War was formally abolished by Act of Parliament in May, 1863.

At first sight it is not obvious why the new arrangements should have failed to succeed. The "absence of connection" seemed to have vanished. The excuse for the "old-fashioned departmentalism"—the phrase is Lord Panmure's—appeared to be gone. Similarly, from the constitutional aspect, there was now a Cabinet Minister with the War Department as his sole concern, and the point seemed to be fully recognised that in all matters relating to the Army the Secretary of State was the supreme authority. But theory is one thing and practice another, and the War Office of 1857 stood on the

brink of a weary struggle between military and ministerial control which lasted for nearly forty years.

To effect changes as sweeping as these in the anxious days of the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny was in itself a remarkable achievement; but the very speed with which they were made was a cause of some of the difficulties which followed. There were defects of organisation. The Department had been thrown together with too little regard to the principles on which the organisation should work. The Secretary of State was overwhelmed with work, swamped with papers from the several departments requiring decisions on minor points. There were no great administrative officers to stand between the Minister and the sub-departments and relieve him of all but important questions. It was impossible without neglecting policy to see that the branches worked with efficiency. Florence Nightingale, writing to Sidney Herbert, described the department in 1859 as

“a very slow office, an enormously expensive office, a not very efficient office, and one in which the minister’s intentions can be entirely negatived by all his sub-departments, and those of each of the sub-departments by every other.”

Apart from this, a great source of trouble lay in the position of the Commander-in-Chief. A supplementary patent of office had been issued in 1855 to the new Secretary of State for War in which a special reservation was made. “Subject to the responsibility of the Secretary of State,” the command, discipline and military appointments were reserved to the

General Commanding-in-Chief. This reservation did nothing at all to clarify the position of the two officers, while it certainly did not improve relations. Its constitutional effect, we may note in passing, was considered later by a Select Committee, who concluded that the patent was unnecessary and inoperative; and in fact, in 1861, the Queen signed a memorandum, drawn up by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, in which the position was better defined. In this document the Commander-in-Chief was assigned his powers "subject to our general control over the government of the Army, and the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of Our Royal Prerogative"; but Sir George Cornewall Lewis, then Secretary of State, made no use at all of this royal declaration, which was only discovered among his private papers when he died in 1868.

Meanwhile, in practice, there was dual control, and the Horse Guards party was strong and numerous. No doubt the view was held widely that all that is implied in the word "patronage," all honours and rewards of a military kind, should be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief rather than in the hands of a member of Parliament; and the embarrassment of the position was much accentuated by another circumstance—a circumstance so difficult that statesmen shirked the real solution.

At the close of the Crimean War Lord Hardinge had been succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by the Queen's first cousin, the Duke of Cambridge. The Duke, who had commanded a division in the Crimea, took a strong personal interest in the Army and had written memoranda on Army

administration. His ideas were extremely conservative. A man "to whom a new idea was perdition" is a critic's phrase which is unkind but in some respects is not exaggerated. Remembering his intense loyalty to the Crown and his devotion to the Army as an institution, we may perhaps appreciate the depth of dismay and the honest distrust engendered in the Duke by political schemes of Army reform. More particularly he detested any step which seemed to infringe his own position as representative of the Sovereign's powers. By intention he was the Army's best friend: he worked hard hand in hand with Sidney Herbert, when the latter was Secretary of State for War (1859-61), with a view to improving the soldier's lot: but he treated the War Office with polite disdain as an inconvenient civil rival, and whenever it suited his own convenience, he submitted questions direct to the Queen. On the subject of parliamentary control his views hardened as the years went by.

On this last point, to make matters more difficult, the Duke possessed, in full measure, the sympathy of his royal cousin. The Queen, deeply sensible of her duty to her Empire, proud of her Army and anxious for its welfare, was jealous of any political tendency to curtail or endanger the Prerogative powers. Finally, the situation was by no means improved by the fact that the Commander-in-Chief's office was housed at the Horse Guards and not in Pall Mall. Apart from its practical inconvenience, this separation did much to foster an unfortunate feeling of antagonism between the "military" and the "civil" departments.

Meanwhile, as the tide of committees shows, the new centralised office was doing its best, and Parliament was extremely watchful. Parliament had exchanged new panics for old. It no longer dreaded a standing Army: it feared lest the country should be caught unprepared and was scared of the cost of making it safe. Lord Palmerston had used most striking words. He had said\* in 1857:—

“ . . . our army must be more than a domestic police. We have colonies to strengthen, possessions to maintain; and you must bear in mind that peace, however long it may continue, is not merely dependent on ourselves, but on the conduct of other Powers, and you must look forward to having a force sufficient at least to protect you in the outset from insult or attack. Depend upon it, for a country great and rich to leave itself without the means of defence is not a method to preserve peace in the long run.”

However, no Government would face the expense of any far-reaching reforms of the system; and while in the labyrinths of Pall Mall and the Horse Guards well-meaning but uninspired staffs slowly penned their formal drafts and watched the shadows cast by their lamps, other eyes were watching a new shadow, growing, spreading, formidable—the shadow of Prussian military might.

But while the collapse of French military power before the new Germany's swift-moving armies was startling the whole of Europe, a great figure had made his appearance in the chequered history of

\* Note 8, page 341.

Army administration. England had found a great Secretary for War in the clear-sighted and resolute person of the Rt. Hon. Edward Cardwell. Appointed by Gladstone as Secretary of State in December 1868, this remarkable statesman achieved reforms in the space of five years the importance of which can hardly be overstated. He had made a study of the military problem before he accepted the seals of office, and had stipulated that Lord Northbrook should be appointed his Under-Secretary of State. The latter's committee on War Office methods dwelt on the existing division of control, and made a series of important recommendations aimed at the closer co-ordination of the military and the civil administration of the Army. One of these was that the Commander-in-Chief should be housed in the same building as the Secretary of State. The Duke of Cambridge showed strong opposition: it would place him, he said, "in a position of subordination" and would be "most injurious to the interests of the Crown"; and the Queen considered, in writing to Cardwell, that "such a step could not fail to damage the position of the Commander-in-Chief." However, Cardwell put a stop at once to all correspondence by formal epistle between Pall Mall and the Horse Guards office, and the number of letters received by the department was reduced in one year by 30,000. Cardwell had said when he took office:—

"I contend for the principle of plenary responsibility to Parliament on the part of the Parliamentary head of the Department; and, consequently, for the absence of all reservations expressed or implied from the authority of that officer."

Accordingly, in 1870, adopting the lead of the Northbrook Committee, he secured the passage of the War Office Act (33-4 Vict. c. 17), and by an Order in Council of June 4th the position of the Secretary of State for War as administering "the Royal Authority and Prerogative in respect of the Army" was made quite explicit.

The formal declaration that the Commander-in-Chief was a subordinate of the Minister for War was, of course, a blow to the Duke of Cambridge. The Duke was given rooms at the War Office, and soothed, we may hope, his injured feelings by addressing his letters from "*The Horse Guards, Pall Mall.*"

The effects of the Act were briefly as follows: Under the control of the Secretary of State the work of Army administration was divided between three great officers: (1) the Officer Commanding-in-Chief, (2) the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, and (3) the Financial Secretary. The position of the Commander-in-Chief was that of principal military adviser. He had charge of the raising, training and discipline of the combatant personnel of all regular and auxiliary forces; and his sphere was enlarged by placing under him, in addition to the auxiliary forces, the department for Military Education, and the recently created Topographical branch which later became the Intelligence Department. The Surveyor-General was given the control of all the civil administrative duties, such as transport, supply, clothing and munitions, with entire responsibility for the purchase, construction and charge of material. He was head of a so-called Control Department. The third chief, the Financial

Secretary, was responsible for the financial side: for the estimates presented to Parliament; the appropriation, accounting and audit of funds, and the control of the Army Pay Department. The Central Department, or Secretariat, was under two Under-Secretaries of State, one Parliamentary and one Permanent.

The idea which inspired these changes was unity. Purely military work was concentrated under the Commander-in-Chief, but the Commander-in-Chief was brought into Pall Mall and so, it was hoped, "more into council." Under the former duality of arrangement the officers of the military department were responsible only to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of State was cut off from their advice. By attempting to make the offices one Cardwell hoped to establish a chain of responsibility: the Secretary of State could obtain information, and responsibility could be brought home. We may note that at this time the staff of the War Office consisted of 82 superior officers and 673 clerks, and its annual cost was a quarter of a million.

Cardwell's other schemes were no less striking. In the light of the recent example of Prussia the first need was to create means for expanding the Army for the purposes of war. With so large a force kept in India and 47,000 men tied in the Colonies, the number of Regulars at home was small (87,500), and no real reserve existed at all. The Militia and the Volunteers were not liable for foreign service, and were under the control of the Lieutenants of Counties. The Regulars were normally enlisted for life, and the only ex-Regular soldiers available were

22,000 aged pensioners who would not go far as a reserve force. In fact, in the stress of the Crimean crisis it had been necessary to engage three foreign legions, one German, one Swiss and one Italian.

Moreover, a dilemma confronted Cardwell, for the great goal at which he aimed was an effective system of national defence, but at the same time a reduction of cost was expected by the Cabinet and the House of Commons. Accordingly, his first step was to reduce the garrisons scattered abroad, the principle being now accepted that colonies, other than coaling-stations, should be responsible for their own defence. He aimed at achieving a more balanced force of 100,000 Regulars at home and 91,000 in India and the Colonies, and his scheme for attaining this end was so skilful that the Estimates for 1869 showed a decrease of over a million pounds. His second step was the Army Enlistment Act, passed in 1870, by which men were enlisted for twelve years only, part of this term to be spent with the colours and the remainder in the Army Reserve, which would be built up into a large force in course of time by these means. The Act also took power to call out the Reserve in case of great emergency without waiting for actual hostilities. Thus for the first time in English history effect was given to the important principle that what England required was a small army capable of expansion in time of war; and the outbreak of war between France and Germany before the Act was finally passed seemed like a comment on Cardwell's foresight.

His next reform, the abolition of Purchase, was helped forward, no doubt, by the war on the

Continent, but was none the less an astonishing achievement.

As matters stood, in the Cavalry and the Infantry each step of promotion up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel depended on money and not on merit. This system, at first sight so incomprehensible, was as old as the standing Army itself. The gentleman who raised a new regiment for the King recouped himself for part of the expense by making those whom he appointed as officers pay for the privilege by buying their commissions. When a captain retired, or bought his promotion, he naturally sold his captain's commission to the officer who succeeded him. Thus juniors who could afford the money passed cheerfully over their seniors. Taking average figures in Cardwell's time, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Infantry who had purchased his promotion at each step had paid in all £7,000; in the Household Cavalry £13,000. The regiments virtually belonged to the officers; and no Government dared to cope with the evil, partly because of the enormous cost of recouping the officers for what they had spent, and partly because of the fierce opposition evoked by any suggestion of change. Most of the influential families in the country were identified with the officers' interests, and the officers themselves were anything but sanguine on the dubious subject of Government generosity, for the cost which the State would have to bear was estimated at eight million pounds.

But Cardwell cared for none of these things. For the purposes of the Secretary of State the existing system was clearly hopeless: he was

hampered in reducing the cadres of units; he could not open a career to efficient officers; and he could not intermix purchase-officers with the non-purchase officers of the auxiliary forces. His Bill, called the Army Regulation Bill, was introduced in February 1871, and was passed by the Commons after lengthy resistance. The Duke of Cambridge did not like it: it would not be for the good of the Army if it lowered the social class of officers. In the Lords it was out-voted at first, but the Queen was persuaded by Mr. Gladstone to come to the rescue of her ministers by cancelling certain ancient Warrants, an exercise of the Crown's powers which made the whole system of Purchase illegal and evoked incidentally a chorus of disapproval, except on the part of the general public. After this to prolong the struggle was pointless; and the Lords, who would have passed a vote of censure at once, had it not been for the Goodwood Races, were content with a protest when the meeting was over. The Army Regulation Act became law, and in addition to the abolition of Purchase it introduced two other changes—the transfer to the Crown from the Lords Lieutenant of the control of the Militia, the Yeomanry and the Volunteers, and the power of the War Department to control the railway system in case of a threatened invasion of the country.

The next reform gave birth to the scheme known ever since as the Cardwell system.

It was, and is, a fundamental conception of this system that the drafts of men required in peace for the maintenance of the garrisons abroad should be trained and supplied by service units

such as regiments of Cavalry, batteries and battalions rather than by mere depots. But in Cardwell's time a regiment of Infantry did not normally possess a second battalion which could train and provide drafts from home. The units posted to oversea garrisons remained there for many years and were fed by large and expensive depots. Further, there was no balance in the numbers. In 1868 there had been 47 battalions of the Line at home and as many as 94 abroad. Again, the Militia had no connection with the Regulars, and the Volunteers were equally unattached. All this Cardwell set out to remedy. Under his Localisation Scheme the British Isles were divided into sixty-six districts, and two Regular battalions were allotted to each, the 60th Rifles and the Rifle Brigade (each of which comprised four battalions) being left, like the Guards, to be treated separately. In each district was a "depot centre" with an experienced Regular officer in command, who would supervise the work of recruiting not only of the Line regiments but also of the Militia battalions which belonged to the same territorial district; and would administer and inspect the Volunteers and the reservists. Of the Regular battalions for each district one was to be at home and the other abroad; and to obtain the necessary double battalions single battalions were "linked" in pairs, so that one linked battalion could feed the other.

The plan for thus "linking" the old regiments gave rise, of course, to much opposition as a blow dealt to regimental sentiment, but the scheme as a whole was essentially sound; for, besides facilitating

the relief of garrisons without disturbance of the forces at home, its basic idea had a large importance. In every territorial district there was now formed an "administrative brigade" of Regular, Militia and Volunteer infantry, and the Artillery was dealt with on similar lines; so that here was the means of maintaining at home a strategic reserve and a home defence force as well as the means of replenishing and relieving the garrisons of India and the Colonies. Cardwell aimed at a force of two Army Corps, each consisting of 30,000 men, and behind them an army for home defence of Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers which would number, he hoped, 300,000 men. He was laying down the solid foundations on which Lord Haldane eventually built.

The work of this "born administrator" was completed in 1873. He would not give way to Mr. Gladstone's demands for further reductions in the Regular forces, and in the following February, when the Government was defeated, he surrendered his seals and was raised to the peerage. In his five years of office Lord Cardwell had achieved a most remarkable series of Army reforms. The War Department had been re-organised and concentrated in one building. Purchase of commissions had been abolished, and the way was open to promotion by merit. An Army Reserve was in process of formation. All the forces had been brought together in a logical scheme which permitted expansion. Money had been provided for buildings and lands. The Intelligence Department had been created. Big guns had been made for fortifications, and the number of field guns had been increased to a total of 336. The soldier had

been given free rations. This was, in truth, no mean record. Morley remarks in his *Life of Gladstone* . . . "In Mr. Cardwell he was fortunate enough to have a public servant of the first order"; to which Lord Cardwell would certainly have added that he himself had been fortunate enough to find very able men in the War Office. One of these, of course, was his friend Lord Northbrook; a second was Mr. Ralph Knox, who in later years, as Sir Ralph Knox, became Permanent Under-Secretary of State; and a third was Colonel Sir Garnet Wolseley, soon to become a national figure.

After these heroic efforts the War Office enjoyed a few years of peace. Indeed, the only memorable change was a great re-organisation of the civil staff (1878-80) which created a higher and a lower division, "administrative" and "clerical." Then, in 1880, Mr. Hugh Childers became Secretary of State for War—a statesman who will be remembered chiefly for his introduction of the territorial system, "a measure," we are told, "which gave rise to more friction and ill-feeling in the Army than perhaps any other introduced during the last century."

Up to this time regiments had numbers, but under the new and unpopular scheme the two Regular and two Militia battalions belonging to the Cardwell brigade-districts were combined to form one regiment, the linked battalions losing their numbers and adopting instead a territorial name. For example, the old 30th Foot became the 1st Battalion, The East Lancashire Regiment, and the 59th Foot became the 2nd Battalion. The Stanley Committee of 1876 had recommended this

further step, and the Duke had written at once to the Queen that the idea was "most distasteful" to him; while the Queen was "*most* anxious to support His Royal Highness." The Duke did not like the linked system at all, much less this new extension of it. "The result is," he wrote in 1880, "that the whole of the Infantry at home is one vast depot fit for nothing but to supply drafts for the Battalions abroad"; and Lord Airey's committee of the same year had doubtless been influenced by His Royal Highness in reporting in favour of unlinking the units. But the strong Mr. Childers had his way, and his "full development" of the Cardwell system was carried through amid angry protests. In a bitter struggle within the War Office he had received much support from Sir Garnet Wolseley, who, after his success in the Zulu War, was now the most popular soldier in England. The Duke hated his "damned new-fangled methods," but the Press hailed him as "our only general," much to the annoyance of the royal circle. The modern expression "O.K." had its counterpart then in "All Sir Garnet," and the "modern major-general" of *The Pirates of Penzance* was made up on the stage as the hero of the day.

The Duke in a rebellious mood tried to insist that "the command-in-chief cannot be merged in the Secretary of State under present conditions," but the protests made by His Royal Highness were met by Mr. Childers with a firm statement of the controlling power of the Secretary of State.

The success of the new short-service system was seen in 1882, when the Arabi revolt took place in

Egypt and the reserves were called up for the first time. Twelve thousand reservists responded at once: the critics of Cardwell were temporarily silenced, and Wolseley added to his laurels at Tel-el-Kebir. But the Mahdi rising in the Sudan and the expedition sent to relieve General Gordon (with which Major Kitchener served on the staff) were followed by a great change in the War Office. Wolseley had been extremely wrathful at the dubious quality of the munitions supplied when he led the troops on the Nile campaign: cartridges had been found defective, and bayonets and swords had been known to bend—a disconcerting attribute. The view was urged that the military departments could not be responsible for the efficiency of the troops unless full control over transport and stores were granted to those who knew best what was wanted; and this view was accepted by Mr. Stanhope, the Secretary of State in Lord Salisbury's Government, and was given effect by two Orders in Council of 1887 and 1888.

Cardwell's triple division disappeared. The Surveyor-General of the Ordnance was abolished, and responsibility for military efficiency was concentrated on the Commander-in-Chief who was now to feed, pay and equip the Army as well as to assume responsibility for fortifications, stores and guns. The War Office thus became two divisions: the Military, responsible to the Secretary of State for advising as to what the Army required, and the Civil, for seeing that demands were met with due regard for proper economy. At the same time the manufacturing departments—the munition factories at Woolwich and Enfield—were placed upon a “commercial” footing,

being paid by the Government Departments concerned for all stores produced to their orders. They were under the control of the Financial Secretary as the head of the civil division of the office, but design was the business of the Commander-in-Chief. The Central branch remained unchanged.

The arrangement so made was not destined to last. It put too much on the Commander-in-Chief, and interpolated a single great officer between the heads of departments and the Secretary of State. The cost of the Services was growing enormously, but despite that disturbing fact the country was said to be totally unprepared. Wolseley told the Lords (May 1888) that the state of the Forces was unsatisfactory: they were not "organised or equipped as they should be to guarantee even the safety of the Capital." The Queen was alarmed, but hardly appreciated the difficulties which arose from the view held by the Duke of Cambridge on the right moment for making changes—"The right time is when you cannot help it." One result was the appointment of a new Royal Commission under the Marquess of Hartington.

The famous Hartington reports marked a turning-point in War Office history. The evidence given was discreetly suppressed. The first report (May 1889) suggested the creation of a co-ordinating Council, with the Prime Minister to take the chair and the naval and military chiefs to advise. The second report (March 1890, C. 5979) was received with dismay in many quarters. It rehearsed the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the discipline as well as of the administration of the Army: it expressed the view that too great a burden rested on the

shoulders of the Commander-in-Chief: it suggested with delicacy that no future Commander-in-Chief could manage as well as the Duke had managed, but that when a suitable opportunity should arise the post of Commander-in-Chief should be abolished. It suggested the appointment of a Chief of Staff who should study and advise on military policy. The heads of the several departments in the War Office would be responsible directly to the Secretary of State, and would advise him collectively as a War Office Council.

Lord Hartington used these words in the Commons: "We have felt that under our constitution it is impossible to place any direct control over the army, over army organisation, in the hands of any man except one who shall be directly responsible to the House of Commons." To place between the parliamentary chief and the heads of the various sub-departments a single supreme military head to whom all other officers were subordinate was, he explained, a mistaken plan. It would diminish the efficiency of the War Office Council by tending to stifle that freedom of discussion on which the civilian Minister must rely.

Even Lord Wolseley was shocked at this. He favoured the creation of a Chief of Staff, and also a Council for National Defence; but the Commander-in-Chief must not be abolished. To the Queen the report was "really abominable," and the Duke of Cambridge wrote of "catastrophe" that threatened both the Crown and the Army. For the time being nothing was done. Then, after the lapse of five years, the Duke of Cambridge, now 76, closed his long

career of devotion to the Army by resigning his post at the wish of the Queen; Lord Wolseley was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and the War Office was reformed once more by a very half-hearted adaptation of some of the ideas of the Hartington report, the change being effected by an Order in Council of 21st November, 1895.

The Stanhope plan was thus reversed, and the concentration of responsibility in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief was abolished. There were now to be five great military officers: the Commander-in-Chief as chief adviser, with general command of all the forces; the Adjutant-General for recruiting, discipline, training and military education; the Quarter-Master-General for food, forage, quartering, fuel, transport and pay; the Inspector-General of Fortifications for barracks, store-buildings, fortifications and lands; and, lastly, the Inspector-General of Ordnance for the design and the holding of military stores. The Commander-in-Chief was to supervise the other four branches in a general way, and so to focus military opinion; but the theory was that all the five were directly responsible to the Secretary of State. The department of the Financial Secretary and the Central office were not affected.

But the situation—a compromise—was still not satisfactory. To retain an officer as “Commander-in-Chief” who in his relations to the Secretary of State was on the same level as the other heads was to give him a general responsibility without giving him real control. Lord Wolseley felt that the Commander-in-Chief had become merely “the fifth wheel of the

coach." He had no effective control himself, while the other heads were not fully responsible: the Secretary of State was the real Chief. Wolseley felt, as his biographers show, that civilian statesmen thought only of peace and quite forgot the needs of war. War came in 1899.

For the purposes of the Boer War the number of men paid and equipped, including the forces prepared in this country, amounted to over half a million. That war, or at least the first part of it, has been described as a terrible muddle, a series of almost uninterrupted disappointments, of military failures, financial blunders, and false methods of estimating difficulties. A great strain was put on the War Office; but the Elgin Commission on the South African War which reported in 1902 [Cd. 1789] did not allot a large measure of blame to the organisation of the department. It pointed out that the papers of the Intelligence branch had never been passed to the Secretary of State by the office of the Commander-in-Chief: there was still a lack of consultation: but the serious shortage in stocks of stores was partly the result of Government economy. In the military system taken as a whole the report disclosed alarming defects.

But before the war had dragged on to its close some interesting changes occurred at the War Office.

In November, 1900, Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State, was succeeded by Mr. St. John Brodrick, and Wolseley was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief in the same month by Lord Roberts. A third event (1901) was the report of the Clinton-Dawkins Committee, which emphasised the important principle of

“decentralising” the work of the War Office by placing a fuller responsibility in the hands of local district commanders. Mr. Brodrick aimed at six “Army Corps districts,” with local auditors to assist the commanders. As further results of the same Committee the Medical branch was elevated in status to rank with the other chief military departments, and the power of the Commander-in-Chief was increased once more. The reader may well begin to wonder how the War Office survived these incessant reforms. The department of the Adjutant-General, as well as that of the Military Secretary and an enlarged department for Military Intelligence which embraced “mobilisation” duties, now passed to the “control” of the Commander-in-Chief, while he retained “supervision” of the other departments and sat as head of an Army Board (which dated from 1895) intended to focus the military view. The Secretary of State had the “War Office Council,” which Wolseley had called a debating society, to tender advice on important questions. There were thus two consultative committees. It was fortunate for such a system that the old antagonisms were lulled. Already its end was drawing near.

Lord Elgin’s commission on the war in South Africa alarmed the country thoroughly, and Mr. Balfour as Prime Minister addressed his keen and powerful intellect to the great problem of national defence. Mr. Balfour was impressed by the Admiralty system, while the War Office system had failed conspicuously to prevent grave errors and waste of expenditure. A searching review was urgently needed, and thus was appointed the Esher Committee, that

famous body of three members which created the form of the modern War Office. Its President and one of its members had been closely connected with the Hartington Commission, and one of its leading recommendations closed for ever a long duel:—

“We therefore consider that it is imperative to abolish the office of Commander-in-Chief.”

To the student of constitutional history that duel possesses a special interest. It illustrates how, in the phrasing of Anson, the Royal Prerogative in respect of the Army accommodated itself by slow degrees to the theory of ministerial responsibility. The Minister of the Crown is responsible to Parliament for the exercise of the King’s Prerogative: he is also, in the phrase of the same writer, bound to take care that the Crown Prerogative is not exercised by Parliament.

Meanwhile the German navy grew.

## Chapter V

### PRE-WAR

WHILE the constitution of the old War Office was being remodelled by the Esher reports, its home in Pall Mall was fast approaching the end of its days.

As a matter of some historical interest the writer has been at pains to establish, with the kind assistance of the Office of Works, the origin of the old building. It was a conglomeration of ancient houses numbered 80 to 91 Pall Mall, which were thrown together mainly by the simple process of making doors in the walls between them, with no alteration of the level of floors.

Prior to this economic expedient No. 80 was the house of Sir John Kirkland whose business as an Army Agent developed later into "Holt & Co." The next numbers eastwards, 81 and 82, formed part of the mansion "Schomberg House," originally built about the year 1690 for the Duke of Schomberg who was killed at the battle of the Boyne. Here had lived three fashionable artists, Astley, Conway the miniature-painter, and Thomas Gainsborough himself; not to mention the notorious Dr. Graham who called his apartments "the Temple of Hymen in Pall Mall" and employed a "goddess," Emma Harte, who was afterwards famous as Lady Hamilton. Nos. 83 and 84, where Christie the great auctioneer had lived, next door to his friend Gains-

borough, were taken over by the Government in 1851 for enlargement of the office of the Board of Ordnance. The old Ordnance Office was the central structure, Nos. 85-87, originally built in 1760 for the Duke of York, brother of George III. Later it was known as "Cumberland House," and was taken over in 1806 when the Master-General of the Ordnance moved from the Tower. Nos. 88 to 90 were houses and shops. The eastern wing, Buckingham House, which was bought by the Government in 1855, was originally designed by Sir John Soane and erected about 1780. As the home of the first Marquess of Buckingham, and afterwards of the Duchess of Gordon, this mansion saw some exciting scenes as the headquarters of the Tory party in the days of the struggles between Pitt and Fox.

Thus the amalgamation of 1858 which created a home for the consolidated War Office consisted in making a larger building out of the old office of the Board of Ordnance by adding Schomberg House, Buckingham House, and three or four small houses and shops. There used to be a tale that the house of Nell Gwynn was embodied somewhere in the rambling building, but the authorities appear to agree that her dwelling (she had previously lived opposite) was next door at the western end.

The modern civil servant is apt to smile at the stories that are told of the old War Office: stories of short hours and leisurely methods, of procedure dictated by long tradition, of the amending of drafts for the sake of amending, of an outlook narrowed by branch-insularity. Before the year 1870 the civil staff was recruited by patronage and not by com-

petitive examinations, and probably some of the old generation were gentlemen more picturesque than efficient among whom traditional methods and jealousies lingered on to the time of the Boer War. Electric light and a luncheon club were twentieth-century innovations. The conditions under which the clerks worked were not highly conducive either to comfort or to speed. No telephones, no typewriters, the pleasant odours of colza-oil lamps, a tiresome jumble of rambling passages, sudden stairs and confusing turns—such is the picture presented to us even as late as the eighteen-nineties. To settle a matter verbally in place of penning a lengthy “minute” involved a journey to another branch which implied an adventurous expedition. Visitors, we are told, enquired anxiously what means existed for finding their way out, provided they ever found their objective. Making due allowance for banausic fables, we are left with the impression of a slow machine patched up in parts, worn out in others, creaking along to the best of its power on lines that have never been properly laid.

Yet in the span of those fifty years reviewed briefly in the previous chapter much had been done in the old War Office which the impartial critic will not belittle. Kipling’s “absent-minded beggar” of the year 1900 was a person very different from the soldier of the Crimea.

At the beginning of the period (1854) the soldier belonged to what was practically a separate caste: he was enlisted for life, uneducated, badly paid, and shockingly provided as to housing and amenities. The officers were a very gallant body, but with few

exceptions they made no pretence of regarding the handling and management of troops as requiring scientific study. Officers of the Staff retained their appointments without regard to efficiency. Administration was so scattered as to be almost incapable of united action. The Army as a whole was still dreaded as a menace to liberty and constitutional government, and was kept out of sight in distant garrisons.

But by the time of the South African War vast strides had been made in the direction of efficiency. The soldier was now better paid, better fed, better housed and better educated; and his future in civil life was considered. For officers, since the abolition of Purchase, the military calling was no longer merely "a phase in the sporting equipment of a gentleman." The Staff College was turning out men who took their profession as a serious study. An Intelligence Department had been formed. The ancillary services of the Army had been developed as corps of recognised importance. Decentralisation of responsibility from the War Office to the local commands had begun to be put into operation. The Army Reserve had been created. The Militia and the Volunteers had been organised to some extent, and at least possessed rôles in a military scheme. Mobilisation plans existed and had worked smoothly in the test of war. Perhaps the old War Office in Pall Mall was not really as inefficient as the history of its quarrels suggests, or as outsiders were fond of alleging. Certainly in the late 'eighties it contained some extremely able men. The young civil servants of that period included the future Sir Reginald Brade, who was Secretary of the War Office in the Great War, and the future Sir

Charles, then Mr., Harris, a notable figure in Army Finance who was one of Lord Haldane's right-hand men. Nor was there ever any trace of "red tape" in the popular personality of Sir Bertram Cubitt. The leading civil servants at the time when the Esher Committee's reports made their fierce attack on "civilian control" were Sir Frank Marzials, the Accountant-General, and Sir Guy Fleetwood-Wilson, who was afterwards Financial Member of the Governor-General's Council in India.

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The three reports of the Esher Committee—"The War Office Reconstitution Committee"—were published in 1904 [Cd. 1932, 1968 and 2002]. The Committee consisted of Viscount Esher, Admiral Sir John Fisher and Sir George Sydenham Clarke, and possessed in Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Ellison a secretary of great ability, equipped both with a fluent pen and a fervid insistence on thinking clearly. These gentlemen were directed by their Terms of Reference to take the Admiralty system as the basis of reform, and they did so in no uncertain terms. They "reiterated in curt and dogmatic form" the proposals made by the Hartington Commission; they enumerated "great principles"; they delivered a bitter attack on the Finance Department, which was unsupported by any evidence; and their caustic remarks on the "past" of the War Office were combined with confident recommendations. The main principles embodied in the reports were *desiderata* already familiar to the younger school of thought in the War Office, but, if the ideas were not new in themselves, their

forcible expression by a powerful body was of first importance to the cause of reform. The recommendations re-cast the War Office. They may be stated summarily as follows:—

(1) The position of the Secretary of State for War should be placed on the same footing as that of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and all submissions to the Crown in regard to military matters should be made by him, and by him alone.

(2) The War Office should be managed by a Council of seven consisting of the Secretary of State as president, two other Civil Parliamentary Members, and four Military Members of Council.

(3) All the members of the Army Council should act in a dual capacity: as colleagues of the Secretary of State in Council, and as responsible for the efficient working of their respective departments.

(4) The appointment of Commander-in-Chief should be abolished and his executive functions removed from the War Office. The administrative military work of the office should be carried out by four military departments, each serving under a Military Member.

(5) The two Civil Members of Council would be (i) the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, with specific duties assigned to him apart from that of representing the Army in one of the Houses of Parliament, and (ii) the Finance Member, or Financial Secretary. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State should be Secretary to the Army Council and Secretary of the War Office, with a general control of office business.

(6) A General Staff, or "thinking department," should be created as one of the military departments

under a "Chief of the General Staff" (First Military Member of the Army Council). The other three military departments should be those of the Adjutant-General to the Forces, the Quarter-Master-General to the Forces, and the Master-General of the Ordnance.

(7) Military work of an executive kind (the command and training of troops) should be carried out locally, vested in Generals outside the War Office—Great Britain and Ireland being divided for this purpose into large "commands" and a London District, each placed under a high officer. Administrative work in these areas should be under the charge of separate high officers subordinate to the chief command.

(8) The preparation and efficiency of the troops should be watched by an Inspector-General of the Forces who would act as the "eyes and ears" of the Council.

(9) The system of financial control should be reformed; and the two existing bodies dealing with finance (the Army Pay Department and the Accountant-General's) should be merged into one Finance Department under the Finance Member of Council. Financial advice should be decentralised, small sections of the Finance Department being attached to the Military Members of Council, and likewise locally in the commands.

(10) The Military Members should hold their appointments for four years only; and a change of personnel both military and civilian should be carried out forthwith at the War Office "in order to bring new minds to bear upon new measures,"

and "the corner-stone of the needed edifice":—

The existing bodies for advising the Cabinet on the co-ordination of naval and military policy should be turned into a Committee with a permanent Secretariat to advise on all questions of Imperial Defence.

"We venture to claim," the Committee observed, "that we have clearly laid down the great principles of reform which lie at the root of the reconstitution of the War Office." . . . "For the first time in the long annals of War Office reform its intricate problems have, we believe, been approached from the point of view of war rather than from those of peace." . . . "We are convinced that efficiency and economy are unattainable until the War Office has been completely reconstituted in accordance with the principles we have laid down."

Thus spake the Committee and the thing was done. The reception accorded to its claims was striking, for the Cabinet took immediate action. By Letters Patent of 6th February, 1904,\* all the powers under the Royal Prerogative hitherto exercised by the Secretary of State or the Commander-in-Chief were vested in the Army Council; and the adoption *en bloc* of the other proposals established the form of the modern War Office. An Order in Council of August 10th affirmed the supremacy of the Secretary of State as responsible to His Majesty and to Parliament for all the business of the Army Council.

This, then, was the end of the struggle for supremacy between the civil and military authorities in the State. "The political head," in the words of Anson, "is and must be supreme"; for this result flows naturally, as indeed had long been admitted in

\* Note 9, page 342.

theory, from the responsibility to Parliament which rests upon the Secretary of State. One result of the Esher reforms was to leave no professional head of the Army who could dispute with the Secretary of State for War the holding of the supreme control in all phases of military administration. Another effect of great importance was to bring together the advisory officers, military and financial, in one council, and to ensure in this way that military policy should be worked out by a body of men who are under a common responsibility for advice tendered to the Minister. This arrangement secured that the Secretary of State should be furnished with the best professional opinion.

So now the War Office, happily undiscouraged by years of criticism and anxious to deserve a new reputation, settled down quietly to make the scheme work. The essential machinery had been provided; the way had been paved for another reform, for the solution of the main problem which the Boer War had thrust to the front—the re-organisation of the Army itself. Mr. Brodrick had made a brave attempt: Mr. Arnold-Forster, who succeeded him, now possessed a properly organised War Office.

Outside, however, storms were raging. It was not only in the War Department that new brooms were to be introduced. In October, 1905, Mr. Balfour's Government was swept away, and a Liberal Government took its place armed with the watchwords "peace and retrenchment." But the War Office was fortunate. It secured in Mr. Haldane a Secretary of State whose intellectual grasp and boldness of vision were matched only by his powers of persuasion; and

those powers were soon in evidence. Readers of the speeches delivered by Mr. Haldane in the House of Commons in the spring of 1906 will learn with some surprise, perhaps, of the transformation which had taken place in the short space of two years. He had found in the War Office "highly skilled experts." The new school of officers was "a revelation." He had found them to be men of "highly scientific training and reflective minds." Moreover, the object which he had set himself to attain—a more efficient Army at a smaller cost—seemed likely to be assisted by another change, scarcely less striking, from the sad conditions of older days. "The people," he said, "are not in antipathy to the Army. They love the Army. They care about these things." The nation lately had possessed an Army that was extravagant, costly and badly organised; but with income-tax at a shilling in the £ it was time that the situation should be closely surveyed. All that was required was time to think clearly: and this Mr. Haldane proceeded to do.

His thoughts, put forward with persuasive diffidence, were of great moment to the British Army, and possibly to the course of history. The South African War, he pointed out, had left behind it some great lessons which the Esher Reports had thrust home. One was the value of a "General Staff," and the separation of the function of command, with the thinking out of plans of operations, from the complicated duties of detailed administration. Another was the value of the Volunteers when given a certain amount of training. Previous schemes had confused two ideas—a force to defend our Empire abroad and a force to defend the shores of Britain. Our business

was to maintain an expeditionary force just so large as to form a reserve by means of which strong and swift reinforcements could be sent to the aid of our garrisons overseas. For home defence in a great crisis we could rely on the spirit of the Volunteers, organised by "military local government under the control of the people themselves." The true organisation for this country was an organisation in two lines, not in three lines as hitherto—not Regulars, Militia and Volunteers, but a first line of professional soldiers, relatively small in numbers but high in quality, and behind it in a crisis the nation itself.

In these ideas lay the germs of the two creations for which Lord Haldane will be chiefly remembered—the Regular Expeditionary Force and the modern Territorial Army. The path was beset with difficulties which a weaker Minister would have found fatal, for the Haldane plans involved two things which offended a large body of sentiment—a reduction in the numbers of Regular units and the disappearance of the old Militia. The Secretary of State was attacked bitterly. Indeed, he was told that he was ruining the Army, although he had stated again and again that both these measures had been put forward with the full concurrence of his military advisers. The clear-thinking philosopher-statesman was accused of having hypnotised his soldier counsellors.

A policy which once was regarded widely as a smirch on the name of a great War Minister deserves at least brief notice here. Lord Haldane's thesis can be expressed quite simply: a striking force which can be mobilised quickly is better than a force which cannot be mobilised at all, even if the latter be a little

larger. Similarly an army for home defence which is complete in all arms and services is of greater value than a volunteer force consisting of Yeomanry, Infantry, some Garrison Artillery and little else. At that time, Mr. Haldane maintained, we were not in a position to mobilise quickly. We needed an Expeditionary Force completely equipped and ready for war. We needed a home Territorial Force so organised as to make it complete in itself. To meet the cost of attaining these ends everything must go that was not really needed. Six Infantry divisions and four Cavalry brigades, with Artillery and Engineers in proportion, and the proper complement of all services, were to form the Regular striking force. We possessed field guns sufficient in number for 93 batteries of Regular Artillery, but men sufficient for 42 only, while 63 batteries were required for the scheme. Haldane proposed to have 99 batteries, of which 63, on a four-gun basis, would be placed in a "mobilisable" state, and 36 more would be placed in reserve and converted into training brigades. Similarly, in the light of the scheme, 8 battalions of Infantry of the Line were surplus to requirements at home and abroad. Thus 8 battalions in the colonies could disappear, and at least one battalion of Foot Guards as well. This, shortly, was the "case" for "the Haldane cuts."

But, keenly as the reductions in the Regulars were resented, the scheme to establish a "Special Reserve" met with a far more passionate resistance, for it sounded the death-knell of the Militia.

Historically descended from the General Levy, the Militia was the old constitutional force—the

county force for home defence. At the close of the sixteenth century its reputation stood very high, for the command of the "trained bands," as mentioned earlier, formed a principal subject of hot dispute between Charles I and the Long Parliament. In the Civil War the effective "bands" fought on the parliamentary side, and Parliament at the Restoration, while acknowledging the supreme command of the King, was careful to see that the real control of the county forces was vested in the local Lieutenants of Counties. But the new Militia fell into decay: it was called out for service in 1690 on the occasion of the French "invasion" when the village of Teignmouth was attacked and burnt, and later to deal with the Jacobite risings of '15 and '45 led by the Old and the Young Pretenders; and was found to be thoroughly inefficient. Consequently it was completely re-organised, when Parliament was again in fear of invasion, by an Act of 1757, and the mode of raising the men was changed. The liability to furnish recruits, which had rested previously on owners of property, was placed now on the counties instead, each of which had to find a fixed quota of men chosen from parish lists by lot; while the cost of training was transferred to the Exchequer.

This was the work of the elder Pitt, who retained the old conception of the Militia as a county force for home defence; but that conception was much undermined by the policy of Pitt the younger. The desperate need of men for the armies abroad in the great French war which closed the century, the rise of the new Volunteers at home, and,

finally (1808-15), the raising of a Local Militia, changed the position of the general Militia to a force with a semi-Regular rôle. Then after the final defeat of Napoleon it ceased to have any real existence until a fresh panic in 1848 led to its revival under new laws, and it became a force raised by voluntary enlistment, with the power of the ballot kept in reserve. In point of fact, after 1810 the ballot was never used again except in the years 1830-1, although the power to use it remained on the statute-book. Lord Cardwell described the Militia succinctly as a force "whose theory is conscription, but whose practice is voluntary engagement."

Though never legally liable at any date to be summoned to serve outside the kingdom, Militia units had volunteered frequently for service abroad in times of crisis. Thus large numbers of officers and men fought in the Peninsular War, and later in the time of the Crimea and the Mutiny the Militia was used to replace the Regulars in various colonial garrisons. Again in the crisis of the Boer War the Militia was invited to volunteer, and more than 45,000 officers and men did good service in South Africa. Indeed, from the days of the younger Pitt onwards the conception of the Militia as a home-defence force had receded steadily into the background, and the precedent of using the force to supply drafts of men to the Regular Army, although unrecognised in law, had become in fact the established practice. Moreover, since 1882 the facilities offered to officers and men to pass on into the Regulars had made the Militia a sort of side-entrance for those who aspired to an Army career.

It was thus a semi-Regular force possessed of great and ancient traditions and a long record of honourable service; but at the time of the Haldane reforms it was dwindling. Its establishment in 1906 was roughly 138,000 men, but its strength was only 98,000. It had no organisation beyond the regiment, no complement of arms other than Infantry, and a minimum of modern equipment. Contributing some 20,000 recruits to the Regular Army every year, it was a force, as Lord Lansdowne described it, "plundered at one end by the Line and encroached on at the other by the Volunteers."

The Volunteers were of far more recent origin. Their roots did not lie in the constitution: they were born of patriotic fervour and were amateurs in the truest sense. The first Volunteer Act was passed in 1794 when the French Revolution was threatening trouble. A second was passed in 1802 when Napoleon was massing his troops at Boulogne for that projected invasion of England which happily remained a project only. So real was the fear and so prompt the response that the Volunteer force of those anxious days numbered nearly 400,000 men; but with the passing of the great emergency the whole movement fell into a deep sleep which lasted over forty years.

Once more it was France who stirred it to life. The revival took place in 1859 when the French Army was clamouring loudly to be led against "perfidious Albion," following an attempt on the life of their Emperor which was planned, so the rumour went, in London. Inspired partly by the Poet Laureate who penned an appropriate ode on the subject ("Form, Riflemen, Form!"), the riflemen formed:

Volunteer corps sprang up all over the country, drilled themselves, secured ranges, and paid, at first, their own expenses. The Government did not demur: the movement was quite a convenient one. Later, financial assistance was given in the shape of "capi-tation grants" for performing a certain number of drills, and allowances for attending annual camps; but the Volunteers, unlike the Militia and the Yeomanry, were given no period of continuous training apart from these annual exercises. The force had now become a permanent institution, and the spirit of its members was notably keen—some 20,000 Volunteers saw active service in the Boer War—but, having grown up in haphazard fashion, it had never been thoroughly organised. It did not possess higher formations; much less could it boast complete divisions with the requisite brigade and divisional staffs and a due proportion of arms and services. It consisted mostly of Infantry: there were some Artillery and Engineers, and also a few medical units. The establishment at the time of the Haldane reforms was 340,000 men, and the strength was 240,000.

This was the state of the auxiliary forces—a state of very small military value—with which Mr. Haldane was confronted. Basing his plans on the needs of war and a clear-cut two-line organisation, he saw in the Militia the appropriate instrument to supplement the Regular Army, provided that it was made liable for service abroad; and he saw in the Volunteers the natural material for his second-line for home defence, provided that it was organised completely and made self-contained in all departments on the

same plan as the Regular divisions. An attempt was made to induce the Militia to accept either one of two rôles: to become definitely an adjunct of the Regular Army with the function of supplying drafts, or to become the backbone of the second line by incorporation with the Volunteers. Both ideas were anathema to the Militia colonels. Similarly the scheme to create out of the Yeomanry and the Volunteers a complete force for home defence, organised on the lines of the Regular Army, was regarded by officers of the old school as misconceived and quite impracticable. It was opposed by England's most popular soldier; for Lord Roberts was wedded to a scheme of his own, a scheme for compulsory military service. The Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was an advocate of drastic economy in armaments; his colleagues for the most part were not interested in military affairs; and the House of Lords was a stronghold of critical doubt.

However, in spite of all opposition the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act was passed in 1907. The Militia ceased to be raised as such, and was replaced by the Special Reserve, which was legally part of the Army Reserve and was liable for foreign service; and the Yeomanry and the Volunteers became a Territorial Force, to be organised in 14 divisions of Infantry together with 14 mounted brigades and all ancillary arms and services. The enlarged duties assigned to-day to the modern Territorial Army will be noted in a later chapter. The Special Reserve created by Lord Haldane (re-christened the Militia in 1921) is no longer maintained, although the power to raise it remains on the statute-book. In the modern

scheme of mobilisation the supply of drafts in war for the Regular Army—a primary function of the Special Reserve—is provided for from other sources.

The following is an appreciation\* written in 1908 by the foremost military critic of the day, Colonel à Court Repington, whose powerful articles as correspondent of *The Times* had greatly assisted the Haldane schemes.

“The Liberal Party,” this critic wrote, “returned to power in a frame of mind which argued ill for the defence of the Empire. Many members of this party entertained generous but none the less dangerous illusions on the subject of the reduction of armaments, and desired amidst a world in arms to reduce our insurance against the risks of war. The task of the new Secretary of State was, in these circumstances, one of the utmost delicacy. . . . Mr. Haldane has endeavoured, with the aid of his official advisers, who have served him well, to substitute order for disorder in the Regular Army and the Second Line, to endow the former with a supplementary reserve available for war, and to lay down for the latter a broad foundation upon which his successors may be able hereafter to complete the edifice of public security. . . . Despite the storms of opposition which beat so fiercely upon all Secretaries for War, Mr. Haldane has held resolutely upon his way, has acquired the confidence of the Army, and has done his utmost in very difficult times to lay the foundations of a settled policy.”

\* Note 10, page 343.

The development of these bold projects continued steadily up to 1914, and were under Mr. Haldane's personal direction until he left the War Office in 1912 to become Lord Chancellor. On all sides, now, the horizon was darkening. Relations between France and Germany had been strained by disputes in regard to Morocco. The establishment of an *entente cordiale* between England and France, together with the Franco-Russian alliance, had aroused suspicions in Germany. England was absorbed in political controversy and bitter disputes on domestic problems. There was more than a hint of trouble in Ireland. The trend of events lent colour to the view that the military potentialities of Great Britain were held in contempt by Germany's leaders—a contempt based not only on the size of the Army but on a conception of the whole attitude of this country as too weakly defensive and pacific to be formidable.

In the fateful year 1914 the Army Estimates were £28,845,000; and the numbers to be voted for the Regular Army outside India were 186,400. The Army Reserve numbered 147,000; the Special Reserve, which replaced the Militia, had reached a strength of 63,000; and the newly-created Territorial Force numbered 252,000 men. These figures did not promise much power for effective intervention in a war on the Continent; but one great lesson had been well learnt. In the autumn of 1906 Mr. Haldane had been the guest of the Kaiser at Berlin; and there he had examined the German War Office, and had seen for himself the condition of readiness in which the German Army was kept—a condition in which it could pass rapidly from a peace-footing to a war-

footing. This lesson he had applied completely to the British Expeditionary Force. The clothes required for every reservist who would join the Colours on mobilisation, the railway warrant to enable him to join, the field-service equipment for every unit stored in readiness at a convenient centre, the large extra number of horses required, detailed time-tables of special trains worked out in concert with the railway companies, special fittings for the necessary ships . . . every need that could be anticipated had been met in a scheme prepared in advance for the great emergency of war. In short, every detail had been worked out which enabled the War Office, in the event, to transport to France within 15 days a force considerably larger than the mixed army which Wellington commanded at Waterloo.\*

Meanwhile the Esher-reformed War Office had settled down in its new shape. It comprised, as we have seen, the Secretary of State, four departments of Military Members of Council, two departments under Parliamentary Members, and the department of the Secretary. The staff of the military departments of the office numbered approximately 630, of whom 270 were serving officers and soldiers, 280 were ex-service personnel, and 80 were technical civilians. The staff on the civil side numbered 500, excluding press-keepers, messengers and so on. For eight years now this staff had been housed in its great modern Renaissance home. Twenty-five millions of bricks, ordinary; one and a half millions of bricks, glazed; seventeen miles of plaster cornices, and fifty acres of plastering had been used by His

\* Note 11, page 344.

Majesty's Office of Works to erect the magnificent building in Whitehall which, in the spring of 1914, when Mr. Asquith took over the seals of office, was considered to be of ample size. A few months later it was ludicrously too small.

The description of the duties performed by the War Office which is set out in chapters vi to xii is that of the work as it exists to-day. One or two post-war adjustments of duties will be noted in the final chapter, but the general lines of the present organisation are those that existed on the eve of the war. The sequence of events from 1914 onwards is resumed in chapter xiii.

## Chapter VI

### MILITARY POLICY AND THE GENERAL STAFF

THE "General Staff" is a technical term. It does not mean the Staff of the Army in general. At the War Office, for example, part of the theory of the organisation is that it provides the Minister for War with the military advice of the Staff in general, including all four of the military departments of which only one is the "General Staff." The department of the General Staff in the War Office is the special military division which is devoted exclusively to three subjects—closely allied and interwoven—the study of the theory and practice of operations, the collection of military information, and the preparation and training of the Army for war.

Staffs in the more general sense must have existed always in one form or another. Alexander leading the hosts of Macedon, or Cæsar commanding the Roman legions, had round him a band of officers who formed a sort of personal staff for transmitting the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. Frederick the Great had a Staff system reputed to be extremely efficient. Napoleon had a specially created Staff, under the direction of Berthier, who translated the orders of his great master into detailed instructions to the commanders of armies. This Staff included a topographical section, an anticipation of an important

feature in a General Staff in its narrower meaning. Like so many other modern creations, "General Staffs" in the technical sense were developed as a result of military disasters, first by Prussia and then by France.

The bitter humiliation of Jena taught the Prussians a great lesson—the paramount value of organisation. The old type of Staff had executive functions: the functions now needed were those of study. A body was required whose permanent business would be to think out the requirements of war, organise the forces to meet those requirements, devise a unified system of training, and provide fully-informed advice on any military situation that was likely to confront the rulers of Prussia. The results were the Prussian General Staff, the brilliant successes of 1866, and the German triumph of 1870. The Germans won by organisation; and the French in turn took the lesson to heart and created the French General Staff of to-day.

Similarly in the case of England the stimulus of alarm was needed before any practical action took shape to create a British General Staff. The first step was taken in the Crimean War when a great want of maps was felt, and a Topographical section was established at the War Office (January 1855). The next advance was made by Cardwell following the Franco-German War. In 1873 the Topographical branch was enlarged to form an "Intelligence Department" with the duty of collecting all possible information which the Government or the Commander-in-Chief might require concerning the armies of foreign Powers and the progress made in military

science. In 1886 a Mobilisation section was added, with the duty of drawing up schemes in peace-time for placing the Army on a war footing. These offices, which were then under the Adjutant-General, certainly marked a considerable advance; but there was still nothing in the shape of a staff entrusted with the duty of linking these functions, of co-ordinating the work of the Intelligence section with the organisation and training of the troops; or, to put the thing in simpler language, there was no body charged with the special business of fitting the Army in time of peace for its particular rôle in any probable war.

Lord Hartington, in 1890, saw clearly that some further step was required. "I beg them," he urged, addressing the Commons, "to consider the propriety and the necessity and the urgency of the formation of a Department the duty of which shall be to work out, study and give judgment upon some of the most difficult questions of military policy which can be presented to any country." . . . "I believe that there is sound reason for the principle, which has been adopted by every other nation, of placing the consideration of these matters under a Department which shall be absolutely free from every administrative and executive duty."

But the country needed the South African War, with its tale of muddle and wasteful effort, to provide the spur to the further action which resulted at last in the Esher Reports and the instant acceptance of the Committee's views by Mr. Balfour's Government. The triumviri, with their customary clearness, combined a brief survey of the errors of the past with their very emphatic

recommendation for the constitution of a "General Staff." "A General Staff," they explained, "as the term is understood in all well-organised armies, consists of a department which devotes its attention to military problems in the widest sense, and a body of officers occupied in peace in the training of all ranks of the Army and prepared to direct operations in the field." To create such a Staff would require time, and "the necessary steps should be taken forthwith." The British General Staff was born.

Mr. Arnold-Forster started the work, but the completion of the task fell to Lord Haldane. The new Prime Minister (Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman) had previously been opposed to it; which explains perhaps why the Minister for War was at pains to impress the House of Commons with the sterling worth of the new creation. He described the General Staff as a "thinking department," and repeated rather more picturesquely what the Esher Reports had already said on the sore subject of the South African War. "Unlike the other great nations, we had never established any thinking department for the British Army. If there had been such a thinking department it would have made out plans for the operations in South Africa, with the result that the distinguished generals who went there would have thought out every inch of their progress before they undertook it, instead of having to devise ways and means as they went along." He christened the department "the brain" of the Army; not a very happy phrase to select in the ears of the rest of the military world. Colonel Repington was in happier vein when he coined the phrase "Peace Strategy."

Peace Strategy is a big subject. It is big not only in its range and complexity, but in its priority of importance also, for a nation which cannot defend itself must lose control, in the long run, of the ordering of its own affairs. Peace Strategy is concerned with the security of the Empire, and calls for incessant and tireless research. It requires from all responsible authorities a complete knowledge of the resources of the Empire, and intimate acquaintance with the military resources, the country, the traditions and the organisation of any potential enemy. Once armed with these data it can decide the standard of power to be maintained, and the best means of ensuring defence.

In the case of the British Empire, therefore, Peace Strategy makes two demands: it demands the co-ordinated advice of the naval, military and air Services; and it demands also the co-ordination of the defence problems of the Home Government with those of India and the great Dominions. These two points formed the first subject dealt with in the Esher Reports. "No measure of War Office reform will avail unless it is associated with provision for obtaining and co-ordinating for the use of the Cabinet all the information and the expert advice required for the shaping of national policy in war, and for determining the necessary preparations in peace. Such information and advice must necessarily embrace not only the sphere of the War Office but also the spheres of the Admiralty and of other offices of State." The result was the formation in 1904 of the existing Committee of Imperial Defence. This consists, in theory, of the Prime Minister and

of such other persons as he may summon to advise him; but in practice those other Cabinet Ministers who are closely affected by Defence questions, and the Chiefs of Staff of the three Fighting Services, form a permanent panel of the "C.I.D."

Thus the General Staff at the War Office is one part of a large machine specially created to deal with the problems of Peace Strategy, and its functions are best appreciated in relation to the whole machine. The direction of Defence policy is the business of the Government: the business of the several departments is to assist the task of the Government by providing the best expert advice. The medium through which that advice is tendered is the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which the Prime Minister himself is the "invariable President" and on which the professional views of the Services—naval, military and air—are given by the three Chiefs of Staff. There is also a special Sub-Committee of Chiefs of Staffs on which it is the business of the three Staffs to co-ordinate the joint advice of the three Services working in unison. The expert "military" view, in the narrow sense, is that of the General Staff of the War Office.

The second aspect of co-ordination—the need of linking together the work of this Staff with the work of Staffs in the rest of the Empire—was dealt with under the Haldane régime as early as the year 1909.

The need hardly required stating. If the forces were ever to fight together their value as an Army would be enhanced immeasurably if the forces of the Dominions and of the Home Government had been organised and trained on a standard system. Similarly, as a simple illustration, an obvious advantage

would be gained in the field if the Dominions used the same natures of guns, the same patterns of equipment and ammunition. The Imperial Conference of 1907 had expressed agreement in the general principle, and this step was followed in 1909 by the shaping of a framework for a General Staff for the whole Empire [Cd. 4948]. Each Dominion would develop its own General Staff who would keep in touch with the General Staff in London, whose members would be trained on uniform lines, and whose policy would be directed by similar principles. India worked on the same lines; and the Chief of the General Staff at the War Office thus became (in 1909) the "C.I.G.S."—the Chief of the *Imperial* General Staff.

Perhaps the importance of this development requires no special emphasis, for the facts of the position are plain. The task which confronts the "C.I.D." and the General Staffs of the three Services is far more complicated and greater in range than the task which confronts any other Power. England has no single and constant objective, such as to defend a defined frontier against possible aggression by jealous neighbours. In the Far East, India, Egypt, Africa . . . the Empire has many vulnerable points; and British forces must be prepared to act at any time and in any one of a number of widely divided theatres, each demanding a different technique of defence. In fine, the task of any other Power may be said truthfully to be relatively simple compared with the British problem of Imperial Defence.

The department of the General Staff at the War

Office is the youngest, and at the same time the first and the senior, of the four Military Members' departments; and its Chief, by virtue of his position, is the senior soldier in the War Office. For the function of advising on military policy we should expect to find it organised for two inter-related spheres of work—plans for the operations of our own forces, and information regarding possible “enemy” forces; and accordingly the first directorate is that of the “D.M.O. and I.”—Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. There are two Operations (“M.O.”) branches and five Intelligence (“M.I.”) branches; and one of the latter is a Geographical branch equipped with a staff for the construction of maps, while another deals with “Security” work—Defence Security Intelligence is the title—and the War Department Constabulary. The duties of the two groups are described officially as (1) “Advice as to the conduct of operations of war and orders in regard to military operations,” and (2) “The collection and collation of military intelligence.” The published details are discreetly vague.

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There are two other directorates, those of the Director of Staff Duties and the Director of Military Training, which, with the “D.M.O. and I.,” complete the department of the General Staff; and perhaps an attempt to sketch their duties should begin by laying stress on the point that the work of all three directorates is very closely inter-connected. The business of “Organisation for war,” which is one of the functions of Staff Duties, and the principles

of Military Training, are subordinate aspects of policy, and are parts of the problem of Peace Strategy which fit into the whole picture as different pieces of the same puzzle. For co-ordination of Staff work generally the "D.S.D." is responsible.

The first, then, of the main functions which fall to the Director of Staff Duties is the organisation of the forces for war.

Only a few generations ago armies consisted of Cavalry and Infantry, a few guns and a host of camp-followers: to-day they are intricate organisations, completely provided in every direction. The complication of a modern army must strike the layman as almost fantastic. Besides Infantry a Division will contain Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Ammunition companies, Baggage companies, Supply companies, Field Ambulances, Hygiene sections, Ordnance workshops, Veterinary sections, Provost companies and Postal units: to which must be added the Headquarters Staff, and again the Headquarters of each Brigade. If we consider an army of several Divisions, we may add Tank and Anti-Aircraft Defence units, to say nothing of Line of Communications troops with their Railway companies, their Ambulance trains, their Hospitals, their Remount depots, their Store depots and Base workshops, their Pay offices, and their Printing sections; and still we can add the Intelligence Corps and squadrons attached by the Royal Air Force without making the list complete.

Further, for each different kind of campaign a different kind of force is required; and a change in the number of men and animals, or in the type

of weapon or the kind of transport that is suitable to the particular case, will involve a mass of detailed changes in the supply and ammunition companies and every other supporting service. The proper proportion of the several arms, the ratio of guns to men, the best system of getting the stores to the troops, the nature and amount of transport required, the rounds of ammunition or the quantity of food to be carried by the various units—such questions as these in a modern Army will not be left to be judged on the field by a commander who, in a sound organisation, should be free for the work of directing operations. Every detail, including the Staff required and the precise functions of every member, must be worked out beforehand at the War Office; and the general principles must be fully understood: the Army must be trained in the system. Moreover each fighting-man is precious; mobility must not be hampered; financial considerations arise; and a hundred other points must be weighed in the composition of "war establishments." The scheme, too, must be flexible, for the British Army has many rôles, and the basic elements of the whole system must be readily adaptable to varied conditions. Such, very briefly, are the types of problem which underlie "Organisation for war" as a primary aspect of Staff Duties.

Closely allied with Organisation is the business of providing communication between the staffs and formations of a force in the field; and a separate branch of "Staff Duties" is charged with this highly modernised work.

An invention such as radio-telephony may in

one sense simplify inter-communication, but each new step in the progress of science creates new problems both technical and tactical. The application to military uses of every means of "signalling," and the organisation for employment in the field of the technical troops (the Royal Corps of Signals), falls, in the sphere of policy, to this special branch of "Staff Duties" where the layman is lost in a strange country of oscillators, ohms and aerials. In its wider aspects "Signals policy" includes all means of communication that affect the Army throughout the Empire, including submarine cables, land-lines and "wireless," the last of which touches many interests and raises some very far-reaching problems. In fact, the work demands a close touch not only with the training of the troops and with the progress of research and design, but also with the requirements of other departments—the Admiralty, the General Post Office and others. Co-ordination of "wireless" work is secured, as between the three Fighting Services, by means of a Wireless Telegraphy Board; and co-ordination in its wider aspect is effected, of course, through the "C.I.D." which possesses a special sub-committee for the purpose, familiarly known as the "I.C.C." (Imperial Communications Committee), on which nine departments are represented.

Turning for the moment from "Staff Duties," the next chief function of the General Staff is the training of the troops for war, and that is the concern of the third directorate, whose chief is the Director of Military Training (in War Office language "the D.M.T.").

Military training has two distinct aspects: the training of the individual soldier and collective training of the men in units. Generally speaking, individual training is carried out in the winter months. Every Infantry soldier fresh from the depot must be trained, for example, in the use of his weapons, in semaphore-signalling, anti-gas measures, map-reading, drill and the use of ground. All leaders of sections, platoons and companies must be trained to command and lead their men. Again, all officers and N.C.O.s must be trained in the various administrative duties which they will have to undertake both in peace and war, such as pay duties, court-martial procedure, the keeping of accounts, or the rules for billeting. Collective training—the training of units—is planned on a progressive system which proceeds through the year in clear-cut stages from early spring to late autumn: from platoon, company and battalion training to the higher formations—brigades and divisions.

The primary business of the local Commands is to train their troops to be fighting assets, and to gain experience in "higher command," the handling of troops in masses, and the co-operation of the several arms, with a view to producing efficient leaders and a staff well trained in all departments. Accordingly, the detailed work of training is "de-centralised" from the War Office to the local commanders; but, paradoxical as the statement sounds, the whole of the task is controlled by the War Office—the special function of the "D.M.T." It is true that soldiers, much less leaders, cannot be produced by the reading of text-books; but it is equally true

that the unity of action which is essential to success in war can be secured only by uniformity of doctrine. In dealing with an army which may be called upon to fight under every condition of climate or ground, and in operations which may vary in scope from "Imperial policing" to a national war, the central direction of the system of training assumes a cardinal importance, and this is the business of the "D.M.T."

Just as in the sphere of organisation the principles are laid down by the General Staff in the classic volumes of *Field Service Regulations*, so from first to last the system and the detailed methods of training are laid down in the Training Regulations and the training manuals for the several arms prepared by this directorate. That is the initial step, and it is supplemented in various ways. The annual programmes of local training are based on "schemes" approved by the War Office, and the training is watched throughout the year by officers of the "M.T." branch and is also "reported on" by the Commands. In this way the experience gained from direct observation and local reports can be used in the preparation of annual instructions to govern the training of each new season, and these instructions or "Training Memoranda," which are issued each spring by the "C.I.G.S.," fulfil a number of functions at once: they pick up the points where improvement is needed; they announce decisions on questions of doubt which the local reports have brought to light; they prescribe the main programme of higher training to be carried out by each Command; and they lay down the special problems to be solved and the trials to be made with experimental equipment in

the course of the coming training-year. The Instructions might prescribe, for example, that "the defence of villages" should be specially studied; that the Cavalry should experiment with a special machine gun, or the Infantry with a new type of tractor. The practice throughout is done by the Commands: the policy comes from the General Staff.

Finally, there are the "exercises" which are carried out under direct supervision, and vary from a "battle-field tour" directed in person by the "C.I.G.S." to the final stage of collective training familiar to the public as "Army Manœuvres." The schemes for War Office exercises for the training of the higher commanders and staffs form the culminating point of the work of "M.T.;" but unfortunately the massing of troops is expensive, and manœuvres on a large scale tend to be few and far between.

Inspectors of Cavalry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Tank Corps and Royal Army Service Corps report direct to "D.M.T." on the training of their respective arms. There is also an Inspector of Fixed Defences. There is no Inspector-General of the Forces. That post, recommended by the Esher Committee, lapsed in 1914 on the outbreak of war. From 1904 to 1907 it was held by the Duke of Connaught, and from 1907 to 1912 by Sir John French. In 1912 the title was changed to Inspector-General of the Home Forces in consequence of the appointment (in 1910) of an Inspector-General of the Overseas Forces, the former being General Sir Charles Douglas (1912-1914) and the latter General Sir Ian Hamilton (1910-1914) who was also General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.

The two offices were merged once more on August 1st, 1914, when Sir John French resumed the appointment, only to relinquish it four days later on assuming the command of the Expeditionary Force.

Another function of training is the provision of instructors, which, so far as it falls to "D.M.T." is attained through the medium of Schools of Instruction. These schools hold courses for various purposes apart from that of producing instructors, but the central idea in all cases is the provision of up-to-date specialist training for selected officers and men. There are nine "schools for the Fighting Arms" which are named and situated as follows: The School of Equitation, at Weedon; the School of Artillery, at Larkhill; the Coast Artillery School, at Shoeburyness; the School of Military Engineering, at Chatham; the School of Electric Lighting, at Portsmouth; the Anti-Aircraft Defence School, at Biggin Hill; the School of Signals, at Catterick; the Royal Tank Corps Central Schools, at Lulworth and at Bovington Camp; and the Small Arms School with its three wings for Machine Gun, Small Arms and Anti-Gas training, at Netheravon, Hythe and Porton. The School of Physical Training, Aldershot, is also directed by the "D.M.T."

The oldest of these very varied foundations is the School of Military Engineering, which was created after the experiences of the Peninsular War by a Royal Warrant of 1812. The predecessor of the Small Arms School was the School of Musketry at Hythe, founded in 1853 for the instruction of the troops in the use of a rifle—the Enfield model introduced in that year. The first school for instruc-

tion in gunnery was established at Shoeburyness in 1859.

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There is yet another large sphere of control which is shared between the two directorates of Staff Duties and Military Training. The generic heading is "Education," but the term is at once too wide and too narrow. Being responsible for the policy of the provision of officers, the General Staff "fathers" the Officers' Training Corps, and controls the instruction at Woolwich and Sandhurst and the examination of candidates for commissions in the Army from the universities and other sources. To assist the provision of Commanding Officers it controls the training at the Senior Officers' School, at which some 120 officers of field rank receive instruction every year. To provide officers for Staff appointments it directs and controls the work of the Staff College. The professional tests of officers for promotion, and the organisation of libraries, are further aspects of the "education" of officers; and finally there are the schools for boys, and a very effective organisation for the education of the soldier and his children.

The history of the older establishments reveals quaint touches here and there.

The first to be created was the Royal Military Academy in the year 1741. The need was set forth to King George II of furnishing instruction "for raw and inexperienced people belonging to the military branch of the Ordnance in the several parts of mathematics necessary to qualify them for the service of the Artillery and the business of the

Engineers." The Master-General of the Ordnance was authorised by royal warrant to set up a school at Woolwich Warren, fitting up a "convenient Room" and appointing "an able and skilful master."

"A Great and Solemn Exercise of Artillery" was here to be performed once a year; and after 1746 instruction in the work of the Laboratory was included. Students were to have "free leave to improve themselves in the art of fire working . . . and whatsoever firework such Engineer, Officer, Bombardier, Cadet, Gunner, or Matross has made or fitted up, the Firemaster or his mate shall put the maker's name thereon before they are delivered into store, to the end that when they shall be tried, the Composer may have notice to see the merits or defects of his performance."

The title "Royal Military Academy" was given in 1764, after which date it was reserved for cadets. The instruction was gratuitous; but after 1774 the cadets had to pass a qualifying test, since some had been found not greatly advanced, being unacquainted with the rule of three. Subsequently, about 1783, the school was removed to Woolwich Common, and the sum of £18,000 was paid for Sir Gregory Page's house. Prior to the Crimean War the cadets, between 14 and 16 years old, were nominated by the Master-General of the Ordnance, and their studies lasted from three to five years; but the whole institution was completely re-organised as the result of a Commission in 1857 when the age of cadets for admission was raised, the period of residence was shortened, and entrance was made competitive.

Meanwhile the creation of a Royal Military College had been sanctioned by Parliament in 1801, the King giving a track of heath land, part of the Crown estate at Sandhurst, and telling the Commons that an establishment had been formed "under His Majesty's directions for promoting the study of Military Science." It was primarily intended for candidates for the Line, and cadets, between the ages of 13 and 15, were admitted on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief, and normally, when old enough, purchased commissions. Changes similar to those at Woolwich were made in 1858, and finally, after the abolition of Purchase, the rule was introduced in 1875 that commissions in the Cavalry and the Infantry should be granted solely by competition, as in the Artillery and the Engineers.

At Sandhurst, however, there was a Senior Department, not for cadets but for serving officers, from which the Staff College ultimately grew. From 1803 onwards a small number of officers, at first 30 and then 15, were given instruction in mathematics, surveying, fortification, French and German. Moved by failures in the Crimea a Select Committee of 1855 recommended that officers who had so qualified should have a claim to Staff appointments; but the Staff College did not take actual shape until after 1870 when a Royal Commission under Lord Dufferin made exhaustive and famous reports on the whole subject of Military Education. A separate College was to be built, the students were to be increased to 40, and the rule was laid down that Staff appointments should be limited to officers who had passed through the Staff College. This is the general rule

to-day; and as regards appointments to the General Staff the right to the initials "p.s.c." is, of course, indispensable. The number of officers at the modern Staff College averages 120, and includes students from India and the Dominions, and also from the Navy and the Royal Air Force.

The average number of cadets at Woolwich is now 185, and at Sandhurst about 510. The education given at all three establishments follows lines laid down by the General Staff.

As regards the education of "other ranks," this function of training has made great progress. There are 15,000 soldiers in the Army to-day who have earned a 1st-class certificate of education, approximately the equivalent of a Schools Certificate. Such a fact would have seemed as incredible as "wireless" to the famous Frederick, Duke of York, in whose far-off days there were serjeant-majors who could neither read nor write. It was this Duke who in 1801 founded the "Royal Military Asylum" at Chelsea for giving free maintenance and education to soldiers' children, particularly orphans and those whose fathers had died in the Service. The school was moved in 1909 from Chelsea to Guston, near Dover, where "The Duke of York's Royal Military School" now holds about 400 boys.

The story of the education of the soldier may also be said to date from the Duke, for the establishment of "regimental schools" for educating the boys of the regiment and the children of the married soldiers was due to his efforts as Commander-in-Chief. These schools were maintained by the Colonels of the regiments with serjeants in charge as school-masters, and since no special qualifications were

demanded of the teachers the instruction given was somewhat uncertain. Voluntary classes were held in the evenings which the grown-up soldier could attend if he wished, a monthly charge being made for the privilege. The next step, the formation of garrison libraries, is attributed to the zeal of Lord Hill, who had been one of Wellington's generals and was known to the Army as "Daddy Hill"; but the first real progress in the education of the soldier must be credited to "the born reformer."

Sidney Herbert, on becoming Secretary-at-War (1846), found the regimental schools so sadly inefficient that he set to work to provide trained masters, and set up at Chelsea a "Normal School" to provide an example of a model school and to train students to be Army schoolmasters. The management of Army schools was placed in the charge of the Chaplain-General, and an order in the name of the Duke of Wellington of 10th April, 1849, compelled all recruits to attend school for two hours daily, and to pay fees, until proficient. A little later (1857) progress justified a general rule that no soldier could be promoted corporal who was not at least tolerably proficient in reading, writing and arithmetic. The fees disappeared in 1864. Then the Dufferin Commission of 1870 thoroughly revised the whole system, and Army schools passed into the charge of a Director-General of Military Education responsible to the Secretary of State. In those days there were four certificates, and attendance at school was compulsory until a soldier secured the lowest of these: this amount of compulsory education remained in force until 1887.

The modern scheme started in 1920 with the formation of the Army Educational Corps and a school at Shorncliffe for training instructors. The recruit is now educated by trained teachers to earn a certificate (3rd class) before he leaves the depot to join a unit. After that point education is voluntary, but a soldier does not earn "proficiency pay" until he has secured his "2nd class," and this rule is a potent spur to attainment since 3d. a day depends on the effort! The numbers who gain "1st-class" certificates, which are necessary for promotion to Warrant rank, are an indication of the high standard that is required in the modern Army for the higher non-commissioned ranks. As to children's schools, the modern policy is to hand over the education of children to local authorities wherever possible, and only to maintain schools in this country where civil facilities are not available. A point which is frequently raised in Parliament is whether in all this Army work touch is maintained with the Board of Education. "The answer is in the affirmative."

A special Scottish establishment, a counterpart to the Duke of York's School, is the Queen Victoria School at Dunblane, which was built and equipped by public subscription as a memorial to Queen Victoria in the year 1905.

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
This sketch of the duties of a large department does not pretend to be exhaustive. It can only indicate the main spheres of work, and the grouping of these under the three Directors is shown, for the convenience of the reader, in the form of a diagram

attached. The General Staff at the War Office comprises some 90 serving officers; while the military and civilian clerks, and the staff for translation, maps, and printing number about 160.

The number of officers has been criticised often; but in this respect the General Staff is in a particularly vulnerable position, for "policy" is a vague word, and "the thinking department" is a vulnerable title. Actually, any new military proposal, even as small as an alteration of uniform, may involve some aspect of General Staff work, and the General Staff has the leading voice in the settlement of priority of importance as between the host of new proposals which compete with each other every year for the limited funds at the disposal of the Council. But the paramount task, which is clearly a vast one, is that of ensuring throughout the Empire that similarity in organisation, in training, and in education which alone can result in efficient Defence. If the tendency of modern conditions is to leave little room for genius in the field, then efficiency of organisation must become the determining factor in war: and that is the task of the Imperial General Staff which is focussed in the first of the Military Departments.

# CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF

(First Military Member of Council)



## Chapter VII

### THE MATTER OF MEN

THE second military division of the War Office is the department of the Adjutant-General to the Forces.

The title “Adjutant-General” is of considerable antiquity. In Cromwell’s New Model Army there were three such officers, two of the Horse and one of the Foot. The post was added to the standing Army in the year 1673, and after being dropped in 1675 was continued again from 1680 onwards. In that astonishing eighteenth century when the Army fought with such vast success in building up the British Empire and the King commanded the Army in peace, there were two chief military officers who handled orders received from the Sovereign through the office of the Secretary-at-War; and of these one was the Adjutant-General. In 1779 his small office occupied two rooms in Crown Street, Westminster, and his peace functions, so far as they are known, were confined to the issue of Orders and Regulations.

It is not until 1793 that he comes into greater prominence. Throughout that century, as we have seen, the policy of Parliament was to scatter the forces in small commands and to entrust their command as a whole in peace-time to no one person other than the Sovereign. Perhaps Parliament remembered

that essay of Bacon in which "trainings of men and arming them in several places and under several commanders" are recommended as measures of safety in dealing with things such as "men of warre." In any case, one unfortunate result was that the selection and promotion of officers was frequently a matter of political influence. In discussing the Estimates of 1792 Mr. Fox called the attention of the House of Commons to the dismissal of officers for reasons of politics, and on the outbreak<sup>\*</sup> of the war with France, when occasion was taken to remedy matters by reviving the post of Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General came to the front as one of the officers of the Chief's staff.

Under the system inaugurated by the Duke of York the office became more important, regulations being issued to all the forces laying down a uniform system of discipline, and the returns of strength, which hitherto had been few and inaccurate, being largely increased and carefully prepared "that the information required by Parliament might be supplied through the Adjutant-General's department with accuracy."<sup>\*\*</sup> When recruiting was added to the duties of the office, its expenses for the half year which ended in June, 1808, reached a total of £1,537 1s. 1d.

From that time onwards the "Adjutant-General of the Forces" was a principal officer of "the Military Department" which carried out the duties of the Commander-in-Chief. In the Stanhope reforms of 1887-8 he was recognised as the principal assistant to the Chief, with a general control over the military

\* Note 12, page 344.

branches; and finally in 1895, under Lord Lansdowne's re-organisation, the "A.-G.'s" department attained a separate entity as one of the principal divisions of the War Office. In those days it was charged with the discipline, the education and the training of the troops, with recruiting and discharges, and with patterns of clothing; but under the reforms of the Esher Committee it assumed the duties which it now discharges, except that the control of the Auxiliary Forces, then placed under the Adjutant-General, has since been removed to a different charge.

The Esher Reports were most explicit. "The proper functions," they said, "of an Adjutant-General comprise the raising and maintenance of the military forces, discipline, drafts, reliefs, establishments, and all that relates to the care of the soldier in peace and war." By "maintenance" the Committee meant maintenance in *men*, and these "proper functions" are closely followed in the organisation as it exists to-day. The business of the Adjutant-General is principally concerned with "men," or in Army phrase with "personnel," and the department consists of three sub-divisions—the directorate of Recruiting and Organisation, the directorate of Personal Services, and the department of Army Medical Services, whose head is a Director-General.

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The first task of the Adjutant-General is inadequately described as "Organisation," which in turn is closely bound up with Recruiting and is dealt with by the same Director.

Just as the General Staff take the lead in the organisation of the Army for war, so the organisation of the forces in *peace* is predominantly the business of the Adjutant-General. The phrase "Peace Organisation" has a simple sound, but the task involved is in fact the pursuit of an endless problem in economy which, from the point of view of the layman, seems to call for that craft and tireless patience which distinguish the solver of jig-saw puzzles. The central problem of "Organisation" is to settle the "Peace Establishments" of the Army: in other words to settle the number of men, in every arm and service and in every rank, who must be kept with the colours each year in peace.

The Army in peace has two functions: one, sometimes described as "policing the Empire," being that of providing the garrisons abroad, which must be kept always at the strength requisite for immediate action in local defence; while the other is to hold in readiness at home, and to be able to place in the field quickly, a Field Force of a given size. Now, the normal soldier serves with the colours for a part only of his term of enlistment: he serves with the colours for (say) seven years and then in the Reserve for (say) five years. Thus the task of the War Office is complicated by the fact that 25,000 men, on an average, are lost to the colours every year by the flow to the Reserve and by normal wastage. At the same time the system is economical, for to pay and maintain as serving Regulars the full number of men required for discharging both of the functions of the Army would be an extremely expensive method, as well as being unnecessary; and in times of "finan-

cial stringency," when the Estimates are condemned to forcible slimming, all needless costs must be avoided.

The economy of the Reserve is obvious. The task of improving our military efficiency by keeping pace with modern developments, of which mechanisation provides one example, demands money at every stage; and this means that the ordinary maintenance costs (pay, food, clothing and so on) must be kept at the lowest possible figure. The reservist is relatively inexpensive: he costs some £16 a year, while an Infantry private serving with the colours costs over £100 a year. Clearly one means of saving money is to supplement the numbers serving with the colours with the maximum possible number of reservists. Again, any reasonable scheme for a Field Force must allow of an interval between "zero hour" and the despatch of at least a part of the force; and a second plan, if this interval permits, is to train men *after* mobilisation who are not required as "Regulars" in peace. This is practicable in certain categories: for example, it is practicable in the case of the men whose technical training in civil life would enable them to be used as soldiers at once or after a very short preparation. The Royal Army Service Corps, to quote an instance, employs soldier-tradesmen of twenty-five trades. The use of a special type of reservist was a feature of the Haldane proposals, which contemplated using Militia artillerymen as drivers for ammunition columns that formed part of his Striking Force; and the Supplementary Reserve of to-day includes a category of officers and men who do no training at all in peace,

their allotted duties on mobilisation being their technical duties in civil life. Here, then, is a second means of economy.

In fine, to ensure the maximum saving, a minute scrutiny of every type of unit, of every trade and of every rank, would settle the minimum number of men who must be kept with the colours in time of peace (i.e. serving soldiers on full pay) to enable each unit to mobilise in war—not forgetting, of course, its peace-time functions. The unit must be large enough to train efficiently, and also to provide its annual quota of trained drafts for the garrisons abroad; but, with these limitations, its "peace establishment" can be fixed at the minimum number of soldiers which, duly increased by its quotas of reservists and possibly of post-mobilisation recruits, will place the unit on a war footing.

That is the background, so to speak, against which the detailed task is set—to organise every type of unit, every staff and depot and school and institution to be fit for its functions at minimum cost. If conditions were static the work would be limited, but the Heraclitean doctrine of flux is painfully true of modern conditions. Nothing is stabilised: everything changes. In practice the heading "Organisation" should be amended to read "Re-organisation." A scheme to mechanise first-line transport is applied, for example, to the Cavalry regiment and involves, incidentally, Ordnance workshops: a change in the rôle of the Tank Battalion entirely alters its composition: the introduction of a new weapon means the re-organisation of Infantry units. Other obvious examples of new needs are provided by modern

signalling methods in the sphere of "wireless" and air co-operation. The tendency of this type of change is to increase requirements in trained experts, and a ceaseless search for balancing economies is, in fact, compulsory. Since other military branches are concerned, and also the Finance branches, all alterations in Peace Establishments are considered by a special standing committee.

This side of the business of "Organisation" is linked closely with the parallel task of finding the necessary number of men. As regards reservists, the size of the Reserve for any Arm can be regulated in several ways. For example, the terms of service can be changed: for terms which prescribe, say, 4 years with the Colours and 8 in the Reserve will, if altered to terms of 3 years and 9, produce in due course a larger reserve. Again, Section D of the Army Reserve, which consists of a number of men who have served for 12 years but are allowed to continue, can be closed or opened for any Arm. The supplementing of the Reserve proper in certain classes of troops, mainly technical trades, is managed by means of the Supplementary Reserve, which is based on the system of short annual training (or in some cases no training at all) and the payment of annual gratuities or bounties in return for the liability of the officers and men to be called out on service on mobilisation. Railway troops, motor-drivers, clerks for Pay Corps offices and mechanical engineers are typical classes; and since the numbers to be maintained in all cases depend upon mobilisation requirements, all reserves must be constantly watched.

Turning to the Recruiting side, the work of

recruiting the Regular Army involves the enlistment every year of about twenty-five thousand men.

The history of recruiting has points of interest. In theory compulsory enlistment ceased for ever in the year 1640, but in practice methods amounting to impressment were employed frequently after that date. In the century which followed the Revolution recruiting was carried out by the colonels of regiments, a sum for each man being received from the Crown to cover pay and the cost of clothes and recruitment, which was credited to a "Stock Purse Fund" and the balance divided at the end of the year between the senior officers of the regiment. Incidentally, the function of the officials with the strange name of "Commissaries of Musters" was to watch that the Crown was not cheated in this matter; that the men for whom the allowance was paid existed in the flesh and not merely on paper: a precaution which was highly necessary, since servants were frequently dressed up for the occasion to act the part of the missing numbers.

To raise recruits was no easy matter, for the pay was low, the housing was execrable, and the discipline was extremely severe, so that every sort of expedient was employed to entice the yokel into Army service. One of the most important functions of the Secretary-at-War in the eighteenth century was to protect the civilian who claimed to have been "pressed." Again, in the event of emergency, which was frequent, when the Army, always kept at a minimum, suddenly had to be increased largely, conscription limited to certain classes was used as a definite policy. Throughout the eighteenth century

criminals and paupers were impressed for the wars: in fact, the recruiting policy of those days, whether an emergency was threatening or not, was to fill the ranks with the cheapest labour at the lowest possible cost to the State.

The normal enlistment was held to be for life or for so long as the Crown required the man's service, and a soldier could only obtain his discharge as a result of a bargain with his Commanding Officer. Short-term or "duration of war" enlistment was employed exceptionally, in the event of a crisis, when extra men were required quickly. Parliament liked short-term enlistment. The policy was to get rid of the soldiers as soon as the particular war was over; and after 1783, when Burke's Act abolished the Stock Purse Fund and recruiting, except in the case of the Guards, was undertaken by the Government, spasmodic attempts were made in the House to introduce the principle of short service as the general rule for the Army in peace. "Life" enlistment, however, remained the normal practice until half way through the nineteenth century. In 1847 an Act was passed introducing a limit of 10 or 12 years with a contingent claim to re-engagement to complete a period of 21 years. The modern system of short-term service, spent partly with the Colours and partly in the Reserve, was started in 1870 by Cardwell's Army Enlistment Act. The periods, but not the principle, have since been changed frequently. Normal service to-day in the Infantry of the Line is for 7 years with the Colours and 5 in the Reserve: the terms vary for the several Arms.

In the House of Commons in April, 1934, the

opinion was voiced that the life of the soldier in the Army to-day is painted in far too glamorous colours: that in actual fact it is dull and drab. If this is true, the percentage of recruits who leave civil employment in order to enlist becomes a truly astounding figure. A corporal in the Army to-day is paid a minimum of 31s. 6d. a week, receives free facilities for education, plentiful games, good food and clothes, decent housing, free medical attendance and a certain measure of free insurance. A further fact that is not, perhaps, known generally is that thirty vacancies at Woolwich and Sandhurst are reserved every year for "ranker" cadets who receive free training as potential officers. It is no part of the policy of the War Office to make promises which it cannot fulfil.

In older days the intake of recruits was increased by lowering the standards required; but the modern policy is to keep these high and rely on the Army's "drawing power" supplemented by a new system which has increased the number of recruiting centres and has placed a Chief Recruiting Officer at the disposal of each Area Commander. The Commands are organised in recruiting "zones," and the work is as far as possible local; but the control and adjustment of the whole machine, which now includes an Inspector of Recruiting, is a function of "D.R.O." at the War Office. The problem of to-day is one of quality. A high standard of quality in recruits is not only necessary to the modern Army, but is definitely economical. Less money is wasted in training recruits who prove later on to be useless to the Army.

This joint directorate has eight branches. One is the Recruiting branch; and another has the special duty of watching the "mobilisation" problem from the point of view of preparedness, particularly in its man-power aspect. The functions common to most of the rest, apart from the question of Peace Establishments, relate to postings and transfers, the distribution of units, the finding of drafts for units abroad, and the annual programme of changes of station. The general principle of the "Trooping" programme, which will be mentioned again in another connection, is to combine fairness to units with economy to the State. It aims at so distributing service overseas that no unit shall remain too long where the climate or training facilities are poor.

The number of branches is due to the fact that they deal with nine separate arms or corps. One acts as "co-ordinator," and possesses a section with the endless task of compiling the necessary statistics of strength of each and every part of the Army, including the duty of intelligent guessing at probable strengths at future dates.

An interesting institution with which the "D.R.O." is concerned from the point of view of "finding the men" is the Army Technical School for boys. Situated at Beachley, near Chepstow, this school holds some seven hundred boys, who are trained to be blacksmiths, carpenters, fitters, electricians, masons and other "tradesmen"; thus assisting to meet a constant need.

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The second division of "A.G." business is con-

trolled by the Director of Personal Services, whose first function is Discipline.

By the law of England a man who joins the Army, whether he joins as an officer or a soldier, remains subject in general to the ordinary law; but he becomes subject also to another code, entirely distinct, known as "military law," which governs all the members of the Army and regulates their conduct as such at all times and places in peace and in war.\*

The object of this special code is twofold: to provide for discipline, for which purpose acts such as disobedience must be made punishable offences; and to provide for such administrative matters as terms of service, enlistment, discharge and billeting. Such military law is not "martial law" in the proper sense of that loosely-used phrase. "Martial law" in its proper sense means the suspension of ordinary law and the government of a country by military tribunals—a method which is employed in some foreign countries, when a grave riot or war is threatened, by a simple declaration on the part of the Government that the country is in "a state of siege." As far as the British Army is concerned, one can use the phrase properly, if somewhat loosely, of the law imposed in an enemy country by the commander of forces in occupation; but "martial law" in its strict sense, in which it suspends the ordinary law, could only be established in this country by a special Act of Parliament. Exceptional measures, such as placing a district under military control, can be taken by the Crown under common-law right, if the circumstances warrant such action; but the ordinary law is not

\* Note 13, page 344.

thereby suspended. When military control in cases of that kind is called "martial law," the term is being used in a general sense. The strict meaning is mentioned here in order to avoid confusion, for in earlier days "martial law" was used to cover a multitude of sins.

Rules for enforcing discipline in the field were necessary from early times, since the armies were frequently fighting abroad where the civil law did not apply. Such rules, which later were called "Articles of War," were issued under the authority of the King, and ceased to operate when peace was concluded. They were issued, for instance, by Richard II; by Henry V for his wars with France; and by Charles I to please himself. This last was an attempt to use "martial law" at the will of the Crown *in time of peace*, and as such was strongly resented by the Commons and declared to be illegal in the Petition of Right. But when after the Restoration the King was allowed to have "Guards and Garrisons" the necessity for a standing code of military discipline was obvious, and Charles II had to issue Articles of War which in time of peace were really illegal. The earlier codes had been very severe, but in these post-Restoration Articles the death penalty was expressly reserved; and only the consequent laxity of discipline forced the hand of the Commons at last to legalise a peace-time code.

Even then, in 1689, the Mutiny Act was purely temporary and required renewal every year to legalise military law in peace: in fact, with the exception of certain short intervals Mutiny Acts were passed annually from 1690 to 1879. At the

latter date the Mutiny Act contained 110 clauses, and the Articles of War, which still existed but had long since been made statutory, numbered 192. Naturally very few officers could understand such intricate codes, and a single Act was passed in that year to comprise the whole body of military law. It was re-named the Army Act in 1881.

An interesting feature of the debates in the Commons in 1879 was the defeat of a proposal to abolish flogging by a margin of 106 votes. Flogging was abolished three years later. As regards the death penalty, the present restriction is a development of the post-war years. Since legislation of 1930 the death penalty is confined in peace to mutiny and sedition, and on active service to mutiny and sedition and certain treacherous offences.

The Army Act, then, as amended from time to time by the annual Act which gives it sanction, is the present code of discipline which, supplemented by the King's Regulations, is administered by the Adjutant-General. The great bulk of questions of discipline are naturally matters for settlement locally, but major cases, and all which present unusual features, are sent up to the War Office.

Military offences requiring trial are, of course, tried by courts-martial, whose far-off and romantic origin was the Court of Chivalry of the Middle Ages. Even with the present high standard of conduct district courts-martial at home and in the colonies number, roughly, a thousand a year, and a great deal of "Personal Services" work consists in examining the major cases, from the point of view of remission of sentence and of Army discipline

generally. From the point of legality all courts-martial are reviewed automatically by an independent civil official, the Judge Advocate General to the Forces, who is appointed by special Letters Patent as official adviser to the Secretary of State on the administration of military law. General courts-martial are few, of course; but since they concern very grave offences they normally require to be confirmed by the King, from whom all the powers of courts-martial derive, and accordingly they come to the Army Council. Similarly, since every officer of the Army is entitled under the Army Act to enter an appeal for redress of grievance not only to the Council but also to the Sovereign, appeals which involve any question of discipline are considered first by the Adjutant-General before they are examined by the Army Council and report is made, in the latter case, through the Secretary of State to His Majesty. The question has been known to be asked whether these appeals really reach the King. His Majesty not only sees the appeal but approves the decision with his own hand.

Among more ordinary "discipline" cases may be mentioned desertions, fraudulent enlistments, and courts of inquiry into losses by fire; and a fairly extensive sphere of work concerns military prisons and detention barracks. The sentence of imprisonment can be passed only by courts-martial, and soldiers sentenced for military offences are sent to the special military prisons which exist at Aldershot, Stirling and Cairo. A Commanding Officer is not allowed to sentence a man to more than "detention," which is carried out in Detention Barracks. This

latter punishment was introduced to avoid the stigma attached to imprisonment when soldiers are convicted of military offences which do not warrant discharge from the Army.

A special side of "Personal Services" is to represent the interests of the soldier, particularly on questions of pay and the like; and the military "case" on these subjects is focussed in this directorate.

The interests of the soldier are manifold, and this duty consequently has a wide range. At one end of the scale is the pursuit of the tradition associated with the Duke of Cambridge, and later with Lord Roberts when Commander-in-Chief, of removing what may be called "pin-pricks"—those regulations or customary rules which are found by the experience of commanding officers to be avoidable sources of irritation to the Army. At the other end of the scale is the important work of providing civil employment for the soldier when he leaves the Colours. Here the War Office acts in two ways: in one, by providing Training Centres where soldiers in the last few months of their service are made competent workers in civil trades; in another, by assisting the voluntary work of placing ex-soldiers in actual employment. This question is not an easy one. Some 3,000 men leave the Colours each year who have served in the Army in a specialised trade such as "wireless," motor-driving or music; but a problem is created by the thousands of others who would be thrown on the market as unskilled labour unless some special steps were taken to enhance their prospects of civil employment. Work of this kind on a small scale was done regimentally in pre-war days, but large schemes

came into being in the long period of "demobilisation" when the war-time soldiers were being discharged, and finally in 1923 the task was taken in hand by the War Office and "vocational training" was made official.

There are now three Vocational Training Centres, at Chiseldon in Wiltshire, Hounslow and Aldershot, which can take about fourteen hundred students, the normal course being for six months. The building trades, the engineering trades, poultry and pig-keeping, dairy farming—the soldier can choose from a varied selection and is thus given the opportunity of equipping himself with a civil trade. In the twelve months ending on September 30th, 1934, 2,536 men were trained, of whom 2,198 proceeded direct into skilled occupations. This War Office scheme is in one sense unique; for probably there exists no other employer who allows his men to be struck off the work for which they are paid for a period of six months and to devote that time to improving their prospects.

Nor does the work end there. Ever since the days of Cardwell the early discharge of the short-service soldier has created this civil-employment problem, and the work of the voluntary organisations was in full swing before the war. The society now called the National Association for Employment of Regular Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen, and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society, were familiar pre-war institutions; but the modern development is wider in scope. Every unit in these days has its own Regimental Association which finds work for its own members and supports the National

Association; the British Legion gives further help through its 3,500 branches; a preference is given to ex-Service men in filling many posts in Government service; and finally, since 1932, soldiers are registered with the Employment Exchanges and the organisation of the Ministry of Labour is joined as a helpful and powerful ally with the work of the regiments and the voluntary schemes. To negotiate all these arrangements, to keep the Army informed of the opportunities offered, and to supervise both sides of the work, Vocational Training and "job"-finding are tasks which fall to the "D.P.S."

"Personal Services" are miscellaneous, for they include the nomination of Garrison Adjutants, questions of leave and of medical boards, the precedence of units, regimental honours, the award of medals and ceremonial. One curious entry in the list of duties consists of the simple phrase "The Word," which refers to the selection every three months, and the secret announcement to those concerned, of a pass-word of great import. In theory no person without this pass-word could gain access to the King's palace or "the Royal Palace and Fortress of the Tower of London," and accordingly "The Word" has been duly changed and solemnly announced to the Household Troops and the Constable of the Tower for the past two hundred and fifty years—ever since, in fact, King Charles II deemed it wise to take some little precautions in the matter of nightly visitors. This small concession to the picturesque is distinguished in a prosaic era by possessing no strikingly practical value.

Questions of regimental Distinctions have, of

course, a real importance. Honorary Distinctions take various forms.\* Perhaps the best known are Battle Honours consisting in the name of an action or a campaign—the earliest is “Tangier 1662-80”—and Badges, of which the first to be granted was “The Lion of Nassau” of William III. All claims to Distinctions are weighed with great care and awards are submitted for the King’s approval; for a platitude which is particularly true of His Majesty’s Imperial Forces is that sentiment plays a very valuable part in the fostering of *esprit de corps*.

Alliances between Dominion and Home units form another item in this type of work; and the business involved in the award of Medals is large enough even at this date, after the lapse of fifteen years since the Great War medals began to be issued, to occupy a special section. Enquiries for medals are still voluminous: every mention in the Press of the War medals brings a train of applications of all kinds. Many who served only at home write to apply for a Home Service medal; others claim for wars of half a century ago; others write to say that their ancestors fought in the Peninsula or in the Crimea, or in Bechuanaland in '84—a campaign for which no medal was issued. The checking of claims is the chief work; and this extends to the current issues of Long Service medals and Efficiency medals, to claims to the award of campaign pensions, which depend on the possession of a war medal, and to the annual crop of appeals, genuine and otherwise, for forfeited medals to be restored or for lost medals to be replaced. Moreover, new awards of medals have been made

\* For further details see Note 14, page 344.

since 1918 for minor campaigns or expeditions numbering no less than eighteen. There was a time shortly after the War when the Medal branch, then very large, was dealing with 30,000 medals a day, and the following figures may be of interest as showing the size of the work carried out: for at that time complaints were loud regarding the swollen staffs at the War Office.

There were issued, beginning in the year 1919, and excluding the issues made in bulk to the Dominions:—

1914 Stars .. ..	366,200
Clasps to the 1914 Star ..	150,000
1914-15 Stars .. ..	2,083,000
British War Medals .. ..	5,700,000
Victory Medals .. ..	5,145,000
Territorial Force War Medals ..	340,000

*For Gallant and Meritorious Service*

Military Crosses .. ..	41,000
Distinguished Conduct Medals ..	33,000
Military Medals .. ..	129,000
Meritorious Service Medals ..	29,000
Emblems for Mentions in Despatches .. ..	126,000

The ribbon attached to these Stars and Medals would stretch for over 2,000 miles; and the card-index for the Great War contains more than 8,000,000 names.

Finally, as an apanage of Ceremonial, the "D.P.S." deals with military bands, and the administration of Kneller Hall, the Royal Military School of Music.

The question of the engagement of military bands for concert work in their spare time was once a sore parliamentary subject, and is governed by very precise rules framed to prevent unfair competition; but the dominant factor in the situation is neither military nor political but that powerful person "the man in the street," who insists on demanding military music.

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The atmosphere of ancient tradition which pervades the sphere of Ceremonial is signally and very properly absent from the last of the "A.-G.'s" three directorates, the department of Army Medical Services.

No contrast with old-time Army methods is stronger than that presented to-day by the modern medical organisation. In the "enlightened" eighteenth century, both during and after Marlborough's campaigns, arrangements for attending the sick and wounded in the field were still in so elementary a stage that Sir John Pringle, the Physician-General at the time of Fontenoy, was one of the first to organise hospital work outside the individual regiment. Even as late as the Peninsular War the service was almost purely regimental. Every regiment had its surgeon and surgeon's mate, and these looked after their own sick and wounded whether in regimental or general hospitals.

The real trouble of these earlier days was that the Medical Department was merely a staff, separated as usual from other Army departments and administering no medical corps. The medical

officers of each regiment had no trained subordinate staff nor any special medical transport: the men who attended the wounded in hospital were fighting soldiers withdrawn from the line, and the officers had to improvise transport by borrowing carts as best they could. Sir James M'Grigor, Director-General from 1815 to 1851, was a famous figure who urged reform, but very little was done to improve matters; and when the Crimean crisis came, where the general hospitals were far from the front on the farther side of the Black Sea, the regimental system broke down completely. As soon as the expedition was contemplated a Hospital Conveyance Corps was organised for bringing the wounded from the field to the hospitals and providing nursing and war attendants; but it consisted mainly of aged pensioners, an untrained and drunken crowd whom the Medical staff had no power to control, and conditions were rendered still more hopeless by the fatal separation of the several departments, each terrified of responsibility, who were charged with supplying essential needs. Food, medicines and medical stores might all be ordered but never delivered; or, if delivered, were unsuitable; or, if suitable, were inadequate in quantity. From this tragic chaos the Army was delivered by the brain and the heart and the will of a woman.

The efficient modern medical system with its trained and well-equipped nursing service owes its first beginning to a chance meeting in the winter of 1847. Sidney Herbert, lately Secretary-at-War, was spending a holiday in Rome when he met and recognised genius in the young Miss Florence Nightingale.

Seven years later, once more in office and shocked by *The Times* reports from the front, he wrote and asked for her expert help, and tore his way through a mass of red tape, of official objection and military prejudice, to despatch Miss Nightingale and forty nurses to the terrible scenes of the wards at Scutari. We are not concerned here with the gentle picture of "The Lady with the Lamp" whom the soldier worshipped, but with the clear brain of the "passionate statistician" who, asked by the Secretary of State for advice, replied in a book of 800 pages\* which proved beyond possibility of rebuttal that 10,053 British soldiers died from disease in seven months, after quite unnecessary suffering, through a mixture of apathy and muddle. "I stand at the altar of the murdered men, and while I live I fight their cause," wrote Florence Nightingale in her private notes; and helped by the Queen, by Sidney Herbert as Secretary of State, and by all progressive officers of the Army, Miss Nightingale fulfilled her promise. Her "Notes" were not merely critical: they contained complete constructive proposals for improving the health and the care of the soldier. Indeed, she devoted her life to this purpose.

The Royal Commission of 1858 on "The Sanitary Conditions of the Army," which Miss Nightingale inspired and Sidney Herbert controlled, started a steady march of progress. The more immediate results were the improvement of barracks, the better planning of hospital buildings, the introduction of women nurses, the allotment of transport to the Medical Service, the raising of the pay and status of

\* Note 15, page 345.

the officers, and the foundation of an Army Medical School. The next great change was made by Cardwell in the year 1873. Regimental hospitals were now abolished and with them the regimental system, and gradually from this time onwards the corps of medical subordinate ranks, which was started in 1855 with the title "The Army Hospital Corps," was assimilated with the Medical Department.

The red-letter day in this story was June 23rd, 1898, when a royal warrant issued by Queen Victoria created the Royal Army Medical Corps with the ranks and titles of the fighting Arms. From the tragedy of the Crimean hospitals arose a corps which in four years dealt with two millions of wounded men on the western front in the Great War, and carried six millions of wounded and sick in ambulance trains from the front to the base. The present establishment of the R.A.M.C. is 526 officers and some 3,300 other ranks; and the health of the Army is so much considered that 120 Dental officers are employed to look after the soldiers' teeth. Full and interesting statistics are contained every year in the published *Report on the Health of the Army*, which is on sale. There are 45 military hospitals proper, of which 17 are at stations abroad, and the largest are at Netley, Woolwich, Aldershot, Cairo, Millbank, Tidworth and Malta. There are also hospitals for military families, 12 at home and 5 overseas.

The work of the Medical Department at the War Office is divided between five branches, and covers the administration of the whole Corps, of its reserves, of the Royal Army Medical College, of hospitals and medical treatment, of the supply of stores, and of

hygiene. The Director-General is assisted also by an Advisory Board and a Consultative Committee composed of civilian and military experts, the one body to advise on policy and the other on professional questions. One branch administers the nursing service.


Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service owes a great debt to royal ladies. From a small beginning in 1856 Queen Victoria's support of Florence Nightingale led, first, to the employment of nursing sisters in the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley and the Herbert Hospital at Woolwich; next, to the appointment of a staff of nurses to all military General Hospitals; and finally, in 1881, to the formation of an Army Nursing Service. Queen Alexandra continued the work, and was zealous in giving personal service as President of the Nursing Board introduced by Mr. St. John Brodrick; and our present Queen, in the same capacity, is a valued patron and staunch friend. The function performed by the branch at the War Office, headed by the Matron-in-Chief, is the recruitment and control of the whole Service.

\* \* \* \*

Thus, to sum up, the Adjutant-General divides his task between three directorates—for recruiting and peace organisation, for "personal services" and for the Medical Service. The staff on April 1st, 1934, comprised 48 officers serving or retired, a Matron-in-Chief and a Principal Matron, 2 civilian inspectors of medical supplies and 142 clerks. The distribution of the main duties is shown in the diagram appended.

## ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO THE FORCES

(2nd Military Member of Council)



*Note.* A.G. branches Nos. 8 and 9, which administer the personnel of the R.A.S.C. and the R.A.O.C., serve also under the Quarter-Master-General and the Master-General of the Ordnance, respectively, as regards the civilian personnel of those corps.

## Chapter VIII

### THE MATTER OF MAINTENANCE

THE third military division of the War Office is the department of the Quarter-Master-General to the Forces.

The history of the title “Quarter-Master-General” runs parallel to that of the Adjutant-General. In the New Model Army of Cromwell there were two, one of the Horse under the commander of the Cavalry, and one of the Foot under the commander of the Infantry. A Quarter-Master-General of the Forces as a whole is first traced after the Restoration in the year 1686, and was concerned solely with “march and quartering.” Throughout the eighteenth century his office remained a very small one, for as late as 1803 it consisted only of 7 officers, 3 clerks and 2 messengers. At the latter date it had become part, with the Adjutant-General, of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, and such work of a “General Staff” type as was done in the time of Wellington appears to have fallen to this officer in addition to movement and quartering duties.

Omitting here the incessant changes and re-allocations of War Office duties which followed the Crimean reform, the Esher Reports of 1904 assigned the following to the “Q.M.G.”: Transport and Remounts, Movement and Quartering, Supplies and

Clothing, and the Charge of Equipment and Ordnance stores. "Ordnance" stores meant the military stores such as arms, ammunition, vehicles and equipment handled by the Army Ordnance Department, which were thus made over to the "Q.M.G." in addition to barrack and general stores for which he was already responsible. This, a perfectly logical arrangement, was the system which obtained in the Great War, but an important change has since been made under stress of modern developments. As a result of the expansion of mechanisation, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and with it the charge of all military stores, was transferred in 1927 to the care of the Master-General of the Ordnance, where it certainly belongs by historical claim.

Accordingly the Quarter-Master-General to the Forces now deals with the feeding, the housing and the conveyance of the troops, and the provision and care of animals, but no longer has charge of military stores; and his department comprises the five directorates of Movements and Quartering, Supplies and Transport, Remounts, Veterinary Services and Works—"Works" being a term meaning building services. The niceties of military nomenclature are much in evidence in this department. Thus the Director of Supplies and Transport has nothing to do with "transportation"; and the Director of Movements and Quartering who deals with "transportation services" (railway, sea and inland water) has nothing to do with transport vehicles. "Supplies," again, has a technical content, meaning food, forage, fuel and light, water, petrol and certain lubricants. "Remounts" is a term of art

for horses; and in classification, if seldom in manners, a mule is a horse.

\* \* \* \*

The quartering of the military forces is, historically, a sore subject.

In the days when an army was created for the occasion the need arose only in time of war, and a gentleman known as the High Harbinger demanded quarters in the name of the King; but Charles I liked to keep his soldiers together with or without the excuse of war, and went so far in abusing the right to "quarter" that the Commons were forced to petition the King "to remove this intolerable burden," and the Petition of Right of 1628 declared billeting to be illegal. This fact does not appear, however, to have occasioned much worry to Charles II. His circumstances were difficult, for his "guards and garrisons" could not have been quartered, even had he wished it, in the scattered fortresses which then existed, and Parliament had provided no barracks. The Crown, entitled to "dispose" the Army wherever it chose, was obliged to have recourse to billeting whether it was illegal or not, and a royal warrant of 1672 gave express instructions to quarter troops in "victualling houses, taverns and ale-houses," and, if these were not enough, then "in other houses"; and the soldier, being frequently left without pay, was compelled to live free at the charge of his host. The subject had no redress whatever, and the practice was declared illegal once more by an Act of 1679. This again did not deter James II from violating the law throughout his reign, and

when William III landed in England, billeting, we are told by Clode, was "probably the greatest social evil endured by the people" at that time; so that William, having accepted the throne on conditions of "parliamentary" behaviour which included the avoidance of this abuse, issued a proclamation at once (January 1689) which forbade billeting in private houses "without the free and voluntary consent of the owner."

But the troops had to be quartered somewhere, and Parliament found itself forced to take action. Confronted not only by a rebellion in Ireland but also by a war with France "whereby there is occasion for the marching of many regiments . . . towards the sea coast and otherwise," Parliament, having authorised the existence of an Army, was compelled to give sanction to billeting on the march. To be sure, this Act (the 2nd Mutiny Act) was cautious and purely temporary. It empowered the constables and other magistrates to quarter officers and soldiers on the march in "inns, livery stables, ale-houses, victualling houses, and all houses selling brandy, strong waters, cyder or metheglin by retaile, to be dranke in their houses and noe other, and in noe private houses whatsoever." However, the power thus cautiously admitted was re-enacted in subsequent Mutiny Acts, and was used for soldiers who were *not* on the march; and the fact that the keepers of ale-houses were underpaid, if paid at all, for the food which they found themselves forced to provide, created, as the years went on, first a grievance and then a crisis.

"We see," said a speaker in the House of

Commons, "what an encroaching thing an army is. Free lodging for soldiers is now become a continual and settled thing upon public-houses." That was in 1741, and the Secretary-at-War had lately been much disturbed on the point, dreading in fact a mutiny, for the publicans had taken to closing their doors. Later, indeed, on the south coast it became a practice with the innkeepers to take down their signboards and throw up their licences upon the approach of troops who were ordered to be quartered. Thus at last, in 1792, Parliament was compelled, much against its will, to take steps to erect barracks.

The building of barracks, as noted earlier, was opposed throughout the eighteenth century on the ground of danger to liberty. More barracks might mean more soldiers, and the standing Army was a terrible thing. The accommodation existing in 1697 would hold 5,000 Infantry, and an estimate for that year provided tents for 10,000 men. The misery of the troops was real and great. When the Army was increased in a crisis the extra men were put under canvas, and when complaints were loud and bitter we read of the hiring of barns being permitted "whereby the soldiers may be kept from perishing." In 1718 a burst of generosity provided the sum of £9,300 to build four barracks in North Britain with one bed for every two men; but "the robberies and depredations of the Highlanders" supplied the real motive for this lavish display. Even when ministers were sorely embarrassed by the anti-billeting ale-house keepers, they did not dare to propose to build barracks. The total barrack accommodation existing

in 1792 in Great Britain and the Channel Islands was designed to house 20,847 men.

As regards Movements, in the earlier days the Kings had relied on the right of "purveyance" to impress carriages as occasion required; but Parliament at the Revolution was compelled to make provision by statute, as in the case of billeting. Every civil magistrate, on receiving an order from the Crown, was bound to provide conveyances at the rates laid down by the Mutiny Act. At the same time a safeguard was carefully introduced for the protection of the people against military demands, for the counter-signing of these movement orders was one of the duties of the Secretary-at-War, and a remark made by the Duke of Wellington in this latter connection is well known: "The Commander-in-Chief cannot at this moment" (the moment was 1837) "move a corporal's guard from London to Windsor without going to the civil department for authority—he must get a route." The power of impressing vehicles in emergency is still retained, like the power of billeting, in the annually renewed Army Act.

The Director of Movements and Quartering to-day has three branches, for Quartering, Movements and Transportation. The "D.M.Q." and the Quartering branch, in addition to their other duties, act as Staff to the "Q.M.G." for co-ordinating the view of the department as a whole. (A similar system exists, of course, in the other three Military Members' departments—one branch acting as a central link.) Thus one of the duties of this directorate is to focus for the "Q.M.G.," in concert with all the branches concerned, the question of securing the utmost

economy in the use of mechanical transport vehicles. With the recent growth of mechanisation the Army possesses a very large number of motor vehicles of various types—a possession from which opportunities arise for casual employment with great waste or for strict control with great savings. To ensure the most economical use of these new and vast resources in transport is a "Q" duty throughout the Army which is specially controlled by the "D.M.Q."

In the matter of Quartering the modern problem is much concerned with those overseas garrisons where, for political or other reasons, it is difficult to obtain a clear and fixed picture of future requirements in accommodation. Where the size and the distribution of the troops can be regarded as reasonably fixed, the War Office can decide forthwith whether permanent or "temporary" building is needed, whether quarters for married families are essential, and generally as to the scale of provision required; but inevitable uncertainty as regards the future, with consequent recourse to temporary expedients, is a fruitful source of Quartering work, of which one instance in recent years is provided by the case of Singapore, and another by that of Palestine. The present estimate of the "works services," which the Army is compelled to undertake as a consequence of the new naval base, is shown (1934) as nearly £2,000,000; and this sum is still "provisional" while detailed requirements are further considered in the constant effort to reduce costs or to meet changes in the general plan. If the reader could see those "detailed requirements" a large part of the business of Quartering would require no further elucidation.

At home conditions are more stable and the task is largely one of selection. Unfortunately for some years past the Department has been compelled by lack of funds to "cut" expenditure very low, avoiding the need for new construction, and the problem is to choose the most important from the lengthy lists of urgent requirements that are put forward by the Commands each year. Probably the age of the Army's barracks is not widely appreciated. Specimens of the Early Georgian, mainly on the south coast, find places in a fine collection which includes Napoleonic relics, select pieces of the Crimean era, and an impressive range of hatted camps, many labelled "South African War" and others "European War." Meanwhile in the matter of health and amenities the modern standard is extremely high, and the "Q.M.G." is besieged with demands for the replacement of huts that are worn out, for more "married quarters" for officers and men, for the improvement of existing structures in sanitary services, dining-rooms, re-creation grounds and institutes; while Mechanisation, like a "big bad wolf," makes great bites at the available funds to satisfy its voracious appetite for workshops, garages and so on. The merits of these competing schemes must be carefully weighed and their details explored in conjunction with the Director of Works and the Finance and other branches concerned.

A further duty of the Quartering branch is to act as official advocate, so to speak, in all questions affecting the "N.A.A.F.I."—the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes. This corporation provides the "shops" where the messing funds of the regiment

are spent and the soldier buys his daily needs—a great co-operative trading concern, conducted entirely for the benefit of the Services, the proceeds of which are given back to the soldier to provide extra messing and “club” amenities. The Services are partners in its control, and when questions arise which concern the Corporation and at the same time affect public funds, the watching of the soldier’s interests falls in the province of the “Q.M.G.” Much the same type of work also falls to this branch in the matter of lodging and furniture allowances, where the claims of the soldier form one side of the picture and fairness to public funds forms the other. Only difficult cases are referred to the War Office.

The second function of the “D.M.Q.,” the movement of troops, animals and stores by sea, land or inland water, is divided between two branches assisted by a special office at Woolwich (known as the A.D.M.T., Woolwich) which, among other Movement duties, administers the War Department fleet.

On the land-movement side of the work fall the detailed arrangements with the Railway Companies for the conveyance of units on change of station. Troops at home change their stations every few years, for the training of a unit is apt to grow stale if it is constantly using the same ground; and the annual programme of Indian and “Colonial” reliefs adds a further mass of railway movement between the ports and the home stations not only of units but of drafts and individuals. Negotiations with the Railway Companies for concessions in the matter of charges has created constant work for the

War Office, complicated in recent years by the competition of road transport, since military traffic is a valuable item. The right of the Army to special railway rates dates from an Act of 1883. A further sphere of Movements work, in concert with the Finance branch, is the settlement of travelling claims. Difficult cases are bound to arise since the regulations which govern the subject have to cover a wide and varied field, and claims may range from some matter of berths for an officer's family bound for the East to the mileage allowance for a private bicycle. Be the Regulations never so lengthy, "border-line" cases always abound which require decision at headquarters.

As regards movements by sea, we here encounter the mystery known as "the Trooping Season," which lasts roughly from September to April. An Infantry battalion, in the course of its twenty-one years abroad, moves round the world on a circular tour; while the Cavalry, the Horse and the Light Artillery move between Home, Egypt and India, and the personnel of other arms and services do tours overseas as individuals. Add to these the flow of "drafts" which are sent out to fill up the units abroad in replacement of the men who are due for the Reserve, add detachments to be carried for the Navy and the Air Force, and the total of all these cross-movements will convey some idea of the annual flux between Home waters and the Mediterranean, Egypt, Palestine, Port Sudan, India, Ceylon and the Far East.

Here, too, we meet some technical terms, though the Army is never obtrusively nautical and even conducts the hiring of ships through the medium of another department, the Mercantile Marine branch

of a valuable ally, the Board of Trade. One is "moved" by sea officially in one of three distinct ways: either as an individual, by the commonplace but superior means of a berth booked on an ordinary liner; or as one of a Government party on a liner, which is then officially a "freight ship"; or in a vessel specially chartered and fitted, which is frankly and definitely a "troopship." Normally there are five troopships making their tours throughout the season, a typical tour being Home—Gibraltar—Hong Kong—India—Palestine—Home; and the overflow from all sources which cannot be fitted into the troopships will require the use of some fifty freight ships for parties varying from tens to hundreds. The working out of the detailed programme to suit the demands of all concerned—the General Staff, the Adjutant-General, the local Commands, and other Government departments—is a large duty of "D.M.Q." The War Office, it has been said, withholds information quite unnecessarily regarding the dates fixed for moves; but the inconvenience and hardship so caused would be much greater, in the light of experience, if official forecasts were made earlier; for in practice it is not uncommon for one small emergency, unforeseen and not within the control of the Office, to upset the whole Trooping picture. Nor are critics lacking within the War Office when sailings have to be held up. The intricate task of readjusting the programme is not noticeably gladdened by the timely reminder that a troopship costs £500 a day! . . . The Embarkation Staff at Southampton works directly under "D.M.Q."

Quite distinct from this passenger work is the

rôle of the War Department Fleet, which originally belonged to the Board of Ordnance and dates back at least to the time of Napoleon. Apart from dinghies and other small boats, it consists to-day of 66 craft ranging from sea-going steamers based on Woolwich to tong-kangs plying off Singapore. Its major functions may be said to be three: the first, to convey heavy guns and mountings which could not be carried in commercial vessels; the second, to tow artillery targets, which again requires special machinery; and the third—a purely economic function—to carry explosives and military stores both in Home waters and at ports abroad such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Bermuda and Jamaica. The economy of maintaining the fleet in Home waters has often been questioned in the past century; but the railage of stores from the central depots, such as Didcot and Bramley, to the various Commands would be demonstrably more expensive; and, unless there are special reasons of urgency, the stores are conveyed via Woolwich coastwise.

Finally, the "D.M.Q." is charged with vital functions relating to war. One is the complete preparation of plans for the movement of the Field Force, not only in arranging the railway moves as a part of the "mobilisation" scheme, but also in collecting for the General Staff all information regarding facilities in possible theatres of war overseas. If Utopia were a possible "theatre," full details concerning the "movement" problem in that somewhat inaccessible country would doubtless be found to be ready and waiting. A second function is technical training—the training of the troops required in war for the

construction and operation of railways, and for dock and water-transport duties. For this work, apart from the Regular R.E., there are special "transportation units," a part of the Supplementary Reserve, recruited from the employees of the Railway Companies; and the War Office maintains a special centre, the Railway Training Centre at Longmoor, where the Woolmer Instructional Military Railway with its eight miles of rails, its yards and its workshops provides facilities for all types of practice from signalling methods to heavy bridging; and also for practical combined exercises in which other arms can rehearse entrainment and co-operation with railway troops in the special problems of transportation. This centre, like the little known "Fleet," is under the control of the "D.M.Q."

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The second directorate of the "Q.M.G." is that of the Director of Supplies and Transport.

The transport and supply columns of a force in the field have rightly been called "the life-blood of an army," and the failure to recognise this fact until comparatively recent times strikes the layman as being a considerable mystery. The history of the subject in the British Army does not flatter the common sense of the nation; but as set out by Sir John Fortescue in his volume entitled "*R.A.S.C.*" it provides some interesting reading.\*

From obscure beginnings, through a shadowy adolescence, the story moves with the pleasing

\* Note 16, page 345.

transitions of a Hollywood picture to the tardy triumph of a happy climax. The first scene is set amid storm and plunder. The soldier of the Middle Ages received no public ration at all and lived on the country in which he fought; and this still was the state of affairs generally with the armies which fought in the Civil War between Charles I and Parliament, until Cromwell created his New Model Army. Then, under Cromwell's ordered régime, the ration consisted of bread and cheese in the charge of a Commissary-General of Victualling, and, the troops being more or less regularly paid, private contractors, known as sutlers, followed the Army and opened a market where the soldiers could buy food and drink—a fashion which had long been common abroad.

The next scene starts in 1661 with the first appearance of the Regular Army, that collection of regiments of Horse and Foot which formed the "Guards and Garrisons." No food was provided now by the State, for the soldier in fact belonged to his Colonel and all arrangements were regimental. The nominal pay of a private of Foot was 8d. a day, out of which he was clothed and fed by the Colonel, lodging, food and beer being provided under contracts made with the ale-house keepers on whom the men were billeted. Later, in 1689, with the passing of the 2nd Mutiny Act, the daily tariff for feeding the soldier was laid down by Parliament, and no great change was made in this system throughout the following century. In practice, therefore, the Commissariat Department, that small body of Treasury clerks which was charged

with the business of supply and transport as being matters financial rather than military, was concerned only with troops overseas.

In Marlborough's campaigns in Flanders, for example, bread was supplied by the Commissariat by means of a single gigantic contract with one Sir Solomon Medina, who engaged to supply bread and waggons; and the soldier depended for everything but bread on a small army of licensed sutlers—one grand sutler for every regiment and one petty sutler for a troop or company. Marlborough was stern in repressing plunder, and ordered that the soldier should be messed regularly and should be given "flesh meat" twice a week, for which, like the bread, he paid with his wages; but the sutlers, of course, were shameless thieves, as we know from the life of Mrs. Kit Ross, a famous character in the Duke's army, who fought as a man and was wounded twice before she discovered her true avocation and took up the business of "sutlering" herself with conspicuous success and a command of language which even in those days met with respect. As to transport, it seems that the contractor's bread-waggons were used for every kind of purpose, and that the regimental baggage—often colossal, at least in the case of senior officers—was carried by hired pack-animals. This primitive state of supply and transport continued throughout that century; and while arrangements could be, and were, made for passable subsistence in the Low Countries, the conditions endured by the garrisons abroad where victualling houses were unknown, and by the troops who fought in Canada and America where sutlers

were rare or non-existent, did little credit to the Home authorities.

The scene shifts to the Peninsular War, where contracts were none and roads were hopeless, and the clerks of the Commissariat, unversed in other than paper-work, had to learn their business by painful experience and persuade an extremely reluctant Treasury that their duty was not one of signing cheques but of moving and feeding 40,000 men from thirty-seven scattered depots. Bread, meat and spirits had to be provided; mules, oxen and drivers collected for transport; and in spite of incredible difficulties the organisation at the end of some years was quite remarkably successful. Thus Wellington showed how much could be done in the way of creating an Army Service Corps.

But his work was allowed to fall to pieces in the great reaction which came with peace. The Commissariat remained a Civil department responsible for food, forage and fuel, while the provision of transport and other requirements of vital importance to troops in the field were left to the chance of extemporised methods; and this is the position forty years later when the Army appears at the Crimea. Here on the luckless Commissariat fell, in the words of Fortescue, "the entire burden of providing money, of making all contracts for supplies and stores, and of furnishing provisions, forage, fuel and light, besides transport, whether by land or sea." An improvised Land Transport Corps was first inefficient and then too late, and in any case was entirely separate from the departments which dealt with stores and supplies; but the many failures

of the Crimean War proved to be well-disguised blessings, one result being that the Commissariat was transferred to the charge of the War Office, and the union of the functions of transport and supply, though still postponed, was at least made possible.

The first Director of Supplies and Transport was appointed at the War Office in 1870 when, in the Cardwell re-organisation, the whole business of stores and supplies was centred in the "Supply" department under the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. A very small "Army Service Corps" with the two functions of supply and transport had been created in the previous year, but bewildering changes had still to be suffered both in its title and its organisation before, by the work of Sir Redvers Buller, it was rebuilt under its first name in December, 1888, as a properly recognised military corps instead of a semi-civilian department. In South Africa at the close of the Boer War the number of men in receipt of rations was 327,000, and of horses and mules 265,000; and the corps which fed this large force numbered 3,000 of all ranks. Its merit and value were firmly established. In the same year, 1902, the Mechanical Transport Section was started, and a small unit (No. 77 Company) was formed at Chatham in 1903, operating with traction engines. Such was the beginning of a branch of the corps which was patiently nursed through the "pre-war" era and was destined fifteen years later to number 150,000 men.

Nor is the change any less striking if we turn for a moment to the soldier at home.

The old billeting methods had come to an end when the building of barracks was started in

earnest at the close of the eighteenth century. The ration, which consisted of 1 lb. of bread and  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb. of meat daily, the latter being beef and always boiled because no other means of cooking existed, was at first supplemented by licensed pedlars, and later by canteens allowed in the barracks out of which contractors made pretty profits, and the State too, from the soldier's pocket. But here the Crimea did another great service: it brought the public for the first time into sympathetic touch with the Army. In place of a brutal and dissolute outcast the soldier was seen as a gallant figure, devotedly loyal and amazingly patient; and very great efforts were made by officers both in and out of Parliament, and not least by Sidney Herbert, to improve the amenities of barrack life.

Progress, slow at first but steady, was made in the sphere of the soldier's food. When Aldershot camp was first opened butcheries and bakeries were set up, and groceries were furnished at wholesale prices. Instruction began to be given in cooking. Next, the canteens were made regimental. Cardwell, in 1873, abolished the stoppage for bread and meat, and the ration became a free issue. A messing allowance of 3d. a day was added in 1898, and great improvements in messing arrangements followed a Committee of 1910 which led to the appointment at the War Office of a messing expert whose duty it is to advise and assist Commanding Officers—the Inspector of Army Catering. Finally, an immense benefit to the soldier dates from the efforts of a few officers in the year 1894, when the Canteen and Mess Co-operative

Society laid the foundations of that great concern, trading within and for the Services, which is now an essential adjunct to the Army in the shape of the "N.A.A.F.I."

The present-day work of the "D.S.T." is organised in three branches, one dealing with Supplies, one with Transport vehicles, and the third with the Royal Army Service Corps.

The Supplies branch is small in itself, but is very large in its spending power. The cost of "supplies," covering food, forage, fuel, light, water, petrol and lubricants, amounts in the Estimates for 1934 to £2,200,000; and this does not include the cash allowances which are given when supplies are not drawn in kind. Further, being so large a consumer, the War Office buys for the Royal Air Force, and to a small extent for the Navy as well. The main duties may be said to be two: to provide and control the feeding of the Army, and to ensure the readiness of the Supply organisation for any emergency, large or small, in any possible area of operations.

In the matter of improving the feeding of the soldier great strides have been made since the late war. The standard ration for the troops at home now consists of three parts: meat, bread (or biscuit), sugar, tea and salt, which are issued in kind by the R.A.S.C.; bacon, cheese, jam or syrup, and margarine, for which, with the exception of a proportion of bacon, the cash equivalent may be drawn instead; and a cash allowance of about 3d. a head for buying such "extras" as vegetables. For troops abroad there is less elasticity; each garrison has its own complete

scale, framed to suit its climatic and other conditions, and the whole of the ration is drawn in kind except, in some cases, a small proportion. At home, speaking broadly, the food and the money are handed over in bulk to the units and are handled through their Messing Committees; and the general policy is for every unit to be served by a Regimental Institute, where the foodstuffs required to vary the diet are provided by the N.A.A.F.I.

The foodstuffs provided by the R.A.S.C. are purchased either in bulk by the War Office, through the Contracts department described later, or through local contracts placed by Commands—whichever of these two methods is both practicable and the more economical. Taking the purchases made at Headquarters, those of frozen meat amount each year to about 34 million lb.; those of flour, about 25 million lb.; and of sugar, about 5 million lb. Some two-thirds of the bread for the troops is baked in the Army's own bakeries.

One question which "D.S.T." has to consider, working of course with the Contracts directorate, is the cheapest method of distribution. It may be economical, for example, for forage for China to be bought in Canada, for meat to be delivered direct from Australia to China and all the large stations abroad, and for tea for those stations to be sent from Ceylon. The supplies not delivered direct to Commands are handled by another large establishment administered by "D.S.T.," the Supply Reserve Depot at Deptford, which not only stores the War Reserves but acts as a distributing centre for the food sent to stations abroad. The turning over

of the perishable reserves is, of course, a complicating factor, and accounts, for example, for the fact that the soldier must perforce consume a proportion of biscuit. The compulsory eating of bacon, on the other hand, is due to the share of the Medical Department in determining how the troops shall be fed with a proper respect for calories.

The Supplies branch, to sum up, is responsible that the Army receives its food; responsible for its adequacy, in the settlement of the ration scales; and responsible for its quality, in drawing up the detailed specifications on which the purchases are made. There are also, of course, forage and fuel which raise similar questions for "D.S.T."—as, for instance, the quality of oats or of coal, and the types of petrol and oils required; and naturally the cash allowances, which are given when supplies are not drawn in kind, form a constant source of work for the War Office in the framing of clear regulations and the settlement of "hard cases." A recent example of the research work which is also one of the tasks of this branch is an attempt to improve the "emergency ration" which the soldier must carry on active service. The old "iron ration" was somewhat weighty, and here modern science can come to the rescue.

A final "popular" topic remains. The variety of the meals served to the soldier is mainly a matter of regimental management; but the "D.S.T." takes a share in this work. Training is given at the School of Cookery, situated at Aldershot, in "the most economical use of the ration," and expert advice is available to units through the Inspector of Army

Catering; while a proof of the acceptance of the modern maxim that "a well-fed soldier is a contented soldier" is the issue of *The Manual of Military Cooking*. This last publication secured for the War Office an unwonted meed of Press approval. Perhaps the reviewers could remember days when Army meals were not quite so inviting as the following specimen diet suggests: Tuesday, Breakfast—tea, bread, stewed steak and onions, and brown gravy; Dinner—meat pies, mashed potatoes, haricot beans, and rice pudding or macaroni and prunes; Tea—tea, bread, margarine and salmon fish-cakes; Supper—vegetable soup, bread and biscuit. Diet-sheets, complete for a week, are issued by the War Office every three months "for the guidance only" of Messing Officers. The opinion appears to be general that the soldier of to-day is well fed.

The second function of "D.S.T." is the organisation of the Transport, animal and mechanical; which carries out Royal Army Service Corps duties, and the provision of the necessary motor vehicles alike for peace and for war functions.

A somewhat difficult modern problem arises out of the pursuit by the War Office of a proper policy of economy. The peace-time duties of the R.A.S.C. are discharged by a small number of Regular soldiers and some sixteen hundred lorries and cars, and the expansion required for a field force is left to be supplied, as far as men are concerned, by reservists and post-mobilisation recruits. But in war, apart from the vehicles required for the ordinary duties of load-carrying in the supply, baggage and ammunition companies, certain special vehicles

would also be needed such as workshop lorries and ambulances, and these must be capable of use off the road: in fine, for efficient cross-country performance these special vehicles must be six-wheelers. To keep idle in reserve all the special vehicles which are not required for peace duties would be wasteful, even if the cost could be met; and the policy is, therefore, to use six-wheel lorries for the normal peace-time station duties together with the means of converting them quickly into the special vehicles required in emergency. Thus the vehicles required in war for the normal work of load-carrying would have to be provided after mobilisation, and the means of obtaining them must be planned. The plan adopted is the Impressment Scheme whereby lorries suitable for load-carrying duties could be taken "off the streets" in time of emergency under powers given by the Army Act. Thus a main duty of the Transport branch is to combine a condition of readiness for emergency with a due economy of ways and means. The difficulty of supplying spare-parts in the field when a number of different makes is involved, is met by standardising types.

Among other duties of the Transport branch is the maintenance of the peace-time fleet of about 2,000 vehicles (including, incidentally, thirteen fire-engines), the hiring of commercial transport when Army vehicles are absent at training, and liaison with the civil authorities as to licensing and suchlike matters. The business of maintenance is centred at Feltham in a Vehicle Reserve Depot, a Mechanical Transport Stores Depot, and a large shop for Heavy Repairs; while the important function of

inspection, both of all vehicles and parts purchased and of vehicles ear-marked for possible use, is carried out by special staffs reporting to the "D.S.T."

Finally, a third branch administers the personnel, both military and civilian, employed on the duties of Supply and Transport and on R.A.S.C. services generally. A large amount of civilian labour is employed at the depots, barracks and offices: in fact, there are over 2,500 civilians employed on manual or clerical duties. The Assistant Director of this branch occupies a two-sided position, being also an Assistant Adjutant-General for administering the military corps on behalf of the "A.G." Department.

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The next business of the "Q.M.G.," the provision and care of the Army's horses, is divided between two small directorates, the one administering the Remount Service and the other the Army Veterinary Services.

The former, the Remount Department, dates from 1887, before which time the purchase of horses was conducted by the separate corps with much expensive clashing of interests, or, in times of sudden emergency, by hastily assembled *ad hoc* committees. The main duties to-day are two—the purchase and maintenance of suitable animals for peace requirements at home and abroad, including the control of the Remount depots; and arrangements for providing animals in war, when large extra numbers would be required. "Animals" in time of war may extend to messenger-dogs and pigeons, but in time of peace "animals" are horses with a due admixture of Army mules.

In these days the Army possesses some 16,000 horses and mules, as compared with 28,800 in the year 1914; and the War Office is sometimes charged with obtuseness in employing even as many as these "when all the world is mechanised." Critics appear at times to be assuming that modern war is of a standard pattern, and to forget, among other material points, the varied conditions of the operations which the British Army must be prepared to meet; while the measures which other nations are taking to preserve horses of the Army type would repay the critic's study. The department would certainly be open to criticism if its eyes were shut to the position in this country where the types of horse which the Army needs are ceasing, as motor transport spreads, to be a profitable investment to private breeders.

In this matter the work of the War Office consists in a very modest scheme—the administration of subsidy grants to a total of £5,000 a year for encouraging the breeding of the requisite types. For the rest, continuous work is being done through the forty-three District Remount Officers in classifying the available supply of horses and in compiling lists for use in emergency. Another duty is the actual purchasing; for the Remount branch is an exception to the rule that the War Office buys through its Contracts department. The branch does its own buying of horses, and the policy is to buy direct from breeders and to purchase only in Great Britain, as far as the nursing of markets permit. The Remount depots in this country are at Arborfield Cross, near Reading, and at Melton Mowbray.

The Army Veterinary Department dates from 1878. The Corps was created in 1903, and became a royal corps in 1918. The Director-General at the War Office deals with all questions of veterinary service, and controls the training school and the School of Farriery, both of which are at Aldershot. Modern improvements in horse welfare form an important side of the work. The best means of conveying horses by sea, and the transport of sick animals in the field, may be quoted as typical Army problems.

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The last of the "Q.M.G.'s" charges is the large directorate of Works, a sphere of the Corps of Royal Engineers.

In a famous royal warrant of 1683 which set forth the duties of the Board of Ordnance, the Chief Engineer is a lesser official, "a person skilled in all the parts of mathematicks" and competent to construct fortifications, with four assistants under his orders. Not until the reign of George I did the Engineers become a military branch, as one of the two "scientific corps" (the other being the Artillery) created under Marlborough when the Duke was Master-General of the Ordnance. The Engineers then were officers only, the artisans being wholly civilian and hired as circumstances required; but at last, in 1772, a company of soldier-artificers was raised who proved their worth at the siege of Gibraltar, and in 1787 amid great opposition, for Parliament feared such a dangerous innovation, six similar companies were raised at home as the Corps

of Military Artificers. The officers were now styled "Royal Engineers," but the corps remained a distinct body, although both belonged to the Board of Ordnance; and this continued to be the position till the Board itself ceased to exist in the sweeping reforms of the Crimean crisis. The united corps of "Royal Engineers" came into being in the following year (1856).

Meanwhile the really vital change, the creation of the means of efficient training, had taken place in 1812 largely through the efforts of a single officer, afterwards General Sir George Pasley. The sieges of the Peninsular War were, Napier tells us, "a succession of butcheries" owing partly to the absence of close connection between the R.E. officers and the Corps of Artificers, and mainly to the lack of training of both. Pasley wrote of the officers in 1809: "As for practical instruction they had none; for they were sent on service without even having seen a fascine or a gabion, without the smallest knowledge of the military passage of rivers, of military mining, or of any other operation of a siege, excepting what they might pick up from French writers." Similarly the Corps of Artificers were mechanics who possessed no knowledge of field duties.

Fortunately, in 1811, after two unsuccessful sieges of Badajos, Wellington wrote to the Home authorities and demanded that six of the companies of Artificers should be renamed "Royal Sappers and Miners," and should be given permanent officers and "some instruction in their art," and the following year saw the royal warrant which authorised the R.E. Establishment at Chatham,

now known as the "School of Military Engineering." Major Pasley was the first Director, a post which he held for 29 years, and thenceforth both the R.E. officers and the Sappers and Miners were properly trained. Pasley was the inventor of Portland cement. His courses in "Practical Architecture" laid the foundation of the building work which is the immediate concern of the Directorate of Works.

The building of barracks, as already mentioned, was started in earnest in 1792. The R.E. at first had no hand in it. Contrary to all tradition the Board of Ordnance was ignored and the work was entrusted to a new officer who received the title Barrackmaster-General, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. This gentleman spent £9,000,000, and was found by a Parliamentary Commission to have grievously wasted the public money; after which unfortunate episode his department was made entirely civilian. Nor were the Engineers responsible for those "field works and other measures of Defence," such as beacons, guard-houses and entrenched camps erected in the southern counties under stress of fear of "the French ogre." An instance of these is the Royal Military Canal from "Shorne-Cliffe in Kent to Cliffe End in Sussex," which cost £221,306 3s. 2*½*d.

Next, in 1822, the control of all works services was re-transferred to the Board of Ordnance, and so it remained till the Board was absorbed. The property in all lands and buildings was then (1855-56) vested in the Secretary of State for War, and the Inspector-General of Fortifications, who had previously served the Master-General of the Ordnance, retained the control of construction services through all the several

re-organisations that separated the Crimean changes from the Esher Reports of 1904. At the latter stage an experiment was made. The construction of any new barracks or hospital costing over £2,000 was removed from the control of the R.E. and entrusted to a new branch, a special Barrack Construction Department, assigned to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and composed of civilian architects and surveyors. But this Esher reform was not lasting, and in 1917 the branch disappeared and the work reverted to the R.E., under the Director of Fortifications and Works, whose title is now Director of Works.

Engineer services in the field include the construction of all installations such as store-sheds, offices and workshop buildings, electric power and pumping stations, bakeries, laundries, roads and bridges; and the employment of Royal Engineers in peace-time to supervise all building services forms an important part of their training. The building is normally done by contract, and is very closely controlled by the War Office. For ordinary repairs and maintenance work the Commands are allowed a free hand within a total allotment of money, except where a service is particularly large; but every new capital works service of over £100 in the case of hospitals and £500 in other cases must be duly approved by the "D.W." before the proposal may be put forward for inclusion in the year's programme. With a strictly limited total of money to be spent within the financial year this plan is absolutely essential. It is necessary to secure that the services included have been fully explored as regards their merits and thoroughly

settled as to cost and design, since delay in starting a particular service on account of some point which was not quite "ready," and the consequent lapse at the end of the year of the money provided in the Estimates, would have the result that some other service had been crowded out to no good purpose.

The point brings out an important feature in the work of this directorate. The "D.W." does not initiate services: his function is that of a technical expert who carries out such building work as the Army Council as a whole approves. Indeed there is here a good illustration of the inter-working of the several departments, which perhaps has been too little stressed in sketching the separate functions of each. The priority of urgency of all proposals is settled between the Members of Council: the prime advocate of hospital services being, for example, the Adjutant-General, of a new barracks the Quarter-Master-General, or of defence works the General Staff. Though the money provided is a large total—over £2,800,000 in the Estimates for 1934—the competition is very severe; for in lean years building services offer a tempting field for "cuts," and the total for new construction and maintenance fell by nearly £1,000,000 between 1927 and 1933. As far as "maintenance" is concerned, which alone costs over a million a year, this includes the upkeep of all estates, telegraphs, telephones and fixed machinery as well as of barracks, hospitals, ranges and all other buildings and fortifications. The War Office owns over seventy pumping stations, and supplies its own electric current at thirty installations

at home and abroad at an average cost (1933) of 2.09d. a unit.

As regards the last point it is the policy of the department to make full use of the Grid system wherever this plan would be economical and would not present any military difficulty.

The directorate is organised in five branches. One deals with building services at home; a second with similar services abroad and all ranges and fortifications; and a third with electrical and mechanical engineering, with the provision of stores in peace and war, and the organisation of the special staff (the "Staff for Works and Engineer Services") consisting of military inspectors and surveyors, and military and civilian clerks of works, foremen, mechanists and so on. The fourth deals with the design of barracks, and the fifth with quantity surveying. There is also a special technical branch which reports direct to the "Q.M.G." and is concerned with the testing of work done and the independent checking of bills.

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The organisation of the department as a whole is summed up in a diagram. The staff of the "Q.M.G." at the War Office consisted on 1st April, 1934, of 60 officers, serving or retired, 87 military and civilian clerks, and 66 civilians in technical posts. This includes the Inspector of R.A.S.C. Services who reports to the Director of Military Training on the training of troops for war and to "Q.M.G." on other matters. The special position of the branch of "Finance" which is attached to this military department will be mentioned in a later chapter.

# QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE FORCES

(3rd Military Member of Council)

<b>DIRECTOR OF MOVEMENTS AND QUARTERING (D.M.Q.)</b>	<b>DIRECTOR OF SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT (D.S.T.)</b>	<b>DIRECTOR OF WORKS (D.W.)</b>	<b>ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF REMOUNTS</b>	<b>DIRECTOR-GEN ARMY VETERAN SERVICES</b>
	<b>Q.M.G. branches</b> Nos. 1, 2 and 13	<b>Q.M.G. branches</b> Nos. 3, 5 and 6	<b>Q.M.G. branches</b> Nos. 7 to 11	<b>Q.M.G. branch No. 4</b> A.V.D. bran
<b>Accommodation;</b> <b>Transportation by Sea</b> <b>and Rail;</b>	<b>Food; Forage; Fuel and Light; Petrol; Messing;</b>	<b>Design, Construction and Maintenance of</b> <b>Buildings, Fortifica-</b>	<b>Remount Services, including Purchase of</b> <b>Horses; Appointment</b> <b>of Remount Officers.</b>	<b>Veterinary Ser Administration</b> <b>R.A.V.C.</b>
<b>Canteens and Institutes;</b> <b>Technical Railway</b> <b>Questions;</b>	<b>R.A.S.C. Civilian Personnel;</b> <b>Telephone and Power</b>	<b>Buildings, Fortifica- tions and Ranges;</b> <b>Installations;</b>		
<b>Field, Lodging and</b> <b>Travelling Allowances.</b>	<b>Vehicles used by</b> <b>R.A.S.C.</b>	<b>Staffs for Works and</b> <b>Engineer Services.</b>		

*Note.* Q.M.G. branch No. 12, which deals with the inspection of works and the test examination of works expenditure, reports direct to the Quarter-Master-General.

## Chapter IX

### THE MATTER OF ARMS

THE fourth military division of the War Office is the department of the Master-General of the Ordnance, which deals with weapons and fighting material and, in general, with the stores of the Army. It thus traces its lineage to the Board of Ordnance, that venerable and prolific body established in the fifteenth century whose three other distinguished descendants are the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the Corps of Royal Engineers, and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. True to this historic tradition one of the Master-General's directors deals with guns and small arms, a second with engineer stores and mechanised vehicles, a third is the Director of Ordnance Services, and the fourth is Director of the Ordnance Factories where warlike stores are manufactured.

The revival of this ancient title was a happy inspiration of the Esher triumvirate. Before a Secretary-at-War existed at all the Master of the Ordnance was a great appointment; and while the small civil office was growing in power the Master-General stood independent, was a principal military adviser to the Crown, and was normally a Cabinet Minister. Even at the end of the eighteenth century when the office of Commander-in-Chief was created, the Master-General and his "scientific corps" formed a separate side of the military picture proudly distinct from "the

Army" at large. The officers and men of these Ordnance Corps were not included in the numbers which were mentioned annually in the preamble of the Mutiny Act. In the Napoleonic wars, again, that aloof body the Board of Ordnance possessed a separate medical department: the Board provided its own engineers while a separate corps of military artificers, called the Royal Staff Corps, was formed by the Army: the Board organised its own transport while the Army created a Royal Waggon Train. In the Crimean War half a century later the Artillery and the Engineers were better served than the rest of the forces, since the Master-General looked after his own. The eminent holders of this high post, before it disappeared in 1855, included Marlborough, Wellington and Raglan.

Although the birth of the Ordnance office is not traced before the fifteenth century, engineers and "artillery" craftsmen had appeared on the scene at a much earlier date. The term "ordnance" was far more ancient, and included all weapons and engines of war. Large catapults and battering-rams in addition to armour, bows and pikes were stocked at the Tower from early times, and at the siege of Calais in 1347, when a rude form of cannon was certainly used, there were engineers and armourers, gunners and artillerymen ("ingenatores, armatores, gunnatores et artillarii"). In these early days and for long afterwards the functions of gunners and engineers were combined in the "trains of artillery" which were specially raised for each campaign. Thus a train sent on service in 1544 under Sir Thomas Seymour, Master of the Ordnance, included 2 master-gunners,

209 gunners, 157 artificers, a chief conductor, 4 men to look after "the King's great mares," 6 conductors of the ordnance, 20 carters and a captain commanding 100 pioneers.

The first cannon were constructed of lengths of wrought iron strengthened with hoops and fired with peril, and no mention of casting occurs in this country before the year 1521 when "great brass cannon and culverins" began to be made by one John Owen. Quaint names appear in Elizabeth's time, such as bombards, robinets, falcons and minions, the name varying with the size of the piece and the largest being the basiliske; and a century later there were "culverin drakes" 8 feet in length, and "saker-drakes." In the course of the seventeenth century the use of guns became universal, but, while they varied immensely in calibre, they were very few in proportion to the forces. When James II attempted to terrorise London, the guns for his fourteen regiments at Hounslow were a small number of brass 3-pounders under Gentlemen of the Ordnance and a few attendants, 2 demi-culverins and 6 mortars; and the artillery train which was raised for Marlborough in his first campaign of 1702 consisted of 34 pieces in all, including 14 sakers and 4 howitzers. The howitzer was a cross between two other types: the cannon proper, cast in iron or brass and firing a solid projectile direct, and the mortar, very short and squat, with a fixed elevation of 45 degrees. These three types remained in use throughout the eighteenth century.

The Royal Regiment of Artillery was born in the year 1716, starting as two companies of gunners,

and remained under the control of the Board of Ordnance, commanded by the Master-General, until the Board was abolished in 1855. From the first the Regiment grew steadily. In the Seven Years' War (1756-63) the R.A. served in the East and West Indies, North America, the Mediterranean, Germany and at Belleisle, and reached a total of 30 companies. Throughout this time the movement of the guns was managed by hiring horses and drivers: indeed it was not until 1822 that a transport corps of Artillery Drivers, which had been created for the French war, was absorbed into the Royal Regiment. The long struggle against Napoleon saw a great increase in the Artillery, the strength reaching 25,000 men; but reaction followed Waterloo and the Regiment was allowed to dwindle. In 1845 the number voted for all ranks was only 7,039.

Improvement began two years later, following a letter which Wellington wrote pointing out the defenceless condition of the country. There had been no artillery range at all until Shoeburyness was acquired in that year. The era was one of repeated panics. In 1852 the strength of the Regiment had risen to 11,972. Then, with Lord Hardinge as Commander-in-Chief—an able and distinguished soldier—and Sidney Herbert as Secretary-at-War, a great re-armament was started, and 300 new guns were ordered to supplement the few old pieces which remained as relics of Waterloo. These were mainly 9-pounders—our movable armament at the Crimea.

In the sweeping changes at home, when the Board of Ordnance disappeared, the R.A. and the R.E. took their place at last alongside of the Cavalry and

the Infantry as integral parts of the Army, while the "civil" duty of providing munitions was vested in the Secretary of State for War, with the Director-General, Royal Artillery, as technical adviser on armaments and the Inspector-General of Fortifications as adviser on engineering stores. To complete the War Office side of the story, in the Stanhope plan of 1887 responsibility for design and demand shared the general concentration in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief as head of the new Military Department; but when that department was split again in the changes of 1895 "war-like stores, patterns and inventions" were allotted to one of the five great officers—then known as Inspector-General of Ordnance. An Order in Council of 1899 substituted the title "Director-General" and added the charge of the Ordnance Factories; and finally with the Esher Reports came the very appropriate revival of the ancient name of "Master-General."

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Of the Master-General's four directors the first, the Director of Artillery, deals with all natures of artillery and ammunition from coast-defence equipments to mortars, with small arms and machine guns, and with the problems of modern research in those fields; while the second, the Director of Mechanisation, has similar functions in regard to engineer and signal stores as well as in regard to mechanised vehicles. In the following outline, as a matter of convenience, the two sets of duties are treated together.

The development of our modern weapons is a subject both lengthy and highly technical, but a few points are of general interest. The smooth-bore gun used at the Crimea, a solid casting of iron or bronze with its round projectile loaded at the muzzle, was a weapon simple to understand, if troublesome to operate. The modern 18-pounder gun comprises over 120 parts, while its operation is exceedingly simple. The scientific construction of guns may be said to date from 1859, when Lord Armstrong invented a rifled cannon which not only was loaded at the breech but, instead of being a solid casting, was built up of coils of wrought-iron shrunk on to a tube of steel. Neither steel, however, nor breech-loading found favour for long with the experts of the day, but the new system of "building up" enabled enormous weapons to be made weighing 81 tons and 100 tons, which were still muzzle-loaders and made of wrought-iron. The notable point is that breech-loading was tried and rejected for the time being. It was not until 1883-85 that an all-steel breech-loading gun, a 12-pounder of 7 cwt., made a first appearance in Army use as the arm of the Horse and the Field Artillery, and was received, we are told,\* with pæans of praise. The first breech-loading field-howitzer appeared in 1895.

Meanwhile a smokeless propellant had arrived, the new "cordite" replacing gunpowder; and the quick-firing gun came on the scene. Rearmament was delayed by the Boer War, but the Secretary of State in 1904 announced a scheme costing £3,000,000 for providing new quick-firing guns

\* Note 17, page 346.

for both the Horse and the Field Artillery. In 1914 our movable armament consisted of these two quick-firing guns (the 13-pounder and the 18-pounder), the 4.5 and 6-inch howitzers, and the 60-pounder for heavy batteries. The extreme range of our field artillery at that date was approximately five miles.

As regards small arms, the story begins with the hand-gun or arquebus, a weapon extremely clumsy to handle, the user supporting one end while a stick in the ground supported the muzzle. Used first, it appears, in the Wars of the Roses, it probably caused more oaths than damage. However, in the days of Henry VIII the hand-gun was superseding the bow; but although it then possessed a stock, it had not ceased to be most unwieldy, its muzzle still requiring a prop. Indeed at this time the musketeer —encumbered as he was with a pouch for bullets, fine powder for priming, coarse powder for the charge, and a piece of slow-match lit at both ends—could fire perhaps 12 shots in an hour and required an escort of pikemen to guard him. The rate of fire improved slowly, and by the time of James I (1603-25) the arms of the Foot were the musket and pike in approximately equal proportions, while the Horse were armed with a weighty pistol. Next, the extremely dangerous method of igniting the powder by means of a match gave way to the spark produced by friction, and the match-lock slowly went out of use; the flint-lock began to replace the pike, and the hand-grenade made its appearance, carried, as Evelyn tells in his Diary, by "a new sort of soldier called grenadiers." The regiments armed with the flint-lock musket were

given the name “Fusiliers,” derived from a Spanish word for flint. But now the bayonet came into use; and by the dawn of the eighteenth century pikes and grenades were ceasing to be carried, and the musket and bayonet held the field.

In the next hundred years there was little change: the “Brown Bess” used at Waterloo was practically the same as the flint-lock musket that was used by Marlborough’s troops at Blenheim: its effective range was 50 yards. Meanwhile, however, on the Continent elementary rifles had come into use. The new invention, a rifled musket, was carried by some of Napoleon’s corps; and in fact in this country in the year 1800 a Rifle Corps, specially formed, had been given this new “arm of precision”; but the old smooth-bore was the general weapon. Next came the invention of the percussion cap, and the early years of the reign of Victoria witnessed the conversion of “Brown Bess” from flint-lock to percussion firing. It remained a most unreliable weapon. Then just before the Crimean War, as a result of years of experiment, a new rifle was introduced with a range of about 900 yards which, in the words of *The Times* correspondent, “smote the enemy like a destroying angel”; and the smooth-bore musket was doomed at last.

This rifle, which came to be known as the Enfield, was still, however, a muzzle-loader. It was the success of the Prussians, when they fought Denmark using their so-called “needle-gun,” that settled the fate of muzzle-loading and led to conversion to breech-loading in 1866-68. The next big step—the repeating rifle—was due to American invention.

England adopted the Lee-Metford, with a magazine carrying 8 rounds; cordite followed in 1891 and the Lee-Enfield in 1895, and the latter was the type, in general principles, of our standard rifle in the Great War.

The machine gun was also an American invention. The Navy first adopted the Gatling, and a few of these guns were used by the Army in the Zulu War of 1879; but they were outclassed by the Maxim gun invented in 1883. The Maxim was first introduced to the Army in the year 1891, and to the German army in 1899. The Vickers model as used in the Great War was a modernised version of the Maxim pattern.

Turning to the task of the present day as shared by the Directors of Artillery and of Mechanisation, the great and primary responsibility which rests upon the Master-General of the Ordnance is to see that the Army is adequately provided in the whole range of military equipments which are generally known as "warlike stores."

And how vast is the change from the "good old days"! The complexity of the weapons of to-day hardly requires to be emphasised. Delicate sighting and range-finding instruments and a further mass of intricate devices are the normal accompaniments of modern artillery. Anti-aircraft defence, to quote an instance, includes the use of elaborate apparatus apart from the modern searchlight plant. Incidentally, defence from the ground, as opposed to defence in the air itself, is the task of the Army, not of the Air Force, and the development of the modern instruments, such as sound-locators and predictors,

falls in the province of the "M.G.O." (A sound-locator is an invention which detects and locates the approach of aircraft; and a predictor is an ingenious instrument which provides automatic adjustments of angles enabling the gun to be ranged on the target—not a simple feat for a gunner to face when the target is moving high up in the air at, say, three times the pace of an express train.) Thus guns of all natures, rifles, machine guns, ammunition, tanks, tracked and wheeled transport, chemical defence appliances, optical instruments, bridging equipment, wireless stores—in fact the whole range of technical apparatus which goes to equip a modern army—form a field of work for these two directors which grows in intricacy every year; and the first part of their responsibility may be summed up in the three words—Research, Design and Experiment.

The British Army, small in size, must at least be highly scientific, and a clear duty which falls to the War Office is to keep abreast or ahead of modern developments in every department of war material. The place of research and experiment in the kind of problems which confront the department might be illustrated by the case of tanks. Just as the weapons of early days were countered by the wearing of armour, and armour in its turn became quite useless and ultimately was discarded in face of the bullet, so the modern machine gun produced the tank, the tank produces an anti-tank weapon, and an anti-tank gun will produce . . . what? Sixteen years have passed since the War and a rôle which was successful then cannot now be

accepted blindly. Improvements in speed, armour, fire-power, radius of action and wireless control would seem to make it a simple task to produce the ideal fighting machine; but meanwhile the experts of all the world turn their attention to automatic weapons capable of piercing the tank's defences. The obvious counter is thicker armour: but thicker armour means greater weight and greater weight means less speed. Keep up the speed with more powerful engines and you have a machine which is vastly expensive, which takes perhaps nine months to make and which, owing to its increased complication, has probably lost the important quality of being easy to repair and maintain in the field. A new question is then presented—is it better to rely on a few powerful tanks, or a much larger number of lighter vehicles which have greater speed and radius of action but are less formidably armed and less well protected?

Problems of similar complication arise over the whole field of weapons, and the policy to be pursued in each case is primarily a matter for the General Staff; but when the latter has said what "performance" it requires in a tank, in a gun, in bridging or "wireless," the devising of the scientific ways and means and the translation of these into actual stores is a technical task reserved for experts: and this is a duty of the "M.G.O." Modern science moves very quickly: it affects the whole range of munition stores; and the search for improved efficiency can never be allowed to rest. Research, design and experiment are, therefore, all-important functions.

The Director of Artillery has four branches, the

first of which deals with heavy armaments for coast defence and kindred purposes, with anti-aircraft guns and instruments, and with the means of defence against chemical warfare; the second is concerned with Field Army equipments; and a third with small arms and machine guns. The Director of Mechanisation has three: one for engineer and signal stores; one for tracked and semi-tracked vehicles such as tanks or dragons, and armoured cars (these are known as "A" vehicles), and one for mechanical wheeled vehicles (these are known as "B" vehicles), except the provision of the transport vehicles used by the Royal Army Service Corps. In passing, the "dragon" *pulls* the gun, as distinct from the fighting vehicles proper, which are the tank and the armoured car. The Director of Artillery's fourth branch is the linking section of the whole department, and also deals with inventions and patents and administers an important array of establishments concerned with research, design and experiment. These latter functions are managed as follows:—

First there are six advisory Committees. The Ordnance Committee is a joint body of experts which looks to all the three Fighting Services to set the problems with which it deals. It advises on matters of construction and design of guns, ammunition and explosives generally, and the progress of science in these fields. The Small Arms Committee and the Chemical Defence Committee again advise the Services jointly. The remaining three serve the Army only. The Royal Artillery Committee advises on artillery equipment—the gun-carriage, buffers, sights, etc. The R.E. Board deals with engineering as

applied to the work of the Royal Engineers and the needs of the Royal Corps of Signals. The newly named Mechanisation Board is concerned, of course, with mechanical vehicles. These Committees are assisted, in most cases, by eminent civilian scientists who serve on them in an honorary capacity. They constitute an invaluable link with the world of thought outside the Services and the progress of modern invention generally. They advise on experiments: they are told what the Services desire to achieve and they control the work of the establishments which actually carry out the experiments.

The purely scientific research problems and the work of designing the actual stores are handled by other technical bodies. Thus the Research Department, situated at Woolwich, has branches for research in metallurgy, explosives, radiology and ballistics, which work under civilian heads of high scientific qualifications; and the Chemical Defence Research Department has an establishment at Porton near Salisbury, a smaller station at Sutton Oak (Lancs.), and Research centres at the universities, where the problems involved in protection from gas are the special business of expert staffs. These two, again, are joint establishments, working for all the three Services; and so also is the Design Department which translates the work of the Advisory Committees and the findings of the Research departments into actual drawings and specifications. The latter task involves original design, development as a result of trials, and final drawings to govern production, and covers, of course, the whole field of munitions—guns, gun-carriages and mountings,

small arms, tanks, all classes of vehicles, and ammunition and allied stores. In the matter of "A" and "B" vehicles a great deal of design-work is done by the Trade, by such firms, for example, as Vickers-Armstrongs and Morris.

As regards the work of experiment, there are eight "experimental establishments." The Research Department has a special section called the "Proof and Experimental Establishment" which carries out the "proof" of guns and carriages, propellants, cartridge cases, etc., and in the course of the tests made at the proof-butts assists in the work of ballistic research. The trials of guns which involve firings at long range are conducted by another establishment, "the Experimental Establishment" at Shoeburyness, where the wide expanses of sand and water provide unique facilities for testing explosives and armour-plate and the performance of guns and ammunition. A third, the Experimental Station at Porton, deals with stores for chemical defence. In these establishments all three Services are represented on the officer-staff.

The remaining five are purely Army concerns, though available to the other Services. The Small Arms and Machine Gun Experimental Establishment is at Hythe. For experiments with mechanised vehicles the establishment is at Farnborough; for air-defence stores, such as searchlights, there is a special station at Biggin Hill (Kent); for signal stores at Woolwich; and for bridging equipment at Christchurch (Hants). The last three are controlled by the R.E. Board and combine the work of experiment and design: indeed, throughout the

whole range of stores, whether engineering or other types, the distinction between research and experiment, and again between experiment and design, cannot in practice be perfectly clear-cut. These functions merge into each other. The other general point to be noted is the joint use made of the same establishments whenever that course is economical. As a rule the Army is the predominant partner, but in a few cases such as Optical Research, where naval interests are the largest, the War Office makes a cash contribution in aid of an Admiralty institution.

The tale of establishments is not yet complete. When research, design, experiment and trials have resulted finally in manufacture there still remains a vital function—the inspection of the completed store by an independent inspecting authority. There are four Inspection departments in all: the Chief Inspector of Armaments (Woolwich); the Chief Inspector of Small Arms (Enfield); the Chief Inspector of R.E. Stores (Woolwich); and the War Department Chemist (Woolwich); and the total number of civilian workers employed under the Inspecting staffs is about 2,350.

Inspection is of several kinds: of new stores before acceptance, of damaged stores which require repair, and the periodical inspection of stores in the Service, including reserves. Over half a million gauges are used by the Chief Inspector of Armaments, and these are made in most cases to a very delicate measure of accuracy—three to five 10,000ths of an inch. The plain fact is that with warlike stores, especially in the case of guns and ammunition, the risk of mistakes cannot be taken; but the large size

of the Inspection departments is not wholly due to that cause. The technical facilities possessed by these departments are specially adapted for other services: for example, the repair of gun ammunition can often be carried out most economically at the time when the stocks are under inspection; and this is one duty of "C.I.A." Other duties include technical advice, the preparation of the drawings and specifications which are issued for the use of contractors, and the drafting of the handbooks and regulations which govern the use of stores in service. The list of components of the medium tank is a large book of drawings and details containing about 2,500 items.

Lastly, the Military College of Science, an educational establishment, is also administered by the "M.G.O." This was originally the Artillery College, which changed its name to the "Ordnance College" and then back to the "Artillery College," and was finally re-christened in 1927. A sound foundation of scientific knowledge is becoming increasingly important in the Army, and the College is open to all arms for courses in physics, chemistry, mathematics, and all subjects essential to training in science as applied to artillery, mechanised traction and the use of modern equipments generally. The teaching is concerned with theory and principles: the actual use of the various equipments is studied in courses at the schools of instruction (the Coast Artillery School, for example) which are under the direction of the General Staff. The average number of students at the College was estimated for 1934 at 75 officers and 305 "other ranks"; and another side of the work there is the technical training of apprentice

artificers for the Royal Artillery—about 150 boys in 1934.

One of the “D. of A.’s” branches deals, as mentioned above, with inventions, and not all of these have the same simplicity, the same attractive boldness of conception that characterised a certain idea which was offered to the department in pre-war days. This was nothing less than a brilliant plan to make London safe from attack from the air, and a prominent newspaper commented scathingly on the crass obtuseness of War Office soldiers who had merely acknowledged the inventor’s letters in place of displaying a suitable interest. But the Press had not seen the inventor’s papers. The idea, which was naturally very secret, was to manufacture a gigantic umbrella composed of mesh of the best steel and to open it neatly above the metropolis. Somehow or other it never matured.

One duty, then, of the “M.G.O.” is that of keeping abreast of the march of science in the matter of the Army’s weapons; but a second heavy responsibility is concerned with the problem of reserve of stores.

Ammunition provides an illustration. In the event of war there must always be a gap between the moment when the troops first take the field, carrying with them a first supply, and the time when supplies can be manufactured and can reach the troops in sufficient amount to balance the actual rate of consumption. Supplies sufficient to bridge that gap, in addition to the first supply, should obviously be held in peace. In the case of a store which could be bought “over the counter” the problem would

hardly exist at all: but the case of warlike stores is different, for a gun may take many months to make; ammunition, which also takes time to make, is likely to be consumed in vast quantities; and similar considerations affect the whole list from guns and tanks to rifle ammunition. (How important it is to use motor machines of which the spare parts are interchangeable and are readily obtainable from commercial sources can be understood in this connection.) Where stores take many weeks to produce reserves adequate to bridge the gap must be bought and stored at great cost, and thus it is a problem of extreme importance to hold the minimum stocks of reserves consistent with what may be called "safety."

The responsibility involved is very great. On broad questions of policy, such as the maximum scale of emergency for which the Army must be prepared, the responsibility rests with the Government—and Governments have fallen before now as a result of disclosures as to "missing" reserves—but within the scope of the policy prescribed by the Government the Army Council are responsible collectively that reserves shall be held of a certain size; and the "M.G.O." is the expert concerned who advises as to ways and means and is responsible for the actual provision and holding. One point that is not always well understood is that ammunition is not a store which, once manufactured, can simply be stocked; it possesses parts that are perishable: and a second point to be noted is this—that when a store is a new development, as a tank or a wireless equipment might be, and at the same time is extremely costly, the War Office has to make up its mind how far,

with its very restricted means, it will invest in stocks which in two years' time may prove to have been superseded.

Thus the problem of reserves is far from simple; and, quite apart from questions of fixity of design or the cost involved in the provision of the stocks, all changes in manufacturing capacity, whether in the Trade or in the Government factories, alter the data for calculating what quantities can be made available; while all changes in the requirements of the troops alter the data on the other side. Special machinery is employed in the War Office to deal with this very vital question, and a small section under the "D. of A." provides a permanent "secretariat" which collates the data on each class of store for periodical review.

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The third Director is the "D.O.S." who controls the business of Ordnance Services, which is carried out in the local Commands by the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and a staff of some 7,000 civilians.

The word "ordnance" is used confusingly. Normally "ordnance" suggests guns, but "ordnance stores," in military language, are all stores of any kind which are handled by the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and these range from a toothbrush or a nail to tanks or guns of the heaviest natures, and indeed include most kinds of military stores.

To appreciate the scope of Ordnance services the reader should bear in mind a distinction between "maintenance" work and "provision" work. Storage, issue and local repair may be said to constitute

“maintenance”; and this is a duty of the “D.O.S.” in respect of the whole range of stores. Thus one side of Ordnance work is the storekeeping of all equipment, and its care and repair in peace and war. But another side concerns “provision,” the ordering of the stores required. Other Directors, as already noted, are responsible for providing guns, ammunition, vehicles and building stores, but “D.O.S.” has certain “provision” duties which he carries out on their behalf; while in the case of the stores which are called “general,” and also of all clothing stores, the “D.O.S.” not only is the storekeeper but is responsible for their provision from first to last. “General stores” include camp equipment, harness and saddlery, accoutrements, tools, barrack and hospital equipment and all stores that are not technical. (In War Office language the distinction is simpler since the stores are bought under separate Votes, as shown in the Army Estimates. Thus warlike stores are “Vote 9 stores,” building stores are “Vote 10,” general stores are “Vote 8,” and clothing stores are “Vote 7.”)

In both duties, “maintenance” and “provision,” the D.O.S. has a large task. The function of “maintenance” is carried out locally in Ordnance depots and Ordnance workshops and the number of items held in the depots is an indication of the range of the work: the number of different parts of tanks and dragons adds up to some 30,000 alone, and the number of items in the whole list runs into several hundreds of thousands. There are six Central Ordnance Depots, of which the largest are at Woolwich and Didcot, administered by the “D.O.S.” through

a Deputy Director at Woolwich Arsenal. There are also 33 depots in the Commands which issue stores direct to the troops, and 30 local Ordnance workshops which carry out larger (but not "factory") repairs which the units cannot do for themselves. In these days, it need hardly be said, workshops are becoming more and more vital and Ordnance Mechanical Engineers an increasingly important body of officers. As regards "provision," the largest task for the Ordnance is the adjustment of the stocks required of each of many thousands of stores to keep pace with current demands and to keep reserves at their right level. Here again the agent of "D.O.S." is the Deputy Director at Woolwich, who in this sense of "provision" work is practically a universal provider. Thus in the current provision of artillery stores he acts on behalf of the "D. of A.," and of (say) tank-parts for the "D. of M.," while in the case of general stores and clothing he is acting directly for "D.O.S." The task of the War Office in these spheres lies in general control and policy.

Among these duties of "D.O.S." is the preparation of the equipment tables which prescribe the exact stores to be held by every unit throughout the Army, and the assembly, storage and turnover of the stores which will be required in case of emergency. In war, as in peace, the R.A.O.C. holds and is responsible for the bulk handling of practically all the stores of the Army. (The point up to which the R.A.O.C. is responsible for delivering stores in the field is, generally speaking, the rail-head. From that point R.A.S.C. transport carries the stores up to the units.)

To deal with the control of this work the "D.O.S." has four branches, apart from the Ordnance office at Woolwich. One administers the military personnel in conjunction with the Adjutant-General (as in the case of the R.A.S.C.); is responsible for their technical training through the medium of a School of Instruction; and deals with the Ordnance civilian staff. A second is concerned with "general stores"; a third with mechanical engineering and the repair of technical equipments; and the fourth with organisation for war, reserves, and the business of dress and clothing.

The past history of store-holding is a tortuous and intricate tale, but one or two points can be stated briefly.

The story begins with the Board of Ordnance which in early times held all stores. A sixteenth-century list, for example, mentions not only "shot, corn-powder, . . . match and all other munitions, as fireworks, bows, arrows, strings, pikes, bills, halberds" and so on, but also "all kinds of necessaries, that is to say ladders, ladles and sponges for artillery, mattocks, spades, shovels, pick-axes, crows of iron, . . . lights, lanterns, candles and links." Later the Board concerned itself mainly with its own "scientific" offspring who developed into the gunners and sappers; and indeed in the course of the Napoleonic Wars several new departments were brought into being (for example, the Barrackmaster-General and the Military Storekeeper-General) to perform services for the rest of the Army which the Board carried out for its own corps; but these disappeared after Waterloo and the duties returned to

the Ordnance office. The stores held in 1831 were valued at £7,000,000.

When Wellington was Master-General (1818-27) we know from his Ordnance Regulations that the Board was intended to be responsible in the field for the holding and issue of all stores; but we also know that in the Crimean War this intention was not carried out in practice. At the Crimea there was no one central Stores authority until, by a great but belated reform in the autumn of 1855, the stores held by the Quarter-Master-General, the Artillery train, the Engineers, the Purveyor and the Transport train were all taken over and "centralised" in the hands of a single Ordnance Store-keeper. This was the year when the Board of Ordnance at home was absorbed into the new War Office. It was the birth of a new era. The Board had been a civil concern which held its stores very tightly, possibly because it was considered to be dangerous for the standing Army to possess such stores; but now it was only a matter of time for the new "Military Stores Department," responsible to the Secretary of State, to become a military organisation. First, in 1861, the officers of the department were given commissions; next, in 1865, a corps of "other ranks" was formed; and after many changes of titles, amalgamations and re-organisations both outside and within the War Office, and the addition of a corps of armourers and, later, of Inspectors of Ordnance Machinery, the custodians of Army stores emerged as the Army Ordnance Department controlling an array of civilian storekeepers and also an Army Ordnance Corps consisting of military

“other ranks.” These were placed by the Esher Reforms under the administration of the “Q.M.G.,” and this was the position in 1914. The amalgamation into a single corps, with the title “Royal,” took place in November, 1918.

The control of the patterns and the supply of clothing is a part-duty, as mentioned above, of one of the “D.O.S.” branches.

The fact that it is only a part-duty is significant of changed conditions. Time was when extremely elaborate uniforms and meticulous niceties of decoration were considered to be vastly important: to-day the wearing of full dress is confined to the Household Cavalry, the Brigade of Guards and regimental bands, and the normal “service dress” of the Army is designed to be strictly workmanlike.

Distinctive dress for the fighting man was adopted in very early days with the hope of terrifying the enemy, protecting the body or distinguishing the troops; but by the dawn of the eighteenth century such practical motives had been discarded. It is true that the resplendent garb and the minute precision in details of dress, the ruffles, lace, cockades and so on, imposed on the Army from this time onwards, were based to some extent at least on the supposed moral effect on the wearer. The Prussian-derived love of display which produced the most elaborate garments originally possessed a psychological object; the soldier who wore such a fine uniform would hesitate to be less than brave: but the dress of the post-Waterloo era, unthinkably tight and uncomfortable and utterly unsuited for fighting work, carried tradition to crazy

lengths. The modern attention to health and comfort dates, like so many other improvements, from the sufferings borne by the troops at the Crimea. The traditional British red coat was finally abolished, except for ceremonial purposes, in the year 1902.

One or two further historical points may possibly be of interest. The wearing of red was confined to the Army, apart from the Royal Family and servants, in the year 1698; and in 1742 all regiments wore red with the exception of the Horse Guards and the Artillery. Until about the latter date there had been no difference in general style between military and civilian dress. The three-cornered hat of the eighteenth century was modelled on the prevailing fashion in which we may picture Johnson or Garrick: it gave place to the shako in 1800. Knee-breeches, stockings and shoes disappeared in favour of trousers and boots as late as 1823. The red coat was last worn in the field at the battle of Ginnis in 1885. It was worn deliberately on that occasion with the hope of impressing the Dervishes; for the khaki originally adopted in India had been worn in hot climates for some years past.

As regards the system, the soldier was clothed by his colonel from the first beginning of the standing Army to the time of the Crimean War. The cost was deducted from the soldier's pay and the colonel derived as much profit as he could. Marlborough, that great administrator, established a Board of General Officers who were to supervise the provision of clothing by every colonel to sealed patterns; but in later days the Board grew lax, its inspection of

samples became a farce, and both colonels and contractors made handsome profits while the soldier suffered and paid highly. Then, in the Crimean changes, the Board and the colonels' financial interests were abolished at the same time: the provision of clothing and equipment was taken over by the Secretary of State, and a Director of Clothing became responsible for everything hitherto found by the regiment. The Clothing Department at Pimlico was opened in 1859, and was enlarged to include a factory, where the State could make its own uniforms, in 1863.

Meanwhile the clothing, except the greatcoat, was still the soldier's own property, since the cost was a charge against his pay. This principle was abandoned in 1881, and the provision of clothing as State property gave rise to a mass of most intricate regulations which were modified and re-modified until the modern system was introduced. The greatcoat is still "public clothing," but the remainder of the soldier's kit is divided into "personal clothing" such as boots, caps, jackets and trousers, and "necessaries" such as razors and brushes, socks, underclothing and so on. The soldier starts with a free kit, and thereafter receives a money allowance sufficient to pay for replacement and washing. The system works well and encourages thrift. The annual cost of clothing of an Infantry soldier after the year of his first outfit is calculated in the Estimates for 1934 at £6 15s. 4d. The clothing is now wholly made by the Trade under orders placed by the Contracts department. This recent change will be mentioned later.

The responsibility for Army clothing was transferred to the military side of the War Office in 1899. It was assigned to the Quarter-Master-General in the Esher Reforms of 1904, and was only transferred to the "M.G.O." as part of the duty of Ordnance Services in the change of 1927. The task of "provision" is not wholly simple. The proportion required of each size of garment has to be kept under constant review, for the brilliant suggestion which was once offered—to abolish much unnecessary complication by accepting recruits of one size only—has never appealed to the Adjutant-General whose task it is to find the men. Further, there are two stages both of storage and of inspection, since the materials for made-up clothing are first purchased in bulk by the War Office and are then issued as required to contractors who "make up" the garments to sealed patterns. The patterns include such small details as the threads, buttons and hooks to be used.

Another recurrent task for the War Office is the re-calculation of the clothing allowance. This must vary, of course, with the cost of the articles in such a way as to be fair to both sides—to the soldier who has to replace his clothing and to the taxpayer who provides the money. More interesting, perhaps, is the constant attempt to improve the kit in quality or comfort, and to lighten the weight to be carried in the field. The Infantry soldier at the Crimea carried, in full marching order, a total weight of nearly 64 lb.: the parallel figure for the soldier of to-day, including his steel helmet and respirator but not including his greatcoat, would be just under 53 lb. This may be reduced still further as a result of experiments now

proceeding. The so-called "new uniform," of which mention has been made in Parliament and the Press, is a new type of service dress for use on field training or active service. It has nothing to do with the normal dress in which the soldier is seen in peace-time.

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The actual production of munition stores is shared between contracts placed with the Trade and orders given to the Ordnance Factories, and the latter are administered by the "M.G.O." through his fourth Director, the "D.O.F."

The Royal Ordnance Factories consist of the following:—

At Woolwich.—The Royal Ammunition Factory, the Royal Filling Factory, and the Royal Gun and Carriage Factory, with an Engineering and Building Works Department which serves the whole of the Arsenal and Dockyard area.

At Enfield Lock.—The Royal Small Arms Factory.

At Waltham Abbey.—The Royal Gunpowder Factory.

There is also a reserve establishment at Hereford, and "pivotal plant centres" at Blackpole (Worcestershire), Birtley (Durham) and Irvine (Ayrshire). The three latter contain plant which would be brought into use on emergency.

The factories execute the orders of the Service Departments, as well as of India, the Dominions and the Colonies, for guns, mountings, rifles, ammunition, tanks, vehicles, bombs and other warlike stores. They are also largely used for repair work

which is beyond the capacity of local repair shops. The average numbers employed for the five years 1929 to 1933 were 7,188 at Woolwich, 940 at Enfield, and 292 at Waltham Abbey.

The Woolwich factories are, of course, the oldest. In Tudor times the Warren at Woolwich was a desolate expanse of scrub and marsh on which stood a manor called Tower Place. Batteries were built there in 1667 as a protection against the Dutch fleet, and in 1681 butts for the proving of guns were erected, and sheds for carriages are mentioned. A laboratory for the making of fireworks was built in 1696. The casting of cannon, both brass and iron, was in private hands until Marlborough's days when a terrible accident in Mr. Bagley's foundry, where the guns which the Duke had captured from the French were being re-cast to make new ordnance, resulted in the building of the Royal Foundry on Woolwich Warren in 1716.

This factory at first cast bronze guns only, all iron cannon being made by contract. Then Woolwich began to grow quickly. Tower Place was rebuilt by Sir John Vanbrugh, the architect who designed Blenheim; and was first the headquarters of the new Artillery, and later (1741) the Royal Military Academy. The Laboratory must have been a small affair, for a Controller, Firemaster and other staff were appointed in 1746 in order that by this means "the art of making fireworks for real use, as well as for triumph, may be again recovered." By the year 1810 the area of the Warren had been increased by about 100 acres, and the Foundry and the Laboratory were surrounded by a mass of buildings

—barracks, store-sheds, proof-butts and ranges. Its new name, "The Royal Arsenal," was given in 1805 on the occasion of a visit from King George III. It was not until the Crimean era, upon the introduction of the Armstrong gun, that the Gun Factory was rebuilt for the manufacture of wrought-iron cannon.

Waltham Abbey is next in age. The Board of Ordnance did not make gunpowder till the year 1759, when a mill was established at Faversham. The powder works at Waltham were established in 1787.

Enfield, the small arms factory, only became an important centre when the Enfield rifle was introduced on the eve of the Crimean War. Muskets were supplied entirely by the Trade up to 1804-11 when, under the stress of the great French war, the Government started some small factories which were concentrated at Enfield Lock; but the coming of peace delayed their expansion, and the Enfield staff in 1823 had dwindled to 42 men in all. However, in 1854 the factory started on a new career. Muskets had been made by a number of firms, and the parts of one might not fit another; but with the advent of the rifle the principle was adopted that the parts must be interchangeable, and Enfield was wholly reorganised to secure precision of manufacture. The first machine-made rifles and bayonets were produced in 1858.

Responsibility for the Ordnance Factories remained on the civil side of the War Office from the time when the Board of Ordnance was abolished to the year 1899. When the factories were placed on a

commercial footing in 1887-88, a Director-General was appointed at Woolwich who was under the Financial Secretary: by an Order in Council of 1899 he was renamed Chief Superintendent and passed to military control. In the late war the control of the factories was taken over by the Ministry of Munitions in June 1916, and finally returned to the "M.G.O." on May 1st, 1921.

The maintenance of these Government factories is a form of insurance against the risks of war. The principle is to lessen such risks by preserving the minimum of plant and of skill which would enable production to be expanded adequately if the State were faced with an emergency. The alternative would be to leave the possibilities of expansion entirely in the hands of private enterprise. There are also the important aspects to be considered that the factories set a standard of quality and provide a check on Trade prices. As matters stand, manufacture of armament stores for the three Services is shared between the Ordnance Factories and Trade firms; and the allocation of available work is not without its own problems, since, when current orders are cut to a minimum under pressure of financial stringency, the Departments stand between two claims: the Factories demanding sufficient orders to employ at least their minimum staff, and the Trade expecting a fair share in return for the help which they give to the Government.

The Factories are run generally on a commercial basis, charging their customers full cost, and are managed by civilian heads—a Superintendent for each of them, a Chief Mechanical Engineer, and a

Chief Superintendent at the Royal Arsenal, all of whom are responsible to the "D.O.F." Design and invention, as explained previously, are the business of "M.G.O's." military branches.

The responsibilities of the "D.O.F." can be expressed under three headings: the administration and control of the factories; the actual production in those factories of war material of all kinds; and the regulation of the labour employed. It is his business to see that the Ordnance Factories are in the highest attainable state of efficiency in organisation, methods and equipment for their peace functions and their war functions.

There are very few industrial undertakings which cover so varied a range of production. The forging, casting and machining of ferrous materials in the manufacture of every type of product from big guns to the smallest components; the making and use of non-ferrous alloys for fuses, cartridge-cases, etc.; engineering, carpentry, saddlery, textile work, the making of explosives and the filling of shells, are included in the ambit of O.F. production. Further, work which extends from the sewing of shalloon to the turning of large naval guns involves almost every grade of labour, and the watching of the conditions of labour under the critical eye of the Trades Unions is one part, and a heavy part, of the task which falls to "D.O.F." At the same time "D.O.F." must secure that the stroke of the work is not less fast than in any comparable outside industry. The administration, lay-out and equipment must be kept in line with the best modern practice. The rapid improvement of recent years in machine-

tools, to quote one instance, must be followed up by the Factories; and another essential modern development is the accurate costing of every process. A very grave responsibility rests on the Master-General of the Ordnance to ensure that a certain productive capacity shall be forthcoming in case of need; and the primary task of the "D.O.F." is to secure that the Government Factories shall be up to date and fitted for their allotted rôle.

He also assists in the cognate problem concerned with production from Trade sources. In the latter connection there is a sub-branch which studies and prepares manufacturing plans for increasing output in case of emergency.

\* \* \* \*

The organisation of the Department as a whole is summed up in a diagram. As there shown, a special Finance branch is attached to the Master-General of the Ordnance, as in the case of the "Q.M.G."; and, excluding this branch, the staff at the War Office consisted on April 1st, 1934, of 57 officers, serving or retired, a civilian Director and Assistant Director, 100 military and civilian clerks, and 5 Technical Staff civilians. The officers include the Inspector of Army Ordnance Services, who is directly responsible to the "M.G.O."

MASTER-GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCE

(4th Military Member of Council)

DIRECTOR OF ARTILLERY (D.A.)	DIRECTOR OF MECHANISATION (D.M.)	DIRECTOR OF ORDNANCE SERVICES (D.O.S.)	DIRECTOR OF ORDNANCE FACTORIES (D.O.F.)
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The scientific development of war material.  
Research, design and experiment.

### M.G.O. branches Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 12

M.G.O. branches  
Nos. 5, 6 and 11

M.G.O. branches  
Nos. 7, 8, 9 and

114

## Ordnance, Ammunition and Ancillary Stores Chemical Defence;

Design of all mechanical equipment;

General Store  
Clothing. Storage, Issue  
and Repair of all

the Royal Ordnance Factories, and produc-

Small Arms and Small Arms Ammunition; Optical Stores;

car vehicles, wheeled, tracked and semi-tracked;

...  
by the Master-General  
of the Ordnance;

all kinds;  
Emergency plans.

## Administration of Technical, Research and Inspection Estab-

revision of the standard  
vehicles, other than  
R.A.S.C.

**R.A.O.C. Civilian  
Personnel.**

## Chapter X

### MATTERS FOR MINISTERS

THE duties of the four large military departments which serve the Military Members of Council have been set out briefly in the last four chapters without more than one or two passing allusions either to the functions of Ministers or to the financial and secretarial business of the large permanent civil division controlled by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State.

This order of mention has been chosen for convenience; and the reader will understand, of course, that the paramount responsibility rests upon the shoulders of the Secretary of State, who is assisted in his ministerial capacity by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and the Financial Secretary of the War Office. The position of the two junior Ministers and their special departmental duties are outlined in the following pages. The position of the Secretary of State himself hardly requires to be elaborated. His constitutional position has been already described. He is responsible to the Crown and to Parliament for all the business of the War Office. He is President of the Army Council and can accept or reject the advice which it offers. In all questions which require decision the Secretary of State's is the final word. He is also the channel of communication between the War Office and the Head of the Army—the King.

In connection with the discharge of one side of this last function there exists a special military officer, independent of the other departments and responsible directly to the Secretary of State. This is the Military Secretary, whose department is thus unique and separate. It seems to be clear that this special office dates from 1795. In that year the Duke of York, on his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, brought with him Colonel Robert Brownrigg to be his "Public Secretary"; and the latter's successor in 1803 is variously described as "Public Secretary" and "Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief." Thereafter the office remained in being, and was doubtless one of great influence, until the Commander-in-Chief himself disappeared. In the changes of 1904 the allegiance of the Military Secretary was transferred to the Secretary of State.

All appointments and promotions of officers, and the grants of all honours and rewards to the Army, are made by the King. They are made on the recommendation of the Secretary of State; and the main functions of the Military Secretary are executive duties in this connection.

Promotions and appointments form the bulk of the work. The executive duties consist in the submission of the names selected and the subsequent gazetting of the King's pleasure; but the actual selection of the names to be submitted is guarded by a careful procedure which aims at securing the utmost fairness. The "M.S." does not determine selection: he sees that the case for every candidate is presented fairly to the selectors. Appointments to commands and promotions from the rank of

Major upwards are recommended by a Selection Board, which consists of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (as President), the Adjutant-General, and the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief of the Aldershot, Eastern and Southern Commands, with the "M.S." as Secretary and his Deputy as Assistant Secretary. There is another special selection board to deal with selections for Staff Appointments, and there are "departmental" selection boards concerned with Medical and Veterinary officers, Army Chaplains and Pay Corps officers. The recommendations of the various boards are finally approved by the Secretary of State. In the case of honours and rewards the procedure is different: selection boards play no part. Such advice as the Secretary of State may require is available in the Members of Council, with the Military Secretary as the central link.

The secretarial and executive duties are organised in four branches. The scope of the first is "non-regimental." It deals with promotions "outside" the regiment, such as promotions to General Officer or Colonel; with Army appointments at home and abroad; with brevet promotions (which are not regimental); with the appointment of officers to local forces such as the King's African Rifles and the Sudan Defence Force, or to special posts in Dominions and Colonies. It deals also with appeals against non-selection. Officers on the active list are permitted by the King's Regulations for the Army to interview the Military Secretary on such personal questions as appointments and promotions, and the principle of accessibility is accepted in full by the "M.S."

The second branch is "regimental." It deals mainly

with first appointments to commissions; the actual preparation and issue of commissions—about 2,500 a year of all classes; and with promotions, retirements, transfers, etc., of officers on the regimental list. A separate section of "M.S.2" deals with the Territorial Army.

The work connected with honours and rewards, which occupies the third branch, falls mainly into two groups: honours lists and individual awards. Honours lists are either anniversary lists, on the King's birthday and at the New Year, or lists of rewards for particular campaigns. Possibly the reader may not be aware that active service conditions have occurred since 1918 in Russia, Turkey, Cyprus, Palestine, Egypt, the Sudan, Iraq, Kurdistan, the North-West Frontier of India, Burma and China. The other group, individual rewards, include promotions to be Field-Marshal and appointments as A.D.C. to the King, as Colonels of regiments or Colonels Commandant, as Constable of the Tower of London and as Governor of Chelsea Hospital. For retired officers and other ranks there are various rewards in the form of annuities, and also in the form of Court appointments. For example, the Military Knights of Windsor, who date from 1348, are chosen, in the words of Queen Elizabeth's patent of August, 1559, from "Gentlemen brought to necessity, such as have spent their times in the service of the wars, garrisons, or other service of the Prince." The King's Body Guard of Yeomen of the Guard and the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms are Court appointments of Tudor origin. The latter claim the title of "The

Nearest Guard," for it is laid down in the charter of the Corps that "the Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, whenever we shall command their attendance, shall do the duty of Guards nearest to our Royal Person."

The Military Secretary's fourth branch is the custodian of the confidential reports which are rendered on officers during their service.

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In the early nineteenth century the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies appointed an Under-Secretary of State to assist him in his parliamentary duties, and the post was continued by Lord Panmure when "War" and "the Colonies" were separated in the change of 1855. Thereafter each Secretary of State for War had the help of a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. The functions of this officer, said the Esher Committee, "have hitherto consisted in representing the Army in one House of Parliament. No specific duties have been assigned to him." The "definite work and responsibility" which the Committee accordingly assigned to this Minister consisted of the Barrack Construction directorate, the Chaplains' department and the pension Votes; but this arrangement did not last. To-day the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, apart from his duties in Parliament and as Vice-President of the Army Council, has two specific charges: the Territorial Army directorate and the branch of the Comptroller of Lands.

The former is controlled by a Director-General, a military officer of high rank. When the administration of the "auxiliary forces" was first transferred in

1852 from the Home Office to the War Office, the forces concerned were the Militia and the Yeomanry. The work was dealt with by four clerks; but it grew rapidly in the Crimean War, and the great revival of the Volunteer Corps which followed the scare of 1859 resulted in the formation of a second small branch. Both branches and an Inspector-General then reported direct to the Secretary of State. Later the two were amalgamated, and in 1872 the united branch was brought into the military department, and the "Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces" was attached to the Commander-in-Chief. Subsequent changes were of minor importance up to the time of the Esher Committee, who recommended the replacement of the Inspector-General by a "Director of Auxiliary Forces" serving under the Adjutant-General who would "study the special requirements" of the forces and "bring them to the notice of the Army Council." The transfer of the directorate to its present position dates from the Haldane re-organisation when the Territorial Force was created. The change to the title "Territorial Army" was made in 1921.

The Director-General has three branches. His responsibility, in general terms, is advice relating to the Territorial Army and the part of the Supplementary Reserve which is administered as part of the "T.A." The administration of the County Associations and the organisation of the "T.A." Nursing Service are special aspects of this duty.

The Territorial Army is a statutory force raised under Acts of Parliament (the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907, and the Territorial Army and

Militia Act, 1921). In principle the composition of the force is assimilated to that of the Regular Army; but its command and training form a distinct province separated from its administration. For the latter it possesses a special machinery. The duty of command and the responsibility for training rest with the military authorities of the Commands; and in the matter of organisation for war and the fighting efficiency of the "T.A." the Director-General at the War Office is responsible to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In training uniformity of principle is essential; but in administration, on the other hand, elasticity has a special importance in the encouragement of local effort, for the force is essentially a County force. Accordingly the work of local administration falls to the County Associations created by the Act of 1907.

The Associations are County bodies who possess a special knowledge of local requirements, and their functions are to raise and maintain their units, to provide headquarters, drill halls and ranges—in short, all the duties of local management except when the units are training in camp or embodied or engaged on active service. For these purposes each Association receives annual grants out of Army Funds, some of them intended for general expenses, clothing, travelling to drills and so on, and some of them earmarked for buildings and lands; and the expenditure of these public monies is subject, of course, to control by the War Office.

Thus the control exercised by the War Office has two sides, military and civil; and the duties of two of the "T.A." branches may be said to correspond

with this division—one dealing with advice on all such matters as organisation, recruiting and discipline, equipment, inspection and permanent staff; while the other is concerned with the civil business such as questions of property, the provision of ranges, the constitution of the Associations and the regulations which govern the force. So much of this work is bound up with finance that a special branch of the Finance division is devoted solely to "T.A." business. The Director-General has also a section for technical advice on building proposals, and a third branch, under the Matron-in-Chief, which deals with the T.A. Nursing Service.

Before the late war Mr. Harold Baker wrote, in his book on Lord Haldane's creation, ". . . a single national army has come into existence, the two lines of which are homogeneous in organisation and differ only in function. The dividing question, it may be said, is no longer whether a standing army is a menace to liberty, but whether the voluntary principle affords an adequate security for internal defence. The answer to that question is supplied by the Territorial Force." But matters have not stood still at that point. Since the war the rôle of this "second line" has been vastly increased in scope and importance. The responsibility for manning the coast defences at home, and a large share in air defence, have been entrusted to the "T.A.;" a wide measure of mechanisation is being applied to it step by step; and finally, while under the original Act the force was intended for home defence only, the general scheme which is now in operation is that every man who joins the force shall have formally agreed to

accept liability to serve outside the United Kingdom and shall join the force with the full knowledge that, in the event of grave emergency, legislation may be introduced which would render him liable for "general service."

This liability would mean, in effect, that the men could legally be used, as individuals, wherever military exigencies might demand, instead of only in their own units; but it does not mean that Territorial units would be used for the purpose of supplying drafts to fill gaps in the Regular Army. The Central Council of Associations, whose advice is sought on important questions, accepted this new condition of entry from November 1st, 1933.

Thus the usefulness of the Territorial Army as the "second line" to the Regular Army has been very materially increased, and contact between the two "lines" is fostered by the War Office and is growing closer every year. The force consists now of fourteen Divisions, the greater part of a Cavalry Division, Air Defence formations, Coast Defence units and various non-divisional troops.

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The Lands Branch, a civilian branch headed by a Comptroller of Lands, dates from 1908, and deals with the administration of lands belonging to, or in charge of, the Department, and duties connected with the purchase and sale, letting and hiring of lands and buildings. Up to that time the control at the War Office rested with the Royal Engineers in the branch which dealt with Works services.

Originally all the properties held were vested in

the Board of Ordnance, but were transferred to the Secretary of State by an Act of 1855. Their local custody then, as now, rested with the military authorities of the district, and immediately with the Royal Engineers. Even in 1882 the land held as sites of camps and barracks, fortifications, factories, storehouses and training grounds amounted to 54,000 acres; and the modern system was foreshadowed then, for a Committee under Sir A. D. Hayter reported to Mr. Childers, the Secretary of State, that "it is no disparagement to the high reputation of the corps of Royal Engineers to admit that its officers are necessarily deficient in the technical training and the professional experience which are desirable in agents for the management of landed property." However, twenty-six years elapsed before a civilian Comptroller was appointed at the War Office, together with a Land Valuer, and three years more before the Lucas Committee, reporting in 1911, recommended that local official land agents should normally be appointed in each Command, and should work under the Chief Engineers as technical advisers on property questions, supervising the collection of rents, the obtaining of tenants and settlements generally.

The main weakness in the old system was one which the R.E. could hardly avoid: the responsible officers were constantly changing, and supervision was bound to suffer. The new system had an added value in providing permanent qualified advice on agricultural and estate questions. At the time of these changes the lands held amounted to 150,000 acres; to-day, in spite of constant review and the

loss of the lands in Southern Ireland, the total estate held at home by the War Office is no less than 246,000 acres, in addition to the holding of clearance rights over another 8,000 acres. The increase is due to the larger scale on which modern training is carried out, the effect of the use of mechanical vehicles on the area required for movement, and the longer range of modern guns. The largest freehold areas are situated, of course, at the military centres, such as Salisbury Plain (68,000 acres), Aldershot and Bordon (26,000 acres), Catterick (14,000 acres), Colchester, Plymouth, Portsmouth and so on. Land rendered surplus by changes in policy results in average sale receipts of approximately £50,000 a year. Properties which are temporarily surplus but cannot be definitely alienated are let to tenants at fair rents; and the annual revenue from this source and from the department's woodlands and sewage-farms is about £100,000 a year.

The landlord is the Secretary of State: the local representative of the Secretary of State is, under the Command Headquarters, the Chief Engineer: the Land Agents in the several Commands are the technical advisers to the Royal Engineers. Abroad the general conditions are different. The bulk of the 16,500 acres at the various stations overseas is so-called "colonial military land" provided by the local Government for perpetual use for defence purposes.

Few property questions are very simple, and, as legislation grows in complexity, the War Office duties in this field form no exception to the general rule. Claims for damage to roads and bridges, ques-

tions of rates, taxes and tithes, the preparation of bye-laws for ranges, and the transfer of property to highway authorities are types of cases which come to the War Office. Parliamentary Bills must be examined, not merely in the obvious cases such as rent-restriction or town-planning measures, but all municipal or other local schemes which may affect the department's landlord-interests. Again, the authority of the War Office is required for the use of its property for club purposes, institute sites, church rooms, shops, municipal works, the laying of gas or water-pipes, and for all other "encroachments" that possess unusual features. Valuations of property, assessment of compensation due, and negotiations for purchases, sales, lettings and hirings of land and buildings comprise the more technical side of the work. When negotiations have been completed full particulars of each case are supplied by the branch to the Treasury Solicitor, and the latter prepares the legal documents.

The Lands Branch consists of the Comptroller of Lands, a Chief Land Agent and Valuer, and a staff of 17 other civilians. It administers a large and scattered estate—a task which is steeped in legal intricacies, which calls for a knowledge of the history of the properties and experience in dealing with outside bodies. In fine, like the Territorial Army, it deserves its place as a special interest of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.

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The Financial Secretary of the War Office is the Finance Member of the Army Council, or in office parlance the "F.M."

The title "Finance Member of Council" was recommended by the Esher Committee, who desired to emphasise the point that his responsibilities in the matter of economy were to be co-equal with those of his colleagues, and not special and separate. The title, however, needs explanation inasmuch as the branches known as "Finance branches" are not responsible to the Finance Member but to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. The Financial Secretary is concerned with finance in a larger sense in which it may be distinguished from the duties of departmental finance. As a member of the Estimates Committee which reviews and selects all the "new services" that compete for a place in the annual programme, and as Chairman of the Finance Committee which watches expenditure throughout the year, he is in close touch with the Army Votes. He is specially concerned with Labour policy. Representing the department in the House of Commons—and being the sole representative there when the Secretary of State and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary both sit in the Upper House—he is associated with every development which possesses a parliamentary interest, a public or political aspect. But apart from these broad responsibilities as a Minister and as a Member of Council, he has a special departmental function as responsible for the policy of Army Contracts.

In the matter of the administration of contracts the Esher conclusions were not very happy. A Director of Contracts was first established shortly after the Crimean War, but following the Reports of 1904 the office was abolished, and the Contract branch was

split up into sections attached to the departments of the military members, the "Q.M.G." and the "M.G.O.," who were responsible for demanding the stores. The experiment was unsuccessful. It obviously permitted of overlapping, of different departments of the War Office competing in the same market. A separate and self-contained Contract department, not concerned with deciding what stores shall be bought, but only with the business of purchasing, and possessed of a centralised knowledge of markets, not only preserves the age-old principles which many a committee of the past has affirmed, but makes for considerable economy of staff, and ensures—a still more important point—uniformity of contract policy.

Parliament, for example, has laid down the principle that Government contracts should be placed with firms, and only those firms, who pay fair wages: further, that as a general rule only those firms should be given contracts whose names are on the King's Roll—who employ, that is to say, a definite percentage of disabled ex-Service men. Similarly Government policy demands that a certain preference in buying should be accorded to Home and Empire products. Uniformity in applying these principles is facilitated, quite obviously, by the existence of a single directorate; and the placing of the revived Director of Contracts under the supervision of the Financial Secretary (October 1908) was appropriate, since the central purchasing department is thus directly in charge of a Minister and a Member of the House of Commons. The administration of Government contracts is a special interest of Parliament, including

of course the cardinal point that it shall be wholly above suspicion.

Under the Financial Secretary, then, and in concert with the military departments who are responsible for saying what stores are required, the purchase and sale of stores, supplies, machinery and clothing, and the contracts for building and other services, are in charge of a Director of Army Contracts and a staff of 78 civil servants. Government buying has special features. Many needs of the Army—its clothing, for example, or its guns and its tanks—have no counterpart in civil trading; and even in the case of ordinary articles in the leather, hardware or cutlery lines, requirements must be stated with extreme precision in order to secure uniformity and the requisite standard of quality. Again, the Army buys on a very large scale, spending perhaps six millions a year, in everything from the most complex machines to toothbrushes and razor-blades. As a consequence, in most cases, the goods have to be specially made, or the arrangements for supply to be specially prepared. The contracts for frozen meat, for example, cover deliveries spread over six months, and the producers in, say, Australia must be allowed some months for making arrangements before the deliveries are due to begin. Thus clear details and exact stipulations must be set out in the tender forms which are sent out to likely suppliers, and these invitations to manufacturers and traders, which vary of course with each class of store and are often special to the particular contract, amount to some 50,000 a year.

Then comes the very vital point of deciding to

whom the contract shall be given, bearing in mind three essential conditions: that the buying shall be done as economically as possible; that the allocation shall be above suspicion; and that equal opportunities shall be afforded to all traders who are suitably equipped to supply what is wanted. The system of to-day, one fears, would hardly have suited the sharp Mr. Pepys as he sauntered through "St. James parke" in the summer of 1664. The prospective victuallers of the garrison of Tangier had promised him a mere £150 a year if he succeeded in obtaining the contract for them at 3s. 1½d. per man per week, and a far preferable £300 a year if he managed the figure of 3s. 2d. Mr. Pepys obtained the higher figure, "which," he notes, "do overjoy me." To-day such joy is not only *démodé*, but is carefully placed quite out of reach. Any firm may apply to tender, and if its capacity and credentials are found to be satisfactory, may count upon being placed on the list. Tenders are invited on each contract from the firms noted for the particular commodity, and, in order to ensure fairness, must all be submitted by the same date. They are then opened at the same time by a specially constituted "tender board." The tender selected is the most advantageous, which means in the vast majority of cases that the lowest offer received is accepted.

Once the order is placed, the Contracts directorate has no concern in inspecting the stores, nor any concern with paying for them. It is simply concerned with the *purchasing*, which of course includes the delivery of the goods as specified in the terms of the contract, and involves much

work if delays occur, if the wording admits any doubt as to meaning, or if the department desires to amend its requirements. There are, of course, certain goods and services which are better provided by local contracts—such cases as flour at small stations, and sometimes laundry or scavenging services—and here the function of “D.A.C.” is only to review the contracts made by the military authorities of the Command concerned. The object of this *post mortem* review is, of course, to secure uniformity of principle in purchasing work throughout the Army.

The work of selling is also important, for sales at headquarters in the course of the year may be worth £100,000 to the public. Many of the stores condemned as unserviceable fetch better prices locally; but centralised selling, like centralised buying, is generally speaking advantageous, and “D.A.C.” is a seeker of markets for an annual collection of stuff of all kinds. Old greatcoats, obsolete patterns of dress, guns captured in forgotten battles, worn-out tentage, disused tractors, the produce of the metal scrap-heaps . . . they neither look nor sound very valuable, but success or failure in disposing of them is of real concern to the taxpayer, as is proved by the figures of total receipts.

Another side of “Contracts” work is concerned with sources of Trade supply for meeting the possible requirements of the Army in the event of grave emergency.

The future may hold no such great crisis as the country faced in 1914, but, if the lessons of the past are not to be ignored, the Department must

at least examine in peace-time how the production of food, ammunition, armaments—the thousand needs of the Army in war—can be expanded and quickened in time of emergency. To advise the Army Council on the capacity of the Trade is a function of the "D.A.C.," and since one of the lessons of a modern war conducted on a vast scale was the intermingling of Army requirements with those not only of the other two Services but of most of the civil departments as well, no theory of peace-time precautions could stand which did not envisage these all-round contacts. Accordingly the Army Contracts directorate is concerned with a series of Standing Committees which examine this problem of trade capacity in relation to all the chief classes of stores; and these Committees include representatives not only of the other Fighting Services but of India, the Dominions and the Board of Trade. This is one side of a large organisation controlled by the Committee of Imperial Defence, in which the War Office takes its due share as one of the principal parties concerned.

Equally the "D.A.C." is concerned with watching the interests of "Trade capacity" when the peace-time orders for stores are allotted. In the Army Estimates for 1934 the sum of £2,470,000 is provided for the purchase of "warlike stores," and the Navy and the Air Force also have large orders to place for munitions. Naturally the Government Factories, as the first reserve for expansion in emergency, have a prior claim to this type of work: for a certain level of peace-time production is required by a given capacity to expand. But the Trade

too, if it is to obtain the necessary experience for assisting production in time of emergency, must be given a share in the work available; and the allocation of the annual orders is an important piece of joint business on which the three Services work together. At these discussions, at which the chair is taken by the Master-General of the Ordnance, the responsibility of the "D.A.C." is to watch, on the Army side of the question, that due weight is given to the claims of the Trade.

The "man in the street" might fairly ask why each of the three Fighting Services requires a separate Contracts division. Why not a single combined department?

One relevant consideration is that the requirements of the three Services are not by any means the same: even in the matter of food or clothing, and more so in fighting stores, most of their needs are not "common." But the idea which underlies the question—economy in combined buying—is obviously reasonable, and is neither forgotten nor ignored. There are goods of common specification which can be purchased with greater economy if the requirements of different departments are "bulked"; and in these cases that plan is followed. The department which is the largest user buys as the agent of the other departments. Thus the War Office is the buyer of meat for the Air Force at home Stations and for the Navy at Malta and Gibraltar, and it places contracts for medicines and drugs which serve not only the Navy and the Air Force but also the needs of the Ministry of Pensions and of the General Post Office. Medical glassware is

obtained by the War Office from contracts placed by the Admiralty; and, again, the War Office buys most of its furniture through the agency of the Office of Works.

In this matter the "D.A.C." is a member of a Standing Co-ordinating Committee, which consists of the three Directors of Contracts together with representatives of the Treasury, the Post Office and the Office of Works, and the question of increasing agency-purchase—by the standardisation of stores, for example—is not allowed to remain dormant. There are advantages in combined buying; but there are also advantages, no less plain, in a system under which a buying department is responsible to its own "board of directors." The system described is a compromise—a pragmatic compromise: it works.

The directorate of Army Contracts is organised in nine branches, of which six may be called purchasing sections (actually one of them includes sales) each dealing with a group of trades. Thus one is concerned with guns and small arms, ammunition, explosives, optical instruments, machinery and plant, railway materials, engineering and electrical stores; another with provisions, fuel and so on; and another with surgical instruments, hardware, woodware, glassware, drugs, etc. A seventh deals with the lists of contractors, the large business of handling the tenders, and the actual issue of the contract documents. The eighth has a special technical section—the inspection of a contractor's works being a type of its duties—and, apart from this, is the branch which is charged with the general work. The

general work includes, for example, the questions of wages and conditions of labour with which the department is confronted constantly in its dealings with many thousands of contractors, and also the task of collecting information for the several committees whose tasks have been mentioned. The ninth branch is again a technical section. It deals with "costings" investigations such as are required for the type of contract which is based on the actual cost of production as ascertained from the books of the firm.

As a list of the duties of a large directorate this short statement is necessarily incomplete, but possibly it may suffice to indicate how wide a field of principle and policy is opened up by "Army Contracts" as the special sphere of the "F.M."

## Chapter XI

### ARMY FINANCE

HARD things have been said about Army Finance, and the fact is not at all surprising. Its functions are frequently irritating. It engenders impatience far from divine. But here is a case where to know all is to forgive much: for most of the duties of Army Finance proceed from a system of check and veto which lies at the root of constitutional government as understood in this ancient State.

The spending of the money provided for the Army is primarily the business of the military departments; for a leading principle of the modern War Office is the government of the Army by the chiefs of the Army, acting under the Secretary of State. Army Finance in one sense is, therefore, a function of the Council as a whole; but we are speaking now of a narrower sense—the functions of the civil branches serving under Directors of Finance as a part of the large civil department controlled by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State.

In this sense its most striking characteristic is that it does not spend any money. It is not finance in any ordinary usage of the word. It has certain duties under the heading of "accounting," and it has two major "financial" functions—one of advice on proposals for spending, with a view to ensuring value for money, and one of imposing conformity

with the definite rules and regulations which govern the spending of public money. Of these the former is the more important, at least from the taxpayer's point of view, and the latter is easily the more troublesome. On the question of conformity or "regularity" Army Finance is very powerful: its voice has the weight of ultimate sanctions; it is the voice of Parliament, inescapable; it is a system of control which is planted in history and has grown up with the Constitution.

The purpose of parliamentary control is constitutional, and its story begins in the Middle Ages.

Originally it was aimed at the Crown. The basis of parliamentary government is control through the power of veto of Parliament on the raising and the spending of money. At first it concerned the raising only. When the King was faced with an expensive war, and the strain was too great for his personal revenues and for any forced loan which he could contrive, he was compelled to come to Parliament to authorise the necessary tax. Then Parliament began to make conditions. It wished to secure that the money which it gave to the King for a war was honestly spent on prosecuting that war. The Parliament of 1341, for example, attached as a condition to the grant of supplies that Commissioners should be appointed to examine the accounts. King Henry IV took the strong line that "Kings do not render accounts," and under the Yorkist and Tudor monarchs Parliament's claim to an audit was dropped. But the free spirit of the era of Hampden was ready to fight for the principle of control. When victory had been won on the basic point that there should

be "no taxation without consent," the Commons reopened the further question of how expenditure should be controlled.

At the Restoration of 1660 the proceedings of the Merry Monarch did not justify a feeling of complete confidence that money provided for naval purposes would be applied to the keeping of ships only; and, when a tax was levied for war against the Dutch, a clause was introduced into the Act that the money should be spent solely on the war. This is called an "appropriation" clause, meaning that funds supplied by Parliament shall be used for the purpose for which they are voted and not for any other purpose. With the accession of William of Orange and the express recognition in the Act of Settlement that the keeping of an Army in time of peace should depend on the annual consent of Parliament, the system of "appropriating" the money supplied laid the foundations of Army Finance from the point of view of control by Parliament.

The curious point at this stage is the failure to set up any machinery to secure that the money was spent as intended. The Commons appear to have relied on the Exchequer, the department which received and issued the money. Originally the Exchequer was wholly the King's; just as the Lord High Treasurer was originally an officer of the King's household. These two offices became entirely distinct; to-day the Exchequer is a Government Department directly responsible to Parliament, and in particular to the House of Commons, while the Treasury has become a Government Department controlled by a Minister of the Crown.

The first step in the evolution was concerned only with the Exchequer. In olden days the business of the Exchequer was merely to see that the moneys issued from the great chests which it kept for the King were issued with proper authority from the Crown. It was now required to ensure that all such issues were made in accordance with the grants of Parliament. No money was allowed to issue from the Exchequer except for the purpose of a particular service as authorised by a vote of Parliament. But throughout the eighteenth century Parliament did not go further than this in attempting to watch how the money was spent. The larger part of the money issued from the Exchequer was paid over to high officials such as the Paymaster-General\* of the Forces or the Treasurer of the Board of Ordnance, and no machinery existed for satisfying Parliament that money voted for Army services was not diverted for civil payments. Even such a system as detailed "appropriation" by dividing the money voted for the Army into a number of separate compartments (there are 15 of such "Votes" to-day, each divided into many sub-heads) was not demanded at this date. Parliament was controlling the existence of the Army and the total of money to be voted each year; it did not attempt to achieve an effective control over the administration of the funds. The efficiency of the Army was left to the Crown: Parliament, with the means of controlling its existence, was content with keeping it weak and cheap. The Exchequer Act of 1834, which reformed the Exchequer and appointed a Comptroller who was

\* Note 18, page 346.

definitely an officer of Parliament, still did not secure the further point—that the funds issued from the Exchequer to the Treasury (as representing the Crown) should be actually devoted to the proper service.

One incidental effect of this Act was that Parliament lost its old home. The old wooden tallies used by the Exchequer were no longer required and were much in the way, but their timely destruction set fire to a flue and both Houses of Parliament were burnt to the ground in October, 1834.

Meanwhile the theory had been developed of “ministerial responsibility”; that is to say, that Ministers of the Crown are responsible to Parliament for all the executive acts of government. Control, originally aimed at the King, was thenceforth aimed at Ministers. Up to this time, as explained above, a Government which was prepared to ignore the intentions of Parliament’s “appropriation” was not prevented from doing so by the existence of the Exchequer department. But a system aimed at more effective control, a system of audit, was now on its way. Examination of the accounts of the persons who received and paid out public moneys had existed, indeed, in the eighteenth century; but this was audit on behalf of Ministers, not on behalf of Parliament. In 1832 an audit was instituted, which may be called “Appropriation Audit,” of the funds provided on Navy Votes; and the auditors—this was the new point—had to ascertain that the payments made were properly chargeable to the particular Vote in accordance with parliamentary intention, and that the total of the Vote was not exceeded. The

results of the audit were reported to Parliament. If the First Lord of the Admiralty was rash enough to "misappropriate" money (not, of course, in the moral sense), the sin would eventually find him out.

In 1846 the system was applied to Army votes and to Ordnance votes. Then, when this plan had had time to sink in, and not without prolonged discussion, a famous Act was passed by Mr. Gladstone—the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866; and what Mr. Gladstone said in 1866 has remained true doctrine to this day. This Act set up a single head, permanent and independent, who is both Comptroller-General of the Receipt and Issue of His Majesty's Exchequer and Auditor-General of the Public Accounts, or more shortly the "Comptroller and Auditor-General"; and from that time onwards every authority entrusted with the disposal of public moneys had to render an account to this officer. Acting on behalf of Parliament he applies the "Appropriation Audit," watching the point that every disbursement made from a Vote must fall within the purpose of that Vote.

But the Act went very much further than that. The historic purpose of Parliament had been to control the Lord High Treasurer as the officer who handled the King's public moneys: it now called in the Treasury to help it, entrusting the Treasury with great powers. The Treasury now had to see that every department rendered its accounts in due form; and under this scheme and for this purpose an Accounting Officer is appointed to-day in each of the great Government departments, who is personally responsible to Parliament. The Accounting

Officer is not only responsible that the Account of his particular department is properly rendered at the due time, but responsible, too, that no part of the expenditure is incurred without due superior authority, either of the Treasury or of Parliament, where such authority is required by the rules.

In the War Office the Accounting Officer is the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. Every payment from War Office Votes is made on his personal responsibility. He is appointed to secure financial regularity. He is charged to refuse to allow any payment which he considers to be irregular, and only the Secretary of State himself, by personal order given in writing, has power to overrule that protest and so to assume the responsibility upon which the House of Commons insists. Further, when the Army Account for the year has been rendered to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, it is subjected to detailed and critical scrutiny by the Standing Committee of the House of Commons known as the Public Accounts Committee, and the Accounting Officer is examined upon it, as by a judicial tribunal.

Thus, to sum up, the control which is now exercised by Parliament lies, first, in its power to refuse supplies; next, in its power of audit of expenditure through the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General; and thirdly, in the fact that it has constituted the Treasury as a central director and arbiter in all matters of public accounts, with power to appoint Accounting Officers who are personally responsible.

In this way, then, Army Finance, on the point of the propriety of the expenditure incurred, is primarily

the voice of Parliament. But the Treasury, wielding its delegated powers, is another voice to which it must hearken. By an Act of 1921, replacing a section of the original Act, the "C. and A.G." is bound to ascertain whether the expenditure contained in an Appropriation Account is supported by the authority of the Treasury, where Treasury rules require that authority.

Now those Treasury rules are very extensive. First of all they prescribe the form of the Estimates and the corresponding form of the Account, and the 15 Votes for Army services, each of which is in theory a water-tight compartment, are divided into a number of subheads. For example, Vote 1 is for the Pay of the Army, and is carved up into eleven subheads. In unexpected emergency it might be necessary to exceed the total of a Vote; but even if the amount of the estimated excess is less than the saving on another Vote, the War Office has no powers in the matter. Only Parliament can sanction an excess on a Vote; but the Treasury under its delegated powers can sanction the excess provisionally, and take steps to obtain parliamentary approval. Such is the theory of "appropriation," which is intensified by the Treasury orders which divide each Vote into so many subheads. The War Office must not deliberately overspend on any one of these many subheads, whatever savings there may be on others, without the prior permission of the Treasury.

Again, the sanction of the Treasury is required for any alteration in rates of pay, or of the numbers of an establishment, or for any "new service" or "increase of cost" which has not been provided, with due

authority, in the grants made by Parliament. In the sphere of control Army Finance must not only watch the rules laid down for "appropriation" by Votes and subheads, but must secure the observance of Treasury regulations on detailed items of expenditure. It must convert the rulings of Parliament and the Treasury into appropriate regulations for the Army, and secure obedience to these regulations. To take a very simple illustration, Parliament has voted the money for stationery as a charge against one of the *Civil* Votes, and the War Office must ensure that no stationery for the Army is bought as a charge on Army funds. Again, a gift of Army stores—the provision, for instance, of blankets and food by the military authorities in the West Indies in aid of the victims of an earthquake disaster—requires the prior sanction of the War Office acting on behalf of Parliament, and requires the superior sanction of the Treasury if the gift exceeds a certain value. A gift is technically a "misappropriation" of money which Parliament has voted for public purposes, and the Council must, therefore, make clear to the Army that such gifts require their prior approval.

Indeed, the property of the taxpayer is guarded with such extreme caution that the Council possess no powers at all to give Army stores to individuals. On February 3rd, 1915, when the War Office was overwhelmed with work, the Council were compelled by the rules in force to apply formally for Treasury sanction before they could allow the mother of a bugler, who had died from his wounds, to keep the bugle which her son had used. The bugle was public property. Its value was assessed

at four shillings and ninepence. This is no reflection on Treasury wisdom, but an illustration of Parliament's vigilance. In Treasury control there is no desire to hamper the business of any department; the spirit of it is wisely elastic: but the War Office is probably far less free than is realised by the public at large.

That is one duty of Army Finance—the pursuit of conformity with rules. The other of its major duties—a difficult but most important duty—is that of controlling expenditure by means of financial advice.

It does not, of course, stand alone in its function of criticising financial policy: the Treasury, too, has a large voice. The Treasury is not merely responsible for ensuring obedience to Parliament's intentions: it is also the special instrument of the Government for carrying out its financial policy. Its head is the Chancellor of the Exchequer (who has no connection with the Exchequer Department), the Finance Minister of the Government. The Army Estimates, for example, are part of the Government's programme for the year, and the total sum is settled by the Cabinet; but each separate Vote requires the sanction of the Treasury acting on behalf of the Government. Similarly, when the Votes have been approved by Parliament, the Treasury has a large voice in the criticising of detailed proposals. Any permanent increase of personnel will involve liabilities for years to come. Immediate expenditure on buildings or armaments, possibly small in the first year, may involve very large future commitments. A change in a rate of pay or allowance may raise parallel claims in the Navy or Air Force. The postponement of a particular

service may prove to have been an actual saving. The Treasury, standing in a central position and surveying the whole broad field of finance, can co-ordinate the demands of departments in the light of ministerial policy, can criticise proposed expenditure from the point of view of its repercussions, and can apply, in the process of "cutting down," a consistent standard of financial sacrifice.

In these directions Treasury control is a highly effective instrument: it can even prevent a waste of money; but it could not pretend to be an efficient substitute for a live system of financial control acting *within* a department itself and aiming at that more difficult target—economy in administration. For this purpose there exists for Army services those special officers and staffs who not only watch "regularity" of expenditure on behalf of Parliament and the Treasury, but occupy an independent position as financial advisers and financial critics of all proposals for military expenditure. This is Army Finance "at home."

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As long ago as 1869 the Northbrook Committee, advising Cardwell, had drawn attention to the old tradition that the administrative branches which spent the money were to be distrusted, watched and checked; whilst the function of finance was to criticise and check. Efficiency and economy were thus at war. Again, the Clinton Dawkins Committee which in 1901, after thirty-seven sittings, produced a very able report on the whole conduct of War Office business, especially "the existing financial

checks," reported that, while the financial staff was quite essential to the Secretary of State, the closest co-operation was necessary between the military and the civilian departments. It was re-echoing the Northbrook view that the perfect theory of organisation lay in the union of finance and administration. Financial considerations, on that view, should attend all the time on administrative policy; they should be made available from its inception as well as control it during its progress. This theory would attribute to Finance a higher function than mere criticism—the function of governing, as far as necessary, the whole policy of administration and of forming a part of the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State and the Government.

But in the eyes of the Esher Committee, reporting with consummate speed and fluency in the Spring of 1904, this Northbrook conception of Army Finance had been very far from realised. The system and methods of financial control were arraigned as the root of all evil. "They do not conduce to economy in peace; they directly promote waste in war; they tend, at all times, to combine the maximum of friction with the minimum of efficiency."

"The entire system of War Office finance, which . . . has its origin in a distant past" was condemned as misconceived and futile, and "a change of personnel" was recommended, since nothing else which the Committee could suggest would "so fully convince the rank and file of the Finance Branch that the old system must be abandoned, and completely new habits formed." The gist of this very bitter indictment was the alleged abuse of the powers of

control placed in the hands of a civilian department described as a "huge and costly machine which is supposed to control expenditure by the aid of involved regulations."

Since this abuse was denied completely by Lord Roberts, Sir Evelyn Wood, Sir T. Kelly-Kenny, Sir Mansfield Clarke and other distinguished military officers who had served in the War Office recently, the accusation was not convincing. An unkind critic might even suppose that the Committee's normal clearness of thought had been temporarily obfuscated, and that individual officials, and not the system, were the real objects of so fierce an attack. That, however, is past history. Whatever the facts of the past may have been, the conception of financial control so roundly condemned by the Esher triumvirate is certainly not the conception to-day. It is true that all control in the Army must work a great deal by regulations—a method which has its limitations. This is not only so in matters of "finance"—such as the rates of pay and allowances—but also as regards the expenditure of stores, which has to be controlled by the military departments by means of minute equipment regulations, by scales of clothing and ammunition, or by schedules of hospital stores and furniture. Inevitably the Army at large is inundated with regulations; but the modern ideal of the Finance Department is to make them elastic so far as it can.

The Committee were clearly right in their contention that economy in the true sense of obtaining the fullest value for money can only be ensured in one way . . . by the military authorities themselves.

They were right when, following the Dawkins Committee, they pressed the point that financial advisers—sections, in fact, of the Finance Department—should be attached to each of the military chiefs, the “Q.M.G.” and the “M.G.O.,” who were mainly responsible for the spending of money. This was already in course of being done, and the system remains in being to-day. The idea that economy in the true sense could only be achieved by military administrators who were fully appraised of the financial bearings of every proposal that might come before them was the theory stressed by Sir Charles Harris, when he advocated the “cost accounts” to which reference will be made in the final chapter. He emphasised the fact in trenchant phrases that “a vital striving after economy” belongs to a higher level of administration than “the mechanical impounding of casual balances” by tying up cash in small compartments.

The Esher picture of Army Finance as regarding all military officers as spendthrifts, if it ever was true, is not true now. Common sense alone forbids such a view. The sum which the nation will spare for its Army is, and must be, a limited sum; and the authorities who are most deeply interested in getting the highest value for money are the heads of the military departments themselves. The Army Estimates for 1934 show a gross total of £45,373,000—the total, that is, without deducting receipts; but if the public imagines that any such sum is available for new projects, for schemes of military ambition, the public is grievously mistaken. Nine millions, for example, are earmarked for pensions; eleven millions

are required for pay. The cost of simply "running" the Army as it stood organised at the beginning of the year, in pay, food, housing, etc., will take up most of the whole sum. These are "maintenance" costs which cannot be avoided, short of reducing the size of the Army. In actual fact the sum for "new services" available to the Council at the beginning of the year (1934-35) for changes in numbers, new stores, new building schemes, new land and so on, was under £3,000,000 in all.

When Members of Parliament press the War Office to give the soldiers home-killed beef in preference to Dominion meat at a cost of, say, half a million a year, it is small wonder that the War Office objects—provided that the soldier has good food.

There is no room for extravagance. Mechanisation, for example, is a "popular" programme: the Press and the public are sympathetic; but each machine is very expensive and the Army cannot afford to be rash: it must make quite sure of the types that are suitable: it must feel its way very carefully before it spends a considerable sum for which other urgent demands are competing. The individual "new services" which finally find their way into Estimates are the chosen remnant of a great host. To know the financial implications of every proposal that comes forward is vital to the military chiefs. In the intentions of the Finance Department the Northbrook conception has been realised. Army Finance in its highest function is co-operation within the Army between an experienced civil department and the military branches who spend the money.

Of course, the position of the Finance branches may not always be enviable. The vigilance of the "C. and A.G." will query any "irregularity," and will report any wasteful expenditure to Parliament. Again, "Finance," in much of its work, stands in a somewhat uncomfortable position between the Olympian omniscience of the Treasury and the idealism of military ambitions. The soldiers are right to be ambitious for the Army: the Treasury is rightly Olympian. The position calls for tact and understanding, and the personality of the Accounting Officer is responsible in no small measure for the maintenance of cordial relations. An important point to be noted here is that the Accounting Officer is to-day, and has been since 1920, a member of the Army Council, and so definitely shares with his military colleagues responsibility for the efficiency of the Army.

How wide is the field for constructive assistance may be judged from the duties of the military branches as set out in previous chapters; and intermingled with this duty is the other aspect of financial advice which derives from the theory of financial control on behalf of the Government and of Parliament. The preparation of the Army Estimates illustrates the combined functions.

The complete printed book of the Estimates, a book of over 300 pages which goes into very considerable detail, must be given to Parliament early in March. The Estimates consist of Vote A (Numbers), and 15 separate money Votes—Vote 1, Pay, etc., of the Army; Vote 2, Territorial Army and Reserve Forces; Vote 3, Medical Services; and

so on (the complete list is appended in a note\*); and each Vote is split into subheads—123 in all. A central finance branch (F.1) is charged with the general collation of the figures. Draft estimates for the several Votes are called for from each Member of Council as early as the preceding November. They consist of the estimated costs of maintenance in pay, food, stores and so on; the amount of the receipts that may be expected (contributions, for instance, from India and the Colonies); and a preliminary list of "new services." Every figure has passed through financial examination—whether it depends on a rate of pay, or the estimated price of food or clothing for the year which begins four months ahead, or on probable fluctuations of numbers, or the amount of cash required in the year for each of a hundred building schemes. The estimates, of course, are strictly *cash* . . . cash to be expended in the twelve months.

That is the first stage in the process. When the Government has settled the total to be allowed, there remains a margin between that total and the sum of the unavoidable costs of maintaining the Army at a given strength and of paying commitments for pensions, etc. This margin constitutes the total allowance for the whole programme of "new services," from the addition of a soldier-clerk in Jamaica to the building of barracks at Aberdeen or of land defences of Singapore. The Council sits as an Estimates Committee combing the list item by item, assigning priority of urgency and importance; and

\* Note 19, page 346.

here a complete financial picture of every item in the lengthy lists is vital to its interests. "Finance" must prepare a full exposition, and memoranda on special items (the programme, for instance, of mechanisation); and, when the reduced programme is settled, it must put the figures into the approved form for presentation to Parliament, and secure that Treasury sanction is obtained for individual items, where the rules require it, and finally for each Vote as a whole.

Looking to the work required of "Finance" by parliamentary procedure alone, three duties are proceeding concurrently in the autumn and winter of every year—the preparation of the Estimates for the year which begins in the following April, the watching of current expenditure, and the preparation of the Army Account for the year which ended in the previous March. Forecasts of current expenditure are very necessary to the Treasury, who are not only acting for the Chancellor but must watch the requirements of the House of Commons as regards any over-spending of Votes. In regard to the Account for the previous year, this must reach the Treasury by the end of December, with explanations, wherever required, of the difference between estimate and actual expenditure under the several subheads of each Vote. It is then examined on behalf of the House by the special Public Accounts Committee who possess the report of the "C. and A.G.," and can challenge the Accounting Officer on any point which they wish to raise.

Thus the two broad functions assigned to "Finance," advice to assist administration, and control

to secure "regularity" of spending, proceed together throughout the year.

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Using the word "department" strictly, there is no "Finance Department" of the War Office, but the phrase can be used conveniently to cover two parts of a large whole: (1) the finance branches at the War Office, and (2) the Local Audit Staff in Commands, who are really detached from the War Office branches. The military Royal Army Pay Corps, which pays the great bulk of the bills of the Army, and of which only a small headquarters section is actually part of the War Office staff, forms a third part of the full picture.

The organisation is, briefly, as follows:—

Under the Permanent Under-Secretary of State the finance branches at the War Office are grouped under three Directors of Finance, and controlled by a Deputy Under-Secretary of State. They number eleven and the general area of the work of each of them can be indicated in a few words.

The first (F.1), already mentioned, deals with Estimates and general finance. General finance includes, for example, adjustments with other Governments and departments, such as the large adjustments with India; financial statements for the League of Nations; banking and foreign exchange questions. This is also the branch which, working closely with the Adjutant-General, acts as his financial adviser on the intricate question of "peace establishments" and the control of numbers generally both of the Army and of the Reserves. The second (F.2) deals with

rates of pay and the interpretation of the Pay Warrant as it affects the pay of officers and men, Army nurses and schoolmistresses; with marriage allowance; with the establishments of military staffs; and, among a host of miscellaneous questions, with the accounts of the two "Army Agents." Either Cox's and King's branch of Lloyds Bank, or Holt's branch of Glyn, Mills and Co., is appointed by the War Office to act as agents to every regiment. They take the place of Paymasters for the issue of pay to officers, and "Cox's" and "Holt's" have been household words to generations of Army officers.\*

The third branch (F.3) deals with half-pay and pensions (the "Non-Effective Votes" of the Estimates) and questions of compensation generally; the fourth (F.4) with the Territorial Army; the fifth (F.5) with the Royal Ordnance Factories, whose finance and accounts are a special study and stand outside the Army Estimates. There is now no F.6. The next (F.7) is concerned with the principles of accountancy, and the administration of the audit branches in the several Commands, which remain to be mentioned. F.8 deals with cash and with cash accounts. It draws the cash from the Paymaster-General, carries out Headquarter payments, makes the claims on other departments and Governments, and keeps the main ledger of cash expenditure, obtaining reports from all Paymasters and compiling the monthly returns of expenditure. These latter are used in framing the forecasts by means of which the Finance Committee watches the progress of Army Votes. It is also the function of

\* Note 20, page 346.

this branch to prepare the Account required for Parliament. F.9 is the office of the Chief Paymaster of the Royal Army Pay Corps. It administers the corps and controls the pay offices in the Commands. F.10 is the Cost Accounting branch.

The remaining two are the special branches attached for duty as financial advisers to the "Q.M.G." and the "M.G.O." They are there to ensure that these Military Members may be given the full financial picture of all proposed expenditure, and are responsible to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State that the money allotted is properly allocated, and that all points are duly considered with a view to securing economy. Their position is one of dual allegiance, which on paper appears to be somewhat awkward: in practice it works perfectly well.

Here, perhaps, three points should be mentioned on which confusion sometimes arises.

The first concerns the sphere of the War Office as distinct from that of the Ministry of Pensions. The retired pay awarded to officers and nurses is given in respect of rank or service, or for disability attributable to service. Similarly pensions are awarded to soldiers either in respect of long service or of disabilities (such as wounds) which are "attributable." The War Office provides for retired pay or pensions awarded for rank and length of service; but, as regards *disabilities*, it is concerned only with those incurred after the close of the Great War or in peace-time service prior to the war. For death or disabilities attributable to service in the Great War (or attributable to service in former wars where retired pay or pension was first granted before 1st October,

1921) the awards are administered by the Ministry of Pensions. To draw the line briefly and very roughly, the Ministry of Pensions deals with the war: Army funds provide for other pensions.

The second point concerns the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, and the part which it plays in the award of pensions.

The institution of Chelsea Hospital for the relief of "aged, maimed and infirm Land Soldiers" dates from 1681. A Board of Commissioners was first appointed by Letters Patent of 1691. Originally the work of the Commissioners was concerned only with the Hospital, which was no doubt intended to hold all pensioners, who in 1689 numbered 579. As numbers increased new duties were added. The system of paying "out-pensions," which to-day number over 100,000, became unavoidable, and the Commissioners were charged with this duty as well. All pensions are granted by grace of the Crown, and the conditions which govern the award of pensions are laid down in royal warrants and regulations. The Board receives a man's record of service, with all relevant particulars, and proceeds to decide the award of a pension according to the terms of the regulations.

Thus the War Office itself does not take part in the actual award of a soldier's pension. The Army Council are only concerned when the Board recommends some special treatment, or when questions of fact must be decided. For example, it may be a question for decision whether a soldier was serving on duty when he received certain injuries, or whether the illness from which he died was

attributable, or not, to his military service. On the facts of the case the War Office decides: the Board of Commissioners, a body appointed by Letters Patent, administers the warrants and regulations.

The third point of some special interest is the system of finance of the Ordnance Factories.

The Factories have their own Estimates. They operate manufacturing accounts by which they are able to charge their customers, whether the War Office, the Admiralty, India or a Dominion, with the ascertained cost of each piece of work. The cost prices are based on a system which, subject to certain modifications (such as including no charge for profit, or for rent of land or for interest on capital), is framed on modern commercial practice. Normally, therefore, no Vote is required, since the charges recover the working expenses and enable the Factories to finance for themselves all their ordinary needs in capital services; but, in order to obtain the necessary sanction, a full Estimate is presented to Parliament annually for staff, wages, stores and so on. After allowing for customers' payments, it works down to a token sum. Parliament votes £100.

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Reverting now to the "Finance Department," the second part, outside the War Office, consists in the staff of Local Auditors, whose offices serve the military Commands—all Commands at home and the larger abroad.

These were instituted in 1902 as a result of the Clinton-Dawkins Committee, who recommended a forward policy of "decentralising" responsibility

from the War Office to the local commanders. Like the two special branches in the War Office itself (the branches for financial advice to the "Q.M.G." and the "M.G.O."), the Local Auditors have a dual position, being available for advice to military chiefs and being responsible to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, whose officers they, in fact, are. Their advice does not bind the administrative officers, who are themselves responsible for securing economy. They are also more than financial advisers, since they audit all the accounts of the Command, both for cash and stores, so that no such accounts have to come to the War Office, but merely an abstract of cash expenditure; and they carry out test stock-taking of stores.

A separate and special audit office, with the title "Store Auditor, Woolwich," is divided between Woolwich and Didcot, and is mainly concerned with the store accounts of the central depots of ordnance stores, and with similar audit and stock-taking duties for the central medical and veterinary stores, the Research Department, the Inspection departments, and other store-using establishments directed by the War Office. The audit of local "Command" depots falls, of course, to the Local Auditors. The audit of the accounts of the Factories is done by a section of "F.5" stationed at Woolwich.

Finally, the Royal Army Pay Corps—not itself a part of the War Office—deals with the receipt and disbursement of moneys for Army services in a Command, and the compilation of the relevant accounts. The Command Paymaster has as his military chief the Officer in charge of Administra-

tion, and on all questions of pay and allowances, and the way in which money is brought to account, he is the adviser to that officer, who can turn to the Local Auditor when doubts arise on financial principle. On questions of "regularity" the Paymaster is responsible to the Accounting Officer at the War Office; for this, in the eyes of the House of Commons, is vital to parliamentary control.

The work of the *regimental* pay offices is concerned with individuals. It deals with the accounts of individual soldiers, reservists and pensioners, and of officers and men of the Supplementary Reserve and also the Territorial Army. These offices are co-ordinated closely with the Record Offices, which keep the records of the same regiments and corps. There is one Record Office for each arm, apart from the case of the Infantry. For the latter there are 12 Record Offices, each dealing with a group of regiments. In the case of all corps a part of this work is carried out under the care of the Paymasters: in the case of the Infantry, the whole of it.

Pay services have an interesting history. When the standing Army first came into being, the distribution of pay and the keeping of accounts was a regimental matter entirely: the Colonel employed a "Colonel's Clerk," a civilian of his own choosing. At the end of the eighteenth century (25th December, 1798) Paymasters, with special commissions as such, were appointed officially for each regiment, and District Paymasters were also instituted. The next change came seventy years later when the so-called "Control Department," a short-lived feature of the Cardwell régime, had a sub-department of

paymasters for pay duties outside the regiments; but these and the regimental Paymasters were together absorbed in 1877 in a general Army Pay Department. Entrance into this new department was restricted to combatant officers, who served as "Staff Paymasters" and "Paymasters" with the honorary ranks of Major and Captain. Paymasters continued to be attached to regiments up to the year 1890, when a "Station" system was introduced. The corps of military "other ranks" was formed in 1893.

In that year the administration of both the department and the corps was removed from the sphere of the Financial Secretary to that of the Quarter-Master-General, and so remained until 1905. Then followed a transitory phase, recommended by the Esher Committee, in which pay, accounting and audit duties were combined in a single civilian department entitled the "Army Accounts Department." This lasted only till 1909, when the military Army Pay Department was reconstituted with its present duties.

The department and corps were honoured by the King in recognition of their war services, and in the same year (1920) became a united corps of the Army with the title "The Royal Army Pay Corps." Its responsibility to the Accounting Officer in no way impairs its military status.

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This sketch of the functions of Army Finance is intended to explain one half of the business which falls to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. This half is officially described as follows:—

“Duties connected with his Office as Accounting Officer of Army votes, funds and accounts. Control of expenditure, and financial advice generally. Consideration and compilation of the Parliamentary Estimates. Review of proposals for new expenditure, or for redistribution of the sums allotted to the different subheads of the Votes. Financial adjustments and relations with other Departments and Governments. Accounts and audit. Non-Effective Votes. Administration of the Royal Army Pay Corps.”

The other half of the responsibilities with which this Member of Council is charged will be set out in the next chapter.

Under the Deputy Under-Secretary of State and the three Directors of Finance, the finance branches at the War Office consisted on April 1st, 1934, of a staff of 257. The majority are civil servants—21 of the Administrative class, 19 of the Executive class, and some 200 of the Clerical class. The personnel of the R.A.P.C., employed in the branches F.9 and F.10, numbered 6 officers and 6 military clerks.

For details of the cost of the Army, its numbers and its rates of pay, a large amount of interesting information is contained in the book of Army Estimates, which is published early in each year.

## Chapter XII

### THE CENTRAL DEPARTMENT

IN a vast organisation such as the modern War Office much must depend upon the pivotal centre which is charged with the task of co-ordination and the smooth working of the machine as a whole. It is this fact that gives a vital character to the position of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, quite apart from his functions as Accounting Officer. As the channel of communication between the Secretary of State and the rest of the department, as the Secretary of the Army Council and as the head of the permanent staff of the Office, he is charged with duties of supreme importance for the efficiency of the discharge of business.

The present Permanent Under-Secretary of State once described his position, with too great modesty, as largely that of a Remembrancer. He referred in this phrase to the Secretariat as a repository of experience, a permanent link between past and present, the element of continuity amid an ever-changing military staff. To keep in touch with the Army itself, with its point of view and its difficulties, and to know its troubles by personal contact, is held to be a very valuable principle in the system of short-term military staffs who come from the Army to serve at Headquarters for a period of four years. To the permanent civilian element falls,

therefore, the complementary task of providing long and continuous experience of the problems of Army administration as seen from the standpoint of Ministers, of other Departments of State, of the public, and indeed of past generations of soldiers—for “new” ideas are seldom novel. This continuity of experience is certainly an asset of great value in assisting the discharge of the “central” duties which fall to the permanent head of the office; but “Remembrancer” is too narrow a term, for “the general control of War Office procedure and the conduct of official business”—a primary function of the “P.U.S.”—is merely the official expression of a duty which, in plainer language, is responsibility for the efficient working of the whole department.

Under the heading of “general control,” the pursuit of expedition without loss of efficiency, and the avoidance of that written circumlocution which was once the taunt of all Government offices, are the constant aims of the modern régime. Naturally, consultation on paper is very largely indispensable; for a glance at the framework of the machine, with its several distinct military departments, each sub-divided into many sections, its branches for contracts and lands business, its finance division and its secretariat, is sufficient reminder of the many interests that a single subject may concern. A purchase of land for training, for example, will affect more than one of the military branches, may involve estate and legal questions, and may even possess political aspects, apart from its financial side: the Air Ministry or other departments may possibly be concerned in it: and to overlook even a minor interest will probably result in

loss of time and, in any case, in some wasted effort. Consultation on paper is quite essential for co-ordinating so large a department. The point stressed is rather that verbal discussion is a feature of modern War Office methods as opposed to that writing of lengthy "minutes" which distinguished procedure in older days.

It is not a question of telephones or of other modern facilities, though the lack of these is too little remembered in criticising "the old days." The real task of the "P.U.S.," as responsible for the conduct of business, is concerned with questions of greater moment than mere convenience of working methods, or even of mere co-ordination, though the latter is an important feature. It is more truly one of co-operation. The public probably conceives of a department as a single unified entity; but actually, like any other large business, it is a mass of interests and points of view which are often divergent and sometimes clashing, and which only result in concerted decisions by a process of mutual understanding. Thirty years ago this division of interests provided a background for plausible tales of military-*versus*-civilian differences; but to-day such tales are no longer heard. The task of "general control" at its best is to secure that spirit of mutual confidence between the several parts of a large whole which results in a concerted policy undelayed by protracted disputes; and the whole trend of the "control" of to-day is certainly towards that end.

Given the existence of that widened outlook, that appreciation of "the other view," which is here claimed for the military staff of to-day no less than it

is for the civil servant, the mere discarding of formal procedures can do much to expedite business. Thus, even at the highest level, formal meetings of the Army Council, with all the machinery of printed précis, are so infrequent as to be rare. As a Board the Council is seldom seen; but Council decisions are given daily. There are frequent meetings of two or more Councillors, with or without Ministers, to expedite important decisions. There are regular meetings of the Military Members to talk over matters of military policy or of military administration; and these are assisted by the "P.U.S." on financial or other civil aspects. Again, in times of emergency, informal meetings of the Army Council are held as often as once a day, or even more than once a day: some such occasions were the General Strike, the Turko-Greek troubles at Chanak, or the despatch of the Shanghai Defence Force. For the rest, decisions are taken on paper; but, subject to proper records being kept, informal discussion "off the paper" is encouraged wherever it is likely to help in the speeding up of office procedure. In this kind of way "control of procedure" can vitally affect administration.

In the actual machinery of co-ordination the responsibility of the "P.U.S." for the signature of all important letters and orders of the Army Council is, of course, a material point. The object of this duty is to ensure that the decision conveyed in the letter is complete and authoritative. When a letter goes out from the War Office "by command of the Army Council," no matter from which branch it may emanate, it is, as it purports to be, a decision of all

the authorities concerned. It is, therefore, the business of the "P.U.S.," or that of the Assistant Under-Secretary of State who may sign the letter on his behalf, to see that all Members of Council concerned are parties to the communication, either personally in larger questions or through their branches in those of less importance. In addition important incoming letters are sorted out from the daily post-bags to be shown at once to the "P.U.S.;" and similarly lists are compiled currently of all important Treasury decisions and are circulated to Members of Council and Directors.

Other ways and means of co-ordination will be mentioned in sketching the duties of the branches.

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Apart from the control of business generally, the other "central" duties of the "P.U.S." are officially summarised as follows:—

"Duties connected with his office as Secretary of the Army Council. The domestic economy of the War Office. Parliamentary and legal business. Committees. The Army Lists. Editing and issue of Army regulations, Army Orders, Army Council Instructions and other publications. Printing and Stationery Services. Communications with the Press. The administration of the Royal Army Chaplains' Department. Conditions of employment of all civilian staffs."

Of these the widest is "domestic economy," since it covers the whole sphere of office arrangements, including the important part of the mechanism which is known as the Registry, or "R." This is

a central organisation which acts on behalf of all branches. With a vast volume of correspondence for distribution among scores of branches it is important to provide a comprehensive system of identifying each particular file, and of keeping track of its whereabouts during the course of its circulation. A central Registry was first adopted when the various departments of Army administration were amalgamated in 1856 to form a united War Department, and, basically, the existing Registry system is a modernised and improved version of the excellent plan of those old days.

The system may be called "subjective." When the new correspondence has been opened and sorted, the papers are classified according to subject, each generic subject possessing a number—"34," for example, signifying Inspections; while a heading, such as "Cavalry," indicates the particular branch of the subject, and a sub-number, say "242," identifies this particular file. Thus the 242nd file which deals with the inspection of Cavalry bears, so to speak, an identity disc in the number marked on its official "jacket"—"34/Cavalry/242": and a "transit section" of the Registry, operating with loose-leaf ledgers, records its movements wherever it goes. Thus fresh correspondence on an "old" subject can be placed at once in its proper file, and the whole dossier on any subject is available at short notice to any branch which requires to see it. There is, of course, a mass of correspondence which does not require fresh registration, since files on the subjects are "open" already. Thus the number of files which were newly "registered" in the twelve months of 1933 was

233,426; but the volume of "unregistered" post was roughly two and a half times as large.

Naturally, in the case of a new file, one of the several duties of "R" is to mark it at once to the branch of the Office which is primarily concerned in taking action. At the headquarters offices of the military Commands the card-index system has been adopted; but the volume of correspondence received by the War Office is so vast and intricate that the book-record system, with its smaller risk of "losing" files by displacement of cards, is still preferred. The "registered" post for 1919 numbered 4,360,000 letters, and the present system stood up to the strain. Files not in use are stored on racks, and the "press-keepers," as the staff is called (because the files were originally stored in "presses"), have charge to-day of 4,000,000 papers. The "weeding" of files with a view to their destruction is, therefore, another duty of "R," and one which requires much knowledge and experience, for all the papers of Government Departments become the property of the Master of the Rolls and can be destroyed only under strict rules. At the end of the war the registered files had risen from 3 to over 10 millions: and of these over 6½ millions have now been weeded as obsolete; but much work still remains to be done.

Thus, to sum up, the Registry at the War Office is organised in three divisions for Registration, Transit and Press, and constitutes an extremely important element in the general scheme of co-ordination for which the "P.U.S." is responsible.

A few explanatory details follow as regards each of the main headings of work; and these, for the

convenience of the reader, are arranged under the names of the branches which deal with them, in order to show the organisation.

Further work for the correlation of business falls to the branch numbered "C.1." The circulation within the department of important decisions and memoranda, and the preparation of domestic instructions for the information and guidance of the Office, are part of the duties of this small section. The latter include Office Memoranda, a Chronology of annual events, and an imposing book of Office Instructions which the newcomer reads (it is hoped) with great profit. Other duties include the preparation of précis for the meetings of the Army Council, and of special papers for the Secretary of State; the formation of committees and the handling of their reports; and such general and miscellaneous matters as applications for official assistance in the making of films with a military interest, or the disposal of local military trophies.

Some of the most difficult work concerns charitable and other grants of money. Small sums are provided in Army Estimates for grants to churches and hospitals and other charitable institutions; but the Council also has at its disposal a limited amount of non-public funds, and the distribution of these in the best interests of officers, soldiers and military families requires judicious handling. In this work C.1 is the focussing point; the actual allocation of money being largely, of course, a military interest. The profits made by the Royal Tournament (which dates from the year 1880) go to swell the annual charity grants.

Parliamentary and legal business is the first charge of "C.2."

To the public its most familiar productions are, doubtless, the answers given by Ministers to the questions put by Members of Parliament. The precise tone of the answer given will depend on the Minister charged with replying, but the facts of the case are supplied by the department, all too often at very short notice and a certain expense of public money on telegrams and telephone calls. Why a military band played tunes at a fête in some remote and unheard-of village, or why the father of a certain soldier has applied in vain for his son's discharge—these are not points which the War Office can answer without incurring considerable labour; but it is a point of honour with a Government Department—though one or two cynical souls among the public may harbour unworthy doubts on the matter—that the facts supplied shall be strictly accurate. "Questions" can give a great deal of trouble in collecting the facts in a large Department.

The main parliamentary work of the branch is concerned with proposals for legislation. The Department has certain bills of its own, such as the Army and Air Force Annual Bill; but all public and private bills and provisional orders presented to the House require to be watched very carefully for the due protection of War Office interests. (A bill relating to Diseases of Fish has been found to affect the War Department!) This branch is concerned also with the Crown, in the sense of preparing the formal submissions by which His Majesty's pleasure is taken. Thus the

holding of manœuvres, to quote an example, requires by statute an Order in Council. If a change is made in the Army Council, the King's authority is sought by warrants for the issue of the necessary Letters Patent. The appeals made by officers under the Army Act, the petitions to the King which any subject may lodge, and the proceedings of certain types of courts-martial, similarly require a formal procedure. Arrangements for attendance at levées and investitures, and the keeping of the register of the "D.S.O.," are other types of a host of duties which fall to this part of the Secretariat.

Appropriately the legal work is coupled with the parliamentary, since the two are frequently intermingled. Here the War Office is well armed, since it possesses direct access to an important group of legal advisers. On the drafting of parliamentary bills the Parliamentary Counsel at the Treasury contributes more than expert knowledge. On cases involving criminal law the Director of Public Prosecutions advises. The day-to-day business is more largely concerned with the civil law; and here the department of the Treasury Solicitor gives constant and unfailing assistance on an almost unlimited range of subjects. For Scotland the War Office employs its own solicitor, and can also consult the Lord Advocate. Finally, on military law the department's official legal adviser is the Judge Advocate General to the Forces. In the case of all these legal officers the official files are "minuted" to them in the same way as to War Office branches.

Indeed the last-named officer, the "J.A.G.," is in a measure a part of the War Office, though he

stands in an independent position as direct adviser to the Secretary of State. The office is one of great antiquity, to which time has brought striking and interesting changes. It dates at least from the seventeenth century, when the "J.A.G." was for practical purposes a public prosecutor to the Army, acting on behalf of the Sovereign, and one of his duties was to "pursue offenders to punishment before a Court-martial." Later he was normally a member of the Government, and was secretary and legal adviser to the Board of General Officers, a capacity in which his sphere of influence was considerably wider than military law. In the nineteenth century the "J.A.G." became legal adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, and still had a seat in the House of Commons as the mouthpiece of the Government, if the actions or the office of the C.-in-C. were subjected to parliamentary attack. From 1892 onwards he ceased to be a Minister, but his position to-day remains special in character. He holds his appointment under Letters Patent, being adviser to the Secretary of State for War (and now also to the Secretary of State for Air) and custodian of the proceedings of all courts-martial. His important functions in relation to courts-martial have been mentioned in a previous chapter (page 132), but he is legal adviser on other matters, also, as the Secretary of State may at any time require.

As an illustration of the many subjects possessing a legal or quasi-legal bearing with which the War Office is confronted, one which has excited some public attention is the policy governing the disclosure or non-disclosure of confidential information. To

plead privilege, for example, for medical reports, which are necessarily confidential documents, may become a very delicate matter of weighing two distinct public interests: and the burden rests on the Secretary of State. This is a case where Government Departments are unreasonably considered to be unreasonable. A second example which affects the public is the duty laid upon the Army Council by Act of Parliament (the Geneva Convention Act of 1911) of protecting the use of the Red Cross emblem. The use of the Red Cross is confined by international agreement to the medical services of the Forces of the Crown and to duly authorised Voluntary Aid Societies, and the number of civil hospitals and traders who occasionally attempt to make use of the emblem reveals a widespread ignorance of the fact that its use is contrary to the law of the land. The three authorised Voluntary Aid Societies are the British Red Cross, the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association, who undertake definite obligations for supplementing the medical services of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force in war.

A separate section of this large branch deals with the control of expenditure which is charged to the Votes of the Stationery Office. The service rendered by His Majesty's Stationery Office to all Government Departments alike is known technically as a "free service," and its cost is not paid by Army funds; but the obligation to pursue economy is rigorously observed by the War Office. The average expenditure for Army purposes on stationery and office requisites, printing of all descriptions required, published books and periodicals, and office machinery ranging from

typewriters to the most elaborate accounting machines, is about £150,000 a year. There is a printing press in the War Office itself for secret and confidential work. In addition to mobilisation reserves, large stocks of printed matter are required by the Army for current work, such as training manuals and Army forms (of which there are some 3,000 varieties), and these are stored at a depot at Wandsworth, where they are packed and distributed. The weight of the stock for all purposes is about 1,500 tons.

The most important work of this section is a constant campaign of economy, which is possible in two directions: in cutting down the number of publications—for example, the number of Army forms—and in pruning the distribution lists. As an instance, "Notes on Map Reading" has a distribution of 48,000 copies on the basis that issue is strictly confined to those who must actually use the book; and a similar method of restricting issues is applied to some 2,000 publications. This is a case where centralisation is definitely economical. The distribution of Army Orders requires about 8,000 copies. For economy in printing costs a considerable amount of duplicating work is done by electrically-driven machines. For typing and shorthand-typing work a department familiarly known as "T" is ruled by a Controller of Typists, with a staff of some 120 ladies.

Yet another section, a very small one, deals with all information given to the Press on subjects which affect or interest the public. Official communiqués are issued almost daily, but the work consists mainly of replying to enquiries. The policy is to encourage

enquiries; and a development of recent years is the holding of conferences on special occasions when matters of current military interests are explained to the Press by senior officers. Great trust is placed in the loyalty of the newspapers in the matter of non-publication of news which might, especially in an emergency, be damaging to the public interest; and several years before the Great War a liaison Committee came into being (the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee) which set up a voluntary system of control. That system worked well both in peace and in war; and the Committee, expanded to include the Air Ministry, remains in existence to-day. Here the Press renders valuable assistance through the medium of representatives of the newspaper owners of the United Kingdom. The important principle of "Press" policy is that all newspapers shall be treated alike.

The editing of War Office publications is the charge of the third branch (C.3). The "big five" in this connection, giving them their short titles, are the King's Regulations, the Pay Warrant, the Allowance Regulations, the T.A. Regulations and the Regulations for the Supplementary Reserve; but the editorial scrutiny extends to the whole mass of War Office literature—textbooks, handbooks, manuals, and pamphlets.

Part of the work is the review and publication of Army Orders and Army Council Instructions, the former being public and placed on sale, and the latter more temporary and domestic in character. Army Orders date from 1888 and are the means of promulgating Royal Warrants, Orders made by

of about fifteen hundred a week. Ex-officers and soldiers seeking employment wish to obtain a record of service or to replace a lost discharge certificate; old soldiers or their children ask for evidence of age which will satisfy the Old Age Pensions authorities; the Civil Service Commissioners, private employers, Regimental Associations and Aid Societies, the police, recruiting officers, or Employment Exchanges require details of Army service, either for assisting men to employment or, sometimes, for checking their misdemeanours.

In addition, there are miscellaneous records which claim 400 enquiries a week touching on every conceivable subject of military activity. These include full particulars of all campaigns from 1879 onwards; the casualty lists of the Great War; the records of the headquarters staffs in all theatres of operations, of the Armies in the field and the Armies of Occupation, of the women's corps and the civilian subordinates; and the schedules of honours and awards granted for service in the field. Items of particular interest are the records of enemy prisoners of war inherited from a temporary war-time department (The Prisoners of War Information Bureau), and the files of the special Government Committee on the treatment by the enemy of British prisoners. Finally there are maps, nearly 20,000 in number, some of which date from the seventeenth century and possess very great historical interest. These records are housed at Walworth.

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The central work hitherto mentioned is controlled, under the "P.U.S.," by the Assistant Under-

Secretary of State; but the main duties of C.4 and the whole of the duties of C.5 are joined to the charge of the Deputy Under-Secretary. These latter branches deal with the civil staffs and the wages, salaries and conditions of service of all industrial employees.

The main civil staff of the War Office belongs to what are called "Treasury" classes—that is to say, it is graded and classified on a basis common to the whole Civil Service; but C.4, in addition to these classes, is concerned with the clerical staffs and typists employed by the Department's "out-stations"; while the work of C.5 has a very large scope, embracing the bulk of civilian employees, roughly speaking, other than clerical. At its various factories, store depots, barracks, hospitals and other institutions at home stations the Department employs (including women and lads) some 29,500 civilians; and 4,500 at stations abroad such as Malta, Gibraltar, Egypt and China. The majority, of course, are industrial employees, such as mechanics, labourers and store-hands, or "domestic" staffs at schools, etc.: the minority are supervisory staffs or technical staffs for drawing offices, clerks of works or surveyors' clerks. The pay-roll of these employees at home is about £4,500,000 a year; and the rates of pay are very numerous; but, apart from the fixing and reviewing of wages, the work in connection with conditions of service, disciplinary questions, the policy of discharges, and consideration of complaints and appeals, which at times involve the attention of Ministers, is necessarily a heavy task. The Regulations for Civilian Employees occupy, quite unavoidably, a book of some 200 pages.

In fixing wage-rates for its workpeople the War Office follows the lead of the House of Commons by adopting the principles of the "fair wages" required to be paid by Government contractors under the Fair Wages Resolution. The main undertaking thus involved is to "pay rates of wages and observe hours of labour not less favourable than those commonly recognised by employers and trade societies (or, in the absence of such recognised wages and hours, those which in practice prevail amongst good employers) in the trade in the district where the work is carried out." This task is as complicated as it sounds. The national policy as regards employing ex-service men is also fully observed by the department.

Finally, the Whitley system of councils for negotiations between employers and employed—the "official side" and the "employees' side"—forms a considerable addition to the work. The "War Department Industrial Council," of which the Financial Secretary is chairman, covers the workpeople generally; and the "War Office Administrative Whitley Council," whose chairman is the "P.U.S.," deals with the clerical and other grades. The Industrial Council and its local committees may deal with all matters touching employment except wages and other questions which come under the heading of "trade matters." The latter are reserved to Trade Councils represented on the official side by the Government Departments which principally employ the particular class (engineering, building trade, shipbuilding or miscellaneous labour), and on the employees' side by the Trades Unions.

These are not the only such bodies concerned: for example, the Shop Stewards' Committee at Woolwich has been prominent since pre-Whitley days. This machinery adds to the work of the War Office, but has accomplished much in avoidance of friction and the settlement of difficult problems.

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From the list of duties quoted above there remains the administration of the Chaplaincy Services. For denominations other than the Roman Catholic the general control, under the "P.U.S.," is vested in the Chaplain-General to the Forces, assisted by a Deputy Chaplain-General. The Roman Catholic Chaplaincy Services are separately administered.

Chaplains have accompanied armies in the field since the earliest exploits of British arms, but the first appointment of a "Chaplain to the Army" is found in Cromwell's "New Model," most of the regiments of which had chaplains. At the Restoration chaplains were appointed by the King, fully commissioned, to every regiment, and the Articles of War of 1662 prescribed that "the chaplains to the Troops of Guards and others in Regiments shall every day read the Common Prayers of the Church of England to the soldiers respectively under their charge, and to preach to them as often as with convenience shall be thought fit." This regimental system broke down, since most regiments at home were scattered in billets, and the appointment of chaplain, obtained by purchase, became little more than a sinecure. A royal warrant of 1796, which appointed the first Chaplain-General, attempted a reorganisation without any

pronounced success; and a second attempt in 1809 which appointed a number of Staff Chaplains—the first step towards the present department—was so far lacking in lasting effect that the number of chaplains who held these commissions in 1843 was five. Real reform had to wait for Sidney Herbert working with a famous figure—the Rev. Prebendary Gleig.

The latter was first the Principal Chaplain and then Chaplain-General for 31 years (1844-75), which saw the Chaplaincy Service of the Army built up anew, properly equipped, and extended to embrace the several denominations. The close connection of the Chaplain-General with the reform of military education has been mentioned in a former chapter. The establishment of Chaplains in 1914 was 117: at the end of the war the numbers had risen to close upon 3,500. The establishment now is 138, and a principal task for the War Office is to secure that the fullest advantage is obtained from the limited number of Regular chaplains by posting them to those garrisons where their services will have the widest scope. At stations where the numbers of a particular denomination do not justify the employment of a regular Chaplain, civilian officiating chaplains are appointed. An Advisory Committee, on which all the Churches are represented, assists the Department in dealing with questions of the moral and spiritual welfare of the troops.

There are also one or two central sections which occupy a special position. One is the province of Actuaries, who produce indispensable calculations which the plain man accepts with awe; another deals with the Income Duty assessed on all the “taxable

emoluments" which are paid out of Army funds; and a third is the War Office Library.

The Library is well known, since it contains the largest collection of military books in Great Britain. Its origin may be credited to the famous Duke of York, who wrote to Mr. Pitt in 1804 recommending the "formation of a deposit for military knowledge," one section of which was to be a military library. There are, indeed, many books at the War Office which still bear the label "Military Depot, Q.M.G.'s Dept." The Library remained a small affair down to the time of Lord Panmure (1855-58), but his interest resulted in a "Librarian's Branch," and a few years later the Franco-German War gave a great impetus to the collection of literature for the newly enlarged Topographical branch which was destined to grow, in due course, to be an important part of the General Staff. In 1860 the number of volumes was probably not more than 5,000: to-day there are 135,000, in addition to 4,000 pamphlets which were issued during the Great War.

There are two sections, a General Staff Library and a Parliamentary and Reference Library. The former consists of works in all languages which deal with the history, military resources, geography and statistics of foreign countries, and the art and science of war generally. All important foreign publications are thus available to the General Staff. The other section is in constant use for reference to parliamentary debates, sessional papers, the historical records of regiments and corps, and scientific and legal works. The earliest printed book in the Library is dated 1573. This is a

scarce work by Peter Whitehorne entitled *Certayne wayes for the ordering of souldiours in battelray, and setting of battayles, after divers fashions, with their maner of marching: and also figures of certayne new plattes for fortification of townes, etc.* Modern literature, whether military or parliamentary, can certainly make no claim to scarcity: the Librarians spend busy days.

Finally, from the civil staff are provided the Private Secretaries to Ministers, to the "P.U.S." and to the Deputy Under-Secretary; and the three "Resident Clerks," who dwell in quarters on the fourth floor and are on duty when the Office is otherwise closed. As to the duties of the Resident Clerks, the writer long ago formed the opinion that there was no limit to their possibilities. The particular occasion for this conclusion was a very hot Saturday afternoon in June, in the far-off days before the war, when a messenger (a commissionnaire) arrived in triumph with an enormous bead, about the size of a blackbird's egg, consisting apparently of glass. This messenger had been engaged in clearing the débris from the War Office stands at the Horse Guards building after the ceremony of Trooping the Colour, and the huge bead was among his finds. As a find it was not in the premier class—a silk garment was judged to be first: its appearance was dingy and unprepossessing: but the Resident Clerk, acting in the best official traditions, locked it up in a safe with the secret ciphers, never dreaming that the telephones at Scotland Yard were ringing busily on account of its loss. It was something of a shock on the Monday morning when discreet detectives invaded the War Office.

This incident had a happy ending, for the messenger was allowed to restore his find to its owner in person, and the Indian prince, whose turban had contrived to discard its diamonds, rewarded him with a handsome gift.

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Historically the post of Secretary of the War Office, and head of the permanent civil staff, can be traced back to an early official with the title of "Deputy Secretary-at-War." The Commissioners of Military Enquiry, reporting in the year 1808, described the Deputy Secretary-at-War as the Senior Permanent Official who conducted the correspondence and, under the authority of the Secretary-at-War, directed the business of the department, with the exception of the Accounts branch. It was he, we are told, who conveyed to the Office the pleasure of the Secretary-at-War.

The earliest recorded holder of the post was a gentleman named Theophilus Blyke, appointed in 1717, who may himself have had predecessors, though their names in earlier days are lost. At the end of the eighteenth century his importance was certainly considered to be great, since his salary rose from £320 in the year 1782 to £2,000 in 1798, and £2,500 in 1806—a figure which, allowing for changes in value, appears enviable to modern eyes. Some fifty years later (1851) Mr. Fox-Maule, later Lord Panmure, described the Deputy Secretary-at-War as equal in point of rank and position to an Under-Secretary of State. Then in the post-Crimean change, when the Secretary-at-War was himself

absorbed, the post of Deputy was abolished, and the last holder, Sir Benjamin Hawes, became Permanent Under-Secretary of State.

Sir R. W. Thompson, Sir A. L. Haliburton, Sir Ralph Knox and Sir Edward Ward are well-known names in the subsequent line. In the Esher changes of 1904 the title was changed to "Secretary of the War Office." In 1920 there were two Joint Secretaries (Sir Herbert Creedy and Sir Charles Harris) who were also made Members of the Army Council; and finally, in 1924, the post regained its older title, and the present "Permanent Under-Secretary of State," already the Secretary and a member of the Council, was also appointed Accounting Officer.

\* \* \* \*

Apart from the Under-Secretaries of State, the civil staff of the central branches serving at the War Office on April 1st, 1934, consisted of the following numbers: Administrative class, 16; Clerical class and other clerks, 171. The typing staff for the whole department numbered 126, and Presskeepers, Messengers, Cleaners, etc., numbered 362. The plan of the distribution of work in the whole department—finance and central—of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State is shown in the diagram appended.

DEPARTMENT OF THE

**PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE**

*(Secretary of the Army Council and Accounting Officer for Army Votes)*

Secretariat; Internal Economy of the War Office; Civilian Staffs; Relations with the Press; Chaplaincy Services; Control of Expenditure; Parliamentary Estimates; Accounts and Audit; Royal Army Pay Corps.

**DEPUTY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE**

Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State

DIRECTOR OF FINANCE (A)    DIRECTOR OF FINANCE (B)    DIRECTOR OF FINANCE (C)

General Preparation of Financial consideration of Financial consideration of  
Army Estimates; Financial Questions relating to Pay Questions affecting the  
Questions relating to and certain Allowances, Votes of the Quarter-  
Regimental Establish- Military Staff of the War Master-General and the  
ments; Financial Relations Office, Staff of Commands, Master-General of the  
with India, Colonies and the Territorial Army and Ordnance, including the Royal Ordnance Factories;  
other Governments; Educational Establish- Royal Ordnance Factories; at Out-Station; Audit of Royal Ordnance  
Accounting and Audit; ments, &c.; Non-Effective Factories Accounts and Whitley and Industrial  
Royal Army Pay Corps. Questions. Wages and Labour  
Questions;

DIRECTOR OF FINANCE (C)

Wages and Labour  
Questions;  
Questions relating to  
War Office Civil Staff  
and Clerical Grades  
Royal Ordnance Factories;  
Audit of Royal Ordnance  
Factories Accounts and  
Woolwich Wages Account.

ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
Secretariat; Papers for the Army Council;  
Parliamentary and Legal Business;  
Regulations and other Publications;  
Printing and Stationery Services;  
Central Registry; Custody of Records.

THE CHAPLAIN-GENERAL TO THE FORCES  
Administration of the Royal Army  
Chaplains' Department.

## Chapter XIII IN THE GREAT WAR

THE year 1914 did not open propitiously for the War Office. The Army was in a ferment. Ulstermen had vowed that they would never accept the Home Rule Bill which seemed likely to become law, and an Ulster Defence Force had been organised. Born of passionate speeches and newspaper articles, the wild rumour ran through the Army that the Liberal Government, a Protestant body, proposed to employ the forces of the Crown to attack and crush Protestant Ulster.

Colonel Seely, now Lord Mottistone, was then the Secretary of State for War, Sir John French was "C.I.G.S.," and Sir Spencer Ewart was Adjutant-General. As early as December 1913 they had summoned to the War Office all the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief, and had informed them, in view of disquieting rumours to the effect that officers would resign their commissions if ordered to attack Ulster, that no intention had ever existed of giving any such orders to the troops: what had to be faced was the possibility of action to protect life and property, if the civil power could not hold its own.

However, in March plots were on foot among the wilder spirits in Ireland to seize munitions which belonged to the Army at Armagh, Omagh and elsewhere. The Government desired to protect these

arms, and hoped that troops could be moved for this purpose without precipitating a crisis; but the orders set the Curragh ablaze. The officers received a wrong impression: they thought that the intention behind these orders was to initiate active military operations. The rumoured surprise attack on Ulster, of which they had read and heard so much, appeared now to be confirmed; and General Gough and fifty-seven officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh announced that they preferred to accept dismissal if ordered to proceed north. As a matter of fact they were to be sent south, and this misapprehension was soon removed; but, when General Gough was summoned to the War Office, the Secretary of State gave him a document initialled by himself, Sir John French and General Ewart, which by some means or other was published in the Press and appeared, with certain amendments in manuscript, to constitute a sort of private bargain between the Government and the "rebellious" officers.

Then the storm broke in Press and Parliament. Furious demands were made that the document should be withdrawn; but Sir John French refused to withdraw. The resignations of the Field-Marshal and Sir Spencer Ewart were announced in the House on March 30th; and the Secretary of State resigned also. Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, took over the Seals of the War Office himself, explaining that the events were such, in his view, as to constitute "a great public emergency."

These events were not lost on the Wilhelmstrasse.

Later, in July, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lloyd George) informed the House of Commons

that there were hopeful signs throughout the world of a reaction against expenditure on armaments. On the night of August 4th-5th Great Britain entered the World War.

\* \* \* \*

The war is a long way away now. Distinguished people can write with detachment, far removed from the heart-stopping strain, to point out the incredible folly of others. The work of certain Government Departments is obscured by a smoke-cloud of personalities. The shock of a nightmare found to be real, the rush, the political obstacles, . . . these and many other things cease to be seen in due perspective, and especially the very limited rôle assigned to the Army in pre-war plans. To rise to the measure of a world war was doubtless a less exacting task in the sphere of national finance, or the management of the great Fleet to which the country had pinned its faith, than it was in the case of our very small Army. For a war overseas the nation had provided a force of six Divisions—no more, apart from the troops at colonial stations and the garrison of India. Few statesmen had visions of anything larger. Few people, perhaps, had vision at all; but among the few was Lord Kitchener of Khartoum who on August 6th, two days after the outbreak of war, was hurriedly appointed to be Secretary of State.

His name was one to conjure with. It conjured into being great new armies with which no machinery existed to deal, which the factories shared by the Fighting Services were never designed or intended to arm, which no Government had ever contem-

plated. The thing was done with painful labour, with grave delays and misunderstandings, in an atmosphere of public excitement not far short of hysteria. The bare facts are that in the four years the War Office became responsible for the conduct of operations at Gallipoli, Salonika, Mesopotamia (the latter part of the campaign only), Palestine, Italy, Africa and Russia, apart altogether from the western front; and for maintaining British forces which grew in numbers, not including Dominion troops, to 3,500,000 men. In France it became responsible also for the food, stores and maintenance generally of Dominion and Colonial forces, and latterly of part of the American troops. At home it was concerned with at least three armies . . . the army of men who were under training, the army of the sick and wounded, and the host of dependants of the fighting men.

In such matters as supply and transport, the accommodation of troops in this country, the training of recruits who numbered millions, or the payment of these colossal numbers in half a dozen theatres of war, the extra burden shouldered by the War Office is easy, perhaps, to understand. Less obvious are the new developments which had no precedent in peace . . . for example, the business of censorship, and later of propaganda work, which fell to the General Staff to organise; the anxious problem of finding the men which distracted the Adjutant-General's department when the voluntary effort had spent itself and the cautious steps taken by the Cabinet in the direction of compulsory military service threatened to fail to provide the numbers; or, again, the financial adjustments entailed by the desire of the Dominion

Governments to pay for the issues made in the field for the maintenance of their own contingents. These are only a few instances: the burden fell on all departments.

At the outbreak of war the Military Members were: C.I.G.S.—General Sir Charles Douglas; Adjutant-General—Lieut.-General Sir Henry Sclater; Q.M.G.—Major-General Sir John Cowans; M.G.O.—Major-General Stanley von Donop. Sir Charles Douglas died in October, and was succeeded by Lieut.-General Sir J. Wolfe Murray. The leading permanent civilians were Sir Reginald Brade, Secretary of the War Office, and Sir Charles Harris, Assistant Financial Secretary. The present Permanent Under-Secretary of State (Sir Herbert Creedy) was private secretary to Lord Kitchener.

The Expeditionary Force, as everyone knows, was landed in France without a hitch. Four Divisions and the Cavalry Division (embarked August 9th to 20th) fought in the retreat from Mons. A fifth Division (August 21st to 23rd) arrived in time to fight at Le Cateau. The sixth followed on September 8th and 9th. These numbers amounted in round figures to 160,000 men. On September 10th came a break in the tension when the Germans were forced back from the Marne to the Aisne. In October the gallant attempt to save Antwerp was followed by the first battle of Ypres and terrible lists of casualties. Then came a lull on the western front from the end of November to the following March, and during the course of this "dreary deadlock" the French Government returned to Paris (December 11th, 1914).

Meanwhile the following steps had been taken. The 14 Divisions of the Territorial Force were embodied at once on the outbreak of war, and in September 14 more were authorised. Two Regular Divisions (the 7th and 8th) were formed from units in overseas garrisons, to be followed shortly by 3 more (the 27th, 28th and 29th); and 2 Cavalry Divisions were formed in France. In addition, under the Kitchener scheme, 5 New Armies (30 Divisions) had begun to be formed before the end of the year. Parliament had voted the following numbers additional to the original estimate for the year: on August 7th, 500,000; on September 14th, 500,000; and on November 20th, 1,000,000 men. The total enlistments in the first five months were 1,186,357. Moreover, India had despatched a number of forces: 2 Divisions and 2 Cavalry Divisions of the Indian Army to France, and smaller forces to East Africa, Mesopotamia and Egypt. The first Canadian and Newfoundland contingents left for England on October 3rd. The first Australian and New Zealand contingents arrived at Suez on December 1st.

On November 3rd an event took place which was destined to throw a vast new burden on a War Office which was already swamped, but not submerged, in the rising waves of a sea of troubles: the Fleet bombarded the Dardanelles.

Every day of these months brought a host of problems . . . legislation required, terms of enlistment, instructors for training, billeting rates, the provision of officers, Home Defence measures, the needs of the Royal Flying Corps, the pay of the missing and prisoners of war, separation allowance

and pension questions, the use of the Territorial Force—apart from the pressing and paramount need of supplying and supporting the army in the field, and the hundred and one domestic questions of staff, space and organisation which arose daily within the department.

A mistake which was hardly avoidable was made at the very beginning of things. A large part of the department of the General Staff (31 out of 64 officers), and the holders of other military appointments, left their posts at once for service in France, and were replaced by officers new to the work. It was possibly due to the lack of experience resulting from this initial exodus that the military censorship of cables and articles was alleged by the Press to be very uneven, and caused much trouble and irritation. Arrangements concerning secrecy had been planned with the Press in pre-war days through the medium of the standing committee (*vide* page 271), and on August 13th a Press Bureau was formed for controlling naval and military “news”; but the Press, with whom this was a voluntary arrangement—observed on the whole with great loyalty—were soon reduced to a state of fury, and the difficult task of mediation was one of the many delicate duties which overwhelmed the Secretariat in holding the balance, precariously, between military demands on the one hand and the clamour of statesmen, the Press and the public. The value of the experience embodied in a permanent civil staff accustomed to dealing with new Ministers and to civil contacts of all kinds was tested highly in these days. To ensure the smooth working of the machine was more than merely a

huge task. In the generous words of a shrewd judge,\* "Brade was one of the pivots of the war."

A mere recital of official events would fail to convey a true impression of the life lived at that time in the War Office; and, indeed, any picture, however full, would be drawn at the best from one angle only, and even so would be blurred and confused. The atmosphere of those crowded months is difficult to recapture now. Some personal impressions alone can be given . . . the thronged hall, the hurrying escorts of countless enquirers, the breathless discharge of unwonted duties, the sudden arrival of news—at last—flashed from the front in secret cipher, the despatch to Sir John French of the bag by means of which urgent and secret letters were carried by hand to Headquarters in France, the painfulness of the casualty lists and the constant enquiries from relatives and friends, the comings and goings of Cabinet Ministers and emissaries from all parties, the brooding eyes of Lord Kitchener, the anxieties of Sir George Arthur, the kindly brusqueness of Sir George Riddell, the inevitable cigar of "F. E." Smith (the first Director of the Press Bureau), the procession of princes, over-age peers, politicians, journalists, cinematographers, who laid siege to Sir Reginald Brade; . . . the astonishing rumours known to be false. . . .

In any faithful record of happenings some of the rumours would find a place. The most amazing, perhaps, was the famous myth of the trainloads of Russians who were carried from Scotland to the south coast behind drawn blinds. People were met

\* Note 21, page 347.

who had spoken to them! Such reports, and the flood of advice from admirers (often enclosing a photograph), which poured upon the Secretary of State, formed a welcome touch of light relief. A single week-end produced the following tales:—

Twenty thousand Germans had landed at Margate.

The Guards had been rushed to the coast in buses.

The British Fleet had been split in two.

Germans had landed at Lowestoft and Newcastle.

The Forth Bridge had been blown up.

Germans had landed on the Isle of Wight *and had sunk it.*

Actually, the nearest approach to “invasion” was the coastal raid of December 16th, when Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby were bombarded: 126 civilians were killed and 567 were injured.

Some quite incredible incidents occurred through the public zeal to assist the department, which was not confined to the post or to daytime. At 1 a.m. on September 4th the writer received a Member of Parliament who brought a small corpse in a deal box. A swift car had borne it through the night from Oxfordshire . . . a carrier pigeon . . . shot on the roof . . . with a left wing that looked very suspicious and ought to be shown at once to the War Office. The dead bird was spread out on a table and its feathers were searched with commendable patience. But the “false quill” was not there: the poor bird had been innocent. Or, again, on December

17th a lady telephoned at 10 p.m., from Leinster Square and a sense of duty, to report that a dog . . . a large dog which belonged to a neighbour of Austrian birth . . . was turned into the Square at certain hours where it barked, quite obviously, *in code*. A letter followed in confirmation. "One cannot but feel that such a bark," it ran, "might be used as a sign for any alien." These are but two among hundreds of cases.

Nor could a faithful record ignore the reports whispered within the Department; for, coming from sources associated closely with the leading military and political circles, they were usually not far wide of the truth. Lord Kitchener, it was said, was slow to believe in the use of the Territorial Force, and had never heard of the Special Reserve. . . . The Cabinet was fearful of Labour troubles and would not think of compulsory service. . . . Headquarters in France (in the course of September) thought that the war would be over by Christmas, and felt that Lord Kitchener was starving them by keeping back men and munitions in England for "New Armies" which would never be wanted. . . . The French were opposed to war correspondents, and the Press was not being treated wisely.

But even the rumours were hurried whispers. Nobody had time to spare.

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To these first nine months belong two criticisms of the War Office to which so large a publicity has been given that to ignore them entirely might be taken by the reader as endorsing their complete fairness.

The first has a special reference to the tragic failure of the Dardanelles. It is directed against the General Staff; for the popular impression is said to be that, if adequate "staff" advice had been given, the campaign would never have been undertaken. But the considered opinion—the written view—of the General Staff was opposed to a military attack on Gallipoli as being too hazardous an operation. Nor could the point be made by critics that the Cabinet was not apprised of this departmental military view.

The second criticism concerns munitions—the new production of guns and munitions aimed at by the military chiefs in the course of the first ten months of the war.

Here a striking picture has been drawn by at least one responsible critic which suggests a remarkable lack of foresight, denseness, and even apathy on the part of "the military mind" at the War Office responsible for the supply of munitions—or, in other words, the artillery experts and the Secretary of State himself. Actually the problem of supplying munitions weighed heavily on Lord Kitchener, who was not notably lacking in vision, and the orders placed in the first few months were based on a total strength in the field of 1,100,000 men, and involved the employment in this country of over 2,500 firms. Further, there were heart-breaking causes of delay which were quite outside the control of the soldiers, but which do not appear as a part of the picture. Germany started with vast reserves, but she did not succeed any better than Britain in accelerating her new output in the first nine months or so of war. The objective of the

attack, however, like the criticisms made by Mr. Lloyd George of the mentality of the "Whitehall Generals" or the alleged follies of commanders in the field, is not a matter of War Office system but of the qualifications possessed or lacked by particular distinguished officers, and further comment here would be out of place.

As a matter of comparative interest, the gun ammunition of all natures expended in the South African War, which lasted for  $2\frac{3}{4}$  years, amounted to 273,000 rounds. The expenditure in France in the first six months amounted to 1,000,000 rounds, and in the next three months to another 1,000,000. For the 18-pr. gun alone the amount ordered up to April, 1915, was approximately 30,000,000 rounds.

On a minor point Mr. Lloyd George is certainly more picturesque than accurate. To describe the War Office of 1915 as "that tranquil sanctuary of the God of War" is truly a poetic licence.

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Meanwhile "the sanctuary of the God of War" was so far possessed of tranquillity that quiet-mannered Sir Reginald Brade snatched sleep on an improvised bed in his office, and a weary-eyed staff blinked through the night at the stream of figures in secret cipher which carried messages over the seas. A fifth storey, "Zeppelin Terrace," rose on the top of the crowded building. In the new branch for casualty work, the bureau for dealing with offers of service, and the Enquiry Office for the general public, the staff was hard pressed to keep pace with

the work. The military and the finance branches were all equally overwhelmed.

The Army Estimates for 1915 provided for 3,000,000 men, and the total enlistments for the calendar year were 1,280,362. In March came the battle of Neuve Chapelle. In April began a long struggle at Ypres when gas was first used by the enemy; and in the same month (25th-26th) the Allied Expeditionary Force landed at Gallipoli. The leading Division of the New Armies left for France on May 9th.

It was a time of disillusionment and discontent in high quarters. The reports whispered within the War Office said that "Lord K.," the soul of loyalty, was upset by signs of divided allegiance on the part of General Headquarters in France. Losses in France and at the Dardanelles . . . bitter attacks on Lord Kitchener . . . the sudden resignation of Admiral Lord Fisher . . . fierce criticism of Mr. Churchill . . . political circles were in a turmoil. The dynamic gestures of Sir Max Aitken, now better known as Lord Beaverbrook, were frequently seen at the War Office. At the end of May a Coalition Government replaced Mr. Asquith's Liberal Cabinet.

It was at this stage that the War Office "threw off" the first of three new departments. The Ministry of Munitions was constituted (June 5th, 1915), and a number of branches were transferred from the War Office—about 150 officials. Further, a special Munitions of War Act (5 and 6 Geo. V, cap. 58) did much to ease the task of provision. In September came the battle of Loos. On October 5th Allied troops first landed at Salonika, and a new campaign

added complications which lasted till late in 1918. In November Lord Kitchener visited the Near East in order to see the situation for himself and to advise finally on future action. The Prime Minister took charge of the War Office. December was marked by two great changes: the evacuation of Gallipoli, a military achievement of the first order, started upon the 19th; and on the same day Sir John French was succeeded by General Sir Douglas Haig. Lord French was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the United Kingdom.

These twelve months (1915) saw the first appearance of 8-inch and 12-inch B.L. howitzers; of five types of trench mortar; of steel helmets, the first respirators, chemical shell and smoke bombs, Lewis machine guns, Verey pistols and anti-aircraft artillery. The Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing) was organised in wings and brigades; and the Directorate of Military Aeronautics was expanded to cope with its growing task. The regiment of Welsh Guards was created. A Machine Gun Corps was authorised. The work in connection with Prisoners of War demanded a new directorate. A series of new royal warrants made large extensions in pension provision. The issue of "Separation Allowance" to the families and dependants of soldiers became a colossal and complex business. The number of families and dependants dealt with in the month of August, 1915, was 1,646,300, and the money issued in that one month was £4,990,000. At the same date the strength of the War Office had jumped to 6,522. In the autumn a new recruiting scheme was introduced in the name of Lord Derby,

under which men were attested, classified, and transferred at once to the Army Reserve to wait until they were "called up." In December General Sir William Robertson took up the post of "C.I.G.S.," and a "Deputy C.I.G.S." was created as a new member of the Army Council.

The air raids on England had started in January: there were 24 during the year, in which 190 civilians were killed.

The strain of the year had been much increased by an atmosphere of intrigue and jealousy outside the War Office itself. The rumours current within the department said that Lord Kitchener was unhappy: that his heart was with the fighting men, but not with those of Downing Street. Great distress had been caused, too, by a very bitter attack on Lord Haldane which appeared in the papers controlled by Lord Northcliffe. Lord Haldane, ever a friend to the Army, had dared to defend Lord Kitchener. The Press as a whole had been somewhat appeased by a wise but belated concession in May under which representative war correspondents were attached to Headquarters on the western front. In the late autumn there was much talk of the possibility of compulsory service, on which the soldiers had set their heart as the only means of carrying on. Alleged political difficulties created impatience in military circles, and produced in Ministers (so it was said) an equal impatience of all advisers who could not promise quick results. This was the era of "Push and Go." The public, loyal to Lord Kitchener, continued to offer a flow of advice; and some of the budget of eager suggestions introduced a most

welcome touch of humour. The following is a specimen:—

“Guildford, 28th June, 1915

My Lord,

I feel sure if thousands of lions were sent into the German trenches it would make the enemy fly. Send them at night. Be such a surprise that they would not want to fire at them. If they were caught and drugged whilst bringing, nothing is impossible. Every day I have that thought, and especially after the good work that Bulls did for Italy.

Yours very truly,  
D. H——”

In the meantime a striking venture, conducted by the Indian Government, and aimed at producing important results, was threatening to involve the War Office in fresh commitments and complications. Against the advice of the General Staff the Indian force in Mesopotamia had been authorised to advance on Baghdad without waiting for reinforcements, and early in December a force of about 12,000 men was cut off and besieged in Kut.

\* \* \* \*

The tragic year 1916 opened with signs of renewed hope. Under the new “C.I.G.S.” the General Staff was re-formed and strengthened. The evacuation of Gallipoli was completed with almost incredible success. The Army Estimates for the new year provided for 4,000,000 men. It was rumoured that Mr. Lloyd George would support the demand for com-

pulsory service, which was strongly opposed by some Ministers. The Germans were swept from the Cameroons. The British Front in France was relatively quiet while the enemy prepared the attack on Verdun which opened on February 21st. In March a Military Service Act applied compulsory military service to unmarried men and widowers, subject to various grounds of exemption. Lieut.-General Sir Nevill Macready took up the post of Adjutant-General.

In April the clouds began to gather. There were seven Zeppelin raids in the month. On Easter Monday the harassed Department was faced with an Irish rebellion in Dublin, which was only suppressed by prompt measures involving 500 casualties. On the 29th Kut surrendered. Air Defence was becoming a big question. Already the head of the aircraft branch, the Director-General of Military Aeronautics, had been made a member of the Army Council; and the formation of an advisory board ("the Air Board") was announced in May. The actual number of air raids in the twelve months was 38, in which 172 civilians were killed. Secret arrangements were now in train for Lord Kitchener to visit Russia.

On June 5th came a staggering shock. The War Office was very still that day. A chilling sense of emptiness seemed to envelop the great building, as though the romance had gone out of its task and left it strangely cold and friendless; for the message had come from the Admiralty that Lord Kitchener would never return. For the third time within a few years Mr. Asquith acted temporarily as Secretary of State.

On July 1st on the western front the battles of the Somme started, and lasted until the third week of November. In that first month the British casualties, including those of Dominion troops, were 187,372 men. In August the War Office took over another new sphere of administration—that of the force in Mesopotamia.

The staff of the War Office had risen now to 12,672, and the problem of accommodation alone was a heavy task for the Secretariat. One development was a new directorate to deal with the registration of graves. The pressure on the Finance branches was somewhat relieved late in the year by the creation of a second off-shoot, when a staff of about 1,500 was transferred to the new Ministry of Pensions. The year saw the introduction of tanks—the Mark II, III and IV types; also the 15-inch howitzer, the Stokes mortar, and the Hotchkiss machine gun. Tanks were used in action for the first time on September 15th on the Somme. Another creation of 1916 was the Royal Defence Corps, organised for home duties in protection and observer companies.

In the meantime, on July 7th, Mr. Lloyd George became Secretary of State, but left the department after five months on accepting the office of Prime Minister; and as a result of this fresh political crisis the War Office received Lord Derby as its new Minister for War (December 11th, 1916). Major-General W. T. Furse now became Master-General of the Ordnance.

With the setting up of a War Cabinet consisting of five members only a year of tragedy and change

closed with the promise of great reforms in the higher direction of war policy.

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The events of the year 1917 brought a further vast increase of work in spite of further transfer of duties.

The Royal Flying Corps had started the war with less than 100 serviceable machines, and in February 400 War Office officials were transferred to a new Air Board office charged with the duty of supplying aircraft. Nevertheless the staff in August numbered 16,624. A second transfer took place in October, when 454 officials concerned with the work of raising recruits were absorbed in another new Ministry (the Ministry of National Service). Two members were added to the Army Council. The transportation system in France had been re-organised by Sir Eric Geddes in the autumn of 1916, at the instance of Mr. Lloyd George, and in March, 1917, a Director-General of Movement and Railways, relieving the "Q.M.G." of these duties, was made a civilian member of Council. In May a further member was added in a Surveyor-General of Supply, with new directorates for Raw Materials, Costings, Wool Textile Production, and Priority of supply-demands. Adjustments with Italy and America were added to the task of Finance. The expansion of the Tank Corps, of Labour formations, of Women's corps, and the great work of the "E.F. Canteens" called for new branches at Headquarters. The number of Voluntary Aid Detachments reached 3,804. The strength of a new Volunteer Force reached 290,000.

Heavy tanks, tank guns, 6-inch guns and gun-carriers were among the latest introductions.

The Estimates for this year (1917) provided for 5,000,000 men. A second Military Service Act had extended compulsion to married men between 18 and 41, and had made certain other helpful provisions in retaining the service of time-expired soldiers and facilitating transfers within the Army from corps to corps as need dictated, but the Council, responsible for the provision of drafts to an army drained by enormous losses, regarded these measures as insufficient. The talk at this time was all of "man-power," and rumour said that the new Prime Minister, with a widened view of the nation's needs, had somewhat abated his sympathy with the urgent demands of his military advisers. The actual enlistments during the year were 820,645.

On March 11th Baghdad was captured, and in the same month, on the western front, the Germans retired to the Hindenburg line. Revolution broke out in Russia and the Czar was forced to abdicate. In April began the allied offensive: the battle of Arras, Vimy Ridge, the Messines offensive and the battles of Ypres meant terrible losses throughout the summer. Passchendaele and the Flanders offensive came to an end on November 10th. The operations at Cambrai followed, famous for the tank attack, and closed in the second week of December. From September 20th to the end of the year the British losses on the western front, including those of Dominion contingents, amounted to over a quarter of a million.

In other theatres the defence of Egypt had turned to offensive action in Palestine, which now occupied seven Divisions, commanded since June by General Allenby. Early in November five other Divisions had hurried from France to the assistance of Italy, who had suffered disaster at Caporetto. The man-power problem was growing steadily, while report whispered that the War Cabinet was dissatisfied with the military policy and craved for some dramatic stroke at the expense of risk in the western theatre. The first contingent of American troops had arrived in France on June 25th, but no large numbers were yet available, and shipping troubles foreshadowed delay.

Meanwhile the proposal for greater concert of the war effort of the Entente Powers had been given new life by the collapse of Russia and the dissatisfaction of Ministers; and the conference of Rapallo, held in November, agreed to establish a Supreme War Council. These were difficult days for the Army Council for, while they agreed with the plan in principle, they could not approve of the original proposal to constitute a Technical Military Adviser independent of the War Department.

There were 33 air raids during the year, in which 471 civilians were killed; and 6 bombardments of coastal towns, in which 17 were killed or injured.

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The opening of the last year of the war was a time of great unease at the War Office. It was rumoured widely in military circles that the views held by the Army Council on the general policy of

Operations were opposed to those of the Prime Minister. It seemed obvious to the General Staff that, with many Divisions released from Russia, the Germans would make a supreme effort to inflict a defeat on the western front before any large American forces would reach France and be ready to fight. The existing Military Service Acts could not provide the men demanded. In February General Sir William Robertson was replaced in the post of "C.I.G.S." by General Sir Henry Wilson. On March 3rd, at Brest-Litovsk, Russia signed peace with the Central Powers.

These anxieties, and the Council's policy of concentration on the western front, were fully justified by the event. On March 21st the great German offensive started, and the British losses up to the end of April included, roughly, 70,000 prisoners and 750 guns. The casualties reported up to the end of May were 343,812 men. Troops were hurried from Palestine, and also from Mesopotamia. A fresh Military Service Act was passed on the basis of great emergency. Similarly the demand for unity of command was brought to fruition by force of circumstances, and General Foch, on April 14th, was appointed supreme Commander-in-Chief.

From the middle of July onwards the Allies began to strike heavy blows, and August 8th may be said to be the date when Germany saw that the tide had turned. In the great attacks by the Allied forces between that date and the Armistice the casualties in the British Forces, including the Dominion troops, were over 360,000. At Salonika the Allies attacked in September, and Bulgaria collapsed at once. In

Palestine in the same month General Allenby launched a final offensive, which broke and routed the Turkish forces. The armistice with Turkey was signed at Mudros on October 30th; Austria-Hungary signed on November 3rd: the Armistice on the western front followed on November 11th. On December 12th, 1918, the British crossed the Rhine at Cologne.

Two domestic events of these months must be mentioned. On April 1st the Flying services had passed to the charge of the Air Council, with a further transfer of War Office staff, 700 in all, to the new Ministry; and on April 20th Lord Derby retired and was succeeded as Secretary of State by Lord Milner.

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These were the events, in bald outline, in which the War Office played a central part for four very exacting years.

In computing the task discharged by the Department mere figures can mean very little, but some idea of size may be given. The original staff of about 2,000 had grown at the time of the Armistice to approximately 22,000. It occupied, in whole or part, fifty-nine buildings outside Whitehall, of which the temporary erections in Embankment Gardens and on the site of the lake in St. James's Park were the ones best known to the general public. Before the war the number of papers dealt with by the Central Registry was, in round figures, 10,000 a week: in November 1918 the figure had amounted to 253,000 a week, not including the letters dealt

with direct by several of the large branches which were housed outside the main building. The staff which dealt with Separation Allowances increased from 2 to 405; the staff for transport of troops and stores, from 19 to 690; the Contracts staff from 55 to 2,818; the ladies of the Type section from 55 to 957. New classes of work absorbed large numbers, such as Graves Registration, 393; Casualties, 1,267; and the Censorship work of the General Staff, 5,678. These figures are mere illustrations of size, and to single out particular cases is not to imply that any one branch bore a larger share than any other of the burden of the war-effort. An adequate picture of that effort could not be drawn in a few pages, and the following selected particulars touch only some parts of the organisation.

The total numbers of the forces at the time of the Armistice, including Indian, Dominion and Colonial troops and large native Labour formations, were nearly 5½ millions; and of these the numbers in this country were 1,600,000. In the British Isles the men enlisted from the beginning of the war to that date numbered 4,907,902.

From the first the question of accommodation was one of the major problems to be met, since the barracks, cleared of married families, held 262,000 men only. At the start large numbers were placed under canvas and others in schools and institutions; but the bulk had to be billeted, as many as 800,000 men being quartered in this way at one stage. The claims in connection with billeting and hiring became in themselves a large service; as also did the issue of "family allowance" to men living in their own homes.

Then came the building of huttcd camps to hold 850,000 men, a task made less easy by shortage of labour and congestion of traffic on roads and railways; and the problem was increased during 1916 by the influx of large Dominion contingents, and later by the expansion of the Flying Corps, the formation of the women's corps, the accommodation of prisoners of war, and the transit of American troops up to 40,000 at one time. To this was added the hospital problem and the housing of the nursing staff. The total numbers of sick and wounded sent to this country from the forces abroad up to November 15th, 1918, were 2,384,412; and the number of equipped beds at that date was 364,000. The nurses of the military Nursing Services then numbered, at home, some 13,000.

The storage of every class of munitions, equipments, clothing, supplies and vehicles was another large side of the quartering business; and the questions arising out of allowances for lodging, fuel and light and so on, were inevitably a heavy burden. The problems of storing and handling ammunition cannot be conveyed by quoting figures, but its size may be gauged by typical facts. From April to June, 1918, the ammunition issued to the troops in France weighed 650,000 tons (value, £40,500,000): and on one single day, September 2nd, the British forces on the western front fired 943,857 shells. The strength of the Army Ordnance Corps, which dealt with storage, issue and repair of practically all kinds of war material, rose, in round figures, from 2,500 on August 1st, 1914, to 40,500 of all ranks on November 1st, 1918. Didcot was one

of the depots constructed. The Bramley depot for storing explosives was  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles in length.

The receipt and handling of clothing and boots necessitated building in Battersea Park and the hiring of Olympia, the White City, and other premises in a dozen towns. In the first rush at the outbreak of war blue serge uniform had to be purchased, no other large supplies being available, to the extent of 500,000 suits; and 400,000 civilian greatcoats were also used in the early stages. In due course, however, 69 Divisions were completely equipped for service in the field, in addition to the furnishing of special requirements in fur and leather winter garments and the clothing of coloured Labour troops. In the rapid expansion of the first year vast purchasing arrangements had to be made in Canada and the United States for much equipment in addition to clothing, particularly tools and harness and saddlery; and the variety of stores for such different theatres as France, Salonika, Mesopotamia and East Africa can easily be realised. As a single and simple example of size, the peace-time provision of spades and shovels was 2,500 a year; the provision in the war was over 10,000,000. The number of vehicles, from guns to barrows, shipped to France from this country for the use of the forces up to April, 1919, was 447,640.

On the repair side of the work an outstanding development was the organisation of mobile workshops for the repair of artillery equipment in the field.

The forces being fed in August 1914 numbered 164,000: on November 11th, 1918, they were 5,363,352. As regards meat, at an early date contracts were made by the Board of Trade for regular

shipments from the Argentine; the whole of the output of Australia and New Zealand was made available for Army use in addition to all frozen meat from the Plate; and supplies were obtained from the United States, Brazil, Patagonia, Canada and South Africa. For economy in feeding the troops at home sausage factories, controlled by the War Office, were erected in London, Liverpool and Aldershot. Bread was supplied by Army bakeries, even at Gallipoli. In the case of cheese the whole of the supply from New Zealand, from Australia and from Canada was taken. To cope with the bulk shipment of oats floating pneumatic suction plants were erected early in 1917 at each of the base ports in France. The whole of the hay crop of this country in the years 1916, '17 and '18 was taken over by the War Office, the balance in excess of the Army's requirements (just over one million tons a year) being released through the controlling machinery of a central council and county committees.

In petrol the monthly requirements at first were 250,000 gallons: these rose, at the time of the Armistice, to 10½ million gallons. For Egypt and Salonika it was shipped from the east and "canned" at Suez: in France tank-storage at Calais and Rouen, enabling large tank vessels to be used, was supplemented in 1917 by the partial employment of bulk distribution, thus overcoming a shortage of tins. One hundred and eighty-six rail-tank waggons and 200 road-tank lorries were despatched from this country for that purpose. The growth in the use of mechanical transport was one of the striking developments of the war. The motor vehicles at first available, largely

as a result of subsidy arrangements, numbered 842: the total at the date of the Armistice was 121,692. The racecourse at Kempton Park was taken over as a reception depot, and a "mobilisation and embarkation area," where the units were formed and despatched to the ports, was established on Salisbury Plain at Bulford. The organisation for spare parts, with its headquarters at the Holborn Restaurant, was the largest store of its kind in the world. The tendency to substitute motors for horses was growing marked towards the end of the war, and only the signing of the Armistice put a stop to experiments conducted in France in the transportation by motor vehicle of field-gun and machine-gun battalions.

As regards remounts, on mobilisation the Army possessed some 25,000, and this number was raised in 12 days to a total of 165,000 by a scheme of impressment evolved in peace-time. Large arrangements for purchase were made abroad, and the animals landed in this country up to December 2nd, 1918, included 600,000 horses and mules from Canada and the United States, 6,000 from South America, and 3,000 mules from Spain. The supply for India and Mesopotamia was arranged for by the Indian Government. Nearly half a million were bought at home. The extensive depots so required added to the "quartering" problem. The horses and mules in all theatres on November 30th, 1918, numbered 735,000; there were also camels, bullocks and donkeys to a total of over 56,000. Four Army Schools of Farriery were established, one in France and three at home, under the Army Veterinary Corps.

The growth of the Army Service Corps was, in round figures, from 6,400 to 325,000 of all ranks.

The staff which dealt with the separation allowances paid to wives, children and other dependants was responsible for the disbursement, up to March 1920, of £414,000,000. The staff which dealt with "soldiers' effects"—the estates of deceased officers and men—rose from 10 officials in August 1914 to 777 at the date of the Armistice. At the latter date it was distributing balances at the rate of about £2,000,000 in the year, this sum belonging to different estates to the number of over 200,000. At this period the Contracts department was buying food and manufactured articles to the value of £6,000,000 a week. The Army Pay Corps, in France alone, was dealing with 36 national currencies, all subject to varying rates of exchange; for the very large Labour formations included, apart from prisoners of war, Indian, South African, Egyptian, Chinese, Fijian, Italian and Russian contingents.

The large size of the Casualty branch requires, unhappily, little explanation. In registering, publishing and investigating the reports it dealt with casualties in all theatres, including those of Dominion troops; and in the case of British Army "other ranks" it provided a central office for enquiries. Written enquiries were close upon a million; and the card index held nearly 4,000,000 cards. The clearing up of discrepancies, the circulation of lists of the missing, and correspondence with enemy countries through diplomatic or Red Cross channels on the subject of individual prisoners of war, were three particular duties involved. The notification of officer

casualties was done by the Military Secretary's branches. The total casualties for the British Empire up to the date of the Armistice amounted, in approximate figures, to 1,000,000 who were killed or had died, or were missing or prisoners, and 2,000,000 wounded.

Another new branch created for the war, the Prisoners of War Directorate, was small in numbers (23 officers), but its large task was the custody and control of all enemy prisoners wherever captured or interned, and care for the interests of the British prisoners interned in various enemy countries. The organisation of camps in this country, which at one time numbered over 500, and their discipline and administration, constituted work both novel and difficult; and the general policy in regard to prisoners, their pay, their employment and other conditions, was not eased by excited public opinion which drew resentful comparisons between the treatment of British prisoners in Germany and the treatment of enemy prisoners here. The alleged indulgence to enemy prisoners as a result of "influence in high quarters" had no foundation at all in fact. The greatest number of prisoners interned by the British at any one time in the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, India and other countries was just over 500,000.

As another instance of new activities, the work carried out by the General Staff under the general heading of "Censorship" was a development of special interest.

It grew gradually out of a small section of the Military Operations directorate, as part of the

work of "Special Intelligence," with three branches for postal censorship, cable censorship, and the military policy of Press censorship. The control of accredited war correspondents, the censorship of cinematograph films and of all official photographers and artists, and the issue of "Operations" communiqués and general liaison work with the Press Bureau formed one side of the Press work. The side which is not so generally known was the work in connection with Press propaganda and the study of the Foreign Press. The "Daily Review of the Foreign Press" grew to be a production of great value with a monthly circulation of 24,000; while a staff of well-known writers and artists was employed on the propaganda work. Summaries of operations, articles and battle-stories were circulated all over the world. For example, Sir Douglas Haig's despatch of December 30th, 1916, was translated into nine languages, and between that date and the end of the war some 7,000 articles were distributed to home, Dominion and American papers and in half a dozen neutral countries. Special literature was also produced to be distributed over the enemy lines, at first by aeroplane and later by balloons, and its great effect on the enemy is testified by German writers. Thirty-two thousand balloons were used, and the leaflets, letters and cartoons so distributed numbered in all over 25 millions.

The work of postal and cable censorship was, naturally, a much larger business.

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The most that this chapter can hope to convey is an impression of a few of the many aspects of the

task which was centred in the War Department, supported throughout by the loyal co-operation of other departments and public bodies, the Territorial County Associations, and the great work of the British Red Cross and other voluntary societies.

At the time the opinion held of the Department was probably not very flattering. Military activities were so widespread that almost everything that happened anywhere was the work, in the public eye, of the War Office. If the local hospital was notoriously wasteful, if a brother or cousin was indifferently nursed, if a small contractor gave signs of wealth, if a blatant "brass hat" paraded his car, or a known shirker had a "cushy job," these things were ascribed to a staff in Whitehall who were probably innocently unaware that such places or people existed at all. The only question of judgment which arises here concerns organisation and system . . . whether the Department as an organisation stood up to the strain imposed upon it. To adapt itself to so vast an expansion in the course of working at full speed was certainly a severe test. Its supporters can at least reply to critics that its system has not been challenged since, nor has any drastic reform been mooted. The proper relation of the military advisers to the higher direction of war policy is, of course, a distinct question.

At the close of hostilities a tired staff turned at once to a new problem—the gigantic task of Demobilisation.

## Chapter XIV

### POST-WAR

THE pre-war reform of the organisation received a very remarkable tribute in the way in which the Department, once freed from its war burdens, reverted to its original shape. Of the functions transferred to new Ministries recruiting duties were the first to return, followed by those of the Ministry of Munitions. The new branches created during the war were gradually absorbed, if not wholly abolished. The extra members of the Army Council disappeared one by one; and in March 1924 that body resumed its pre-war shape, except that its Secretary was now also a Member of Council.

At first, in 1919, some branches actually grew in size. The volume of Registry correspondence reached its peak in that year; the staff for distributing soldiers' "effects" rose, owing to the issue of the war gratuity, to 1,852; and the staff of the Demobilisation directorate numbered 1,228. The numbers of men demobilised up to December 31st, 1919, were 166,996 officers and 3,678,204 other ranks. The salvage of surplus stores and animals, which had been started early in 1918, was another extremely large task which saved enormous sums to the public. As a single instance, the animals sold up to September 1st, 1919, fetched just under £17,000,000. Again, the work of issuing medals had not then

reached its maximum. However, by the end of that year the staff had fallen from over 22,000 to 9,559.

For the War Office Peace did not prove to be peaceful.

The British forces in North Russia, despatched in the summer of 1918 to Archangel and Murmansk, were withdrawn in the autumn of 1919, and also most of the troops in the Caucasus; but there still remained two armies abroad, the Army of Occupation on the Rhine and the Army of the Middle East and Egypt. From May to November, 1919, there were hostilities in Afghanistan; while at home serious civil disturbances were intermittent throughout the year, terminating in a general Railway strike. In 1920 a rebellion in Mesopotamia necessitated the despatch of a division, and the troubles in Ireland became so serious that martial law was proclaimed in four counties. From March to June, 1921, a state of emergency was declared at home in consequence of a great Coal strike, and a special Defence Force was formed for the occasion; while a great deal of work was thrown on the War Office by the outbreak of Turko-Greek operations. In 1923 came the Treaty of Lausanne and the withdrawal from Turkey of the Army of Occupation. In 1924 operations in Waziristan, which had been intermittent for five years, were brought at last to a successful conclusion; but mutinous outbreaks in the Sudan, and the assassination of the Governor-General, required the despatch of forces from Egypt.

In 1925 plans were maturing for the evacuation of the Cologne zone. Early in 1926 the attention of the War Office was required at home by another

Coal Stoppage, the declaration of a state of emergency, and a General Strike in the month of May. Troops, who were employed in large numbers, could not be returned to their permanent stations until the Coal dispute ended late in November. In 1927 the situation in China demanded the despatch of considerable reinforcements, and the arrival in China of the Shanghai Defence Force gave rise to large problems of quartering and the like at Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tientsin and elsewhere. Reductions proceeded during 1928, but at the end of that year there were still 6 battalions additional to the normal garrison of China. There were also operations in Iraq.

Plans for total withdrawal from Occupied Germany, and particularly for the settlement of the claims arising, which threatened to be a most troublesome business, formed the central feature of 1929. Actually the evacuation was completed on December 12th of that year. In the autumn serious riots in Palestine called for troops to be sent from Egypt and Malta. In China there were still 5 British battalions, the assistance of troops being required constantly for dealing with pirates and bandit forces. Again in 1931 anti-Japanese riots created much trouble at Hong Kong; and troops were required by riots in Cyprus. Trooping arrangements for 1932 were upset once more by trouble in China, where hostilities between Japan and China were resumed at Shanghai at the beginning of the year. A battalion was also required in Iraq to deal with a rising of Assyrian Levies.

These incidents are quoted to remind the reader

that the post-war reductions and reconstruction were not carried out in complete peace. Officially the Great War ended on August 31st, 1921.

Meanwhile the Department was faced with the task of complying with strong and continuous pressure for economy in Army expenditure. The process of retrenchment started at once. The expenditure charged to Army funds fell from £412,000,000 in 1919 to £86,000,000 in 1921. Then came in turn the Geddes Committee on National Expenditure, whose interim report affecting Army votes was submitted in December 1921 [Cmd. 1581]; Lord Weir's Committee of 1923 on the staff of the three Defence Departments; Lord Colwyn's Committee of 1925 on the expenditure of the three Departments; and the May Committee of 1931 [Cmd. 3920] on the means of effecting all possible reductions in the national expenditure on Supply Services. To these were added departmental committees, the normal pressure exercised through the Treasury, the examination conducted annually by the Public Accounts Committee of the House, and three special enquiries made by the Select Committee on Estimates. Re-statements and re-calculations on every aspect of Army expenditure followed in seemingly endless succession. In 1925 Army expenditure had fallen to £44,783,000: the Estimate for 1934 was £39,600,000.

Both in the Army and at the War Office these years saw a number of striking developments, some of which must be noted briefly.

At the War Office two important changes have been mentioned already in earlier chapters. The

first was the change of 1924 by which the Permanent Under-Secretary of State was appointed to be the Accounting Officer, in accordance with a general Government decision that the permanent civilian head of a Department should normally hold that responsible position. The second was the re-allocation of duties between the "Q.M.G." and the "M.G.O." which was made in October, 1927, resulting from the growth of mechanisation. Briefly, engineer services and barrack construction were transferred to the charge of the "Q.M.G.," while the directorate of Ordnance Services was put in the charge of the "M.G.O.;" and thus the duties of research, design, inspection, provision, storage and repair of all mechanically propelled vehicles (except the storage, issue and repair of the vehicles used by the Royal Army Service Corps) were concentrated in one division of the Office. To unify the work of design, to simplify the repair problem, and to economise in men and workshops were the chief objects of this transfer.

A still more recent break with the past (1932-33) was the abolition of the Clothing Factory, which had operated at Pimlico since the year 1859. The surrender of all the premises there, and the wholesale transfer to Trade contracts of the making up of Army clothing, are expected to result in considerable savings.

For the Army itself the most notable changes have resulted from the modern development of new types of war material, the familiar cases being mechanised vehicles, of which there are more than 200 types, signal stores, including "wireless," and anti-aircraft

stores generally. The creation of the Royal Corps of Signals, separated from the Royal Engineers, and the appearance of Anti-Aircraft units, are both post-war developments. Other new introductions of these years were the Army Educational Corps and the great expansion of Army education, the building of Catterick Camp in Yorkshire to compensate for the loss of the Curragh, and a large land-purchase scheme at Imber, accompanied by a comprehensive review of all the properties held by the War Office, from which extensive sales resulted. An introduction of a special kind, which belongs to the earlier post-war years, was the institution of "Cost Accounts."

The institution of cost accounts is associated with the name of Sir Charles Harris. It began with a very remarkable experiment, for which a special corps was created and in which the Department can claim with some justice to have played a bold pioneering rôle. The familiar form of Estimate and Account deals only with cash required for the year, arranged in compartments according to "subject," such as pay, food, clothing, warlike stores, road transport, or the staffs of establishments. A different and more informative form might show the cost of the Army by *objects*—the cost, for example, of cavalry regiments, of hospitals, of military railways, or of each of the various types of depot; and might cover not merely the cash outgoings but the true cost in each case, including such elements as the cost in buildings, in fuel and light and stationery, or in stores withdrawn from stock and consumed. Such a scheme would produce comparative costs between one unit and another which, placed in the hands of administrative

officers, should prove to be valuable weapons of control and both aids and incentives to the pursuit of economy. It might also be expected, when fully developed, to be helpful to the House of Commons.

The Select Committee on National Expenditure had endorsed such a scheme in its seventh report (H.C. 98 of 1918), recommending that the accounts of all Departments should comprise their total expenditure, including the rental value of buildings, pensions paid and pension liability, and the services rendered by other Departments such as the Post Office and the Office of Works; and that the estimates and accounts should be so grouped as to show "the objects rather than the subjects of expenditure, and with carefully chosen units of cost." In this bold departure from time-honoured methods the War Office proceeded to lead the way, after practical tests carried out in Commands, and the Estimate and Account for 1919 were presented in a new form, under six main heads of Estimate and Expenditure in place of the usual cash Votes.

Being super-imposed on the existing system of cash accounts and store accounts, the scheme was, of course, expensive in cash and involved very great additional work. The cost of the Corps of Military Accountants involved a considerable addition to Estimates at a time when the cry was all for reduction. In fine, the time was not very propitious for the working out of the full implications inherent in so ambitious a project, and the Council decided in 1925 to discontinue the main scheme and to limit continuous cost accounting to selected "operative" establishments. The Army Estimates

for 1926 were accordingly presented in cash Votes, and from that year onwards the cost accounts, which are published annually in the Army Account, will be found to comprise such establishments only as Electricity Supply Stations (working down to the cost of a B.T. unit), Hospitals (the cost of each occupied bed), Bakeries, Laundries, M.T. Companies, Vessels, Railways, Pumping Stations, Steam Heating Plants, Cold Stores, and certain types of workshops. The Corps of Accountants, as such, disappeared; but accountant officers of the Royal Army Pay Corps are available to the administrative heads of the Army for the investigation of working costs for which cost accounting is not continuous.

A special feature of the post-war years, of which the general public knows too little, has been the continuous effort made to improve and strengthen the co-ordination between the three Defence Departments.

There are two sides to this important question, the economical and the strategical. On the former the Contracts Co-ordinating Committee (which includes the Treasury, the Post Office and the Office of Works) continuously reviews all practicable methods of saving money by centralised buying, by evolving common specifications, and by adopting the principle that the largest user shall buy as the agent of the other Departments. Again, the Royal Ordnance Factories work, of course, for all three Services; and research and other technical establishments are "common," too, in this sense. Nor is there any overlapping either in the case of hospitals or prisons. At no station is there more than one hospital, unless

numbers demand more space, and reciprocal arrangements are made by the Services for admission of each other's cases. Or again, in the case of the Chaplains' departments, economy is pursued by the pooling of staffs.

Remembering the widely divergent requirements of the Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force, with their different problems and their different weapons, it is doubtful whether, on the business side, there is more to be gained by co-ordination than is achieved by the steps already taken. These steps include standing Joint Committees (set up, in most cases, as a result of the Mond-Weir Committee on amalgamation of Common Services) to watch the progress of co-ordination in medical, educational, chaplaincy, and building services; and in the purchase of food-stuffs, clothing and textiles, mechanical transport, general stores, medical and veterinary stores, and electric power and water supply. Further, this question is watched constantly by the Select Committee on Estimates.

The strategical aspect is quite different: since here the whole Empire enters the picture. The central machinery has been mentioned already. Originating as a permanent body from the recommendations of the Esher Committee, the Committee of Imperial Defence, extended and developed by sub-committees, constitutes an effective and flexible instrument for co-operation between all Departments and the several Governments of the Empire as a whole in the joint problems of Imperial Defence.

In the narrower sphere of "military" strategy

due co-ordination of the three Services demands a combined General Staff, was anticipated in the year 1923 by the creation of a standing Sub-Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff. Of this the Prime Minister is chairman, as he is of the C.I.D. as a whole. In addition to the duties of the Chiefs of Staffs as advisers to their own Board or Council on sea, land or air policy, they have here an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole. The three officers constitute, as it were, a Super-Chief of a War Staff. They meet periodically, and also on any special occasion; and the effectiveness of this organisation is not merely a matter of theory: it has stood the test of actual practice. The crisis in China of 1927 provides one example, and there have been others; but in no case has this Sub-Committee failed to produce a concerted plan or to present their joint conclusions to the Cabinet within twenty-four hours of being called together. Each Chief of Staff holds a special warrant which requires him to submit to the Prime Minister any matter relating to Imperial Defence on which further enquiry or investigation may appear to him to be necessary.

Again, a significant step forward was taken in January, 1927, with the opening of the Imperial Defence College, to be supervised by the Sub-Committee. This exists for the study by selected officers of the broadest aspects of Imperial strategy, the courses lasting for one year and being shared by students from the Indian Army, the Dominion forces and the Civil Services. The needs of the three fighting Services are here considered as a single whole.

The problem of attaining effective co-ordination between three Departments with differing traditions and differing outlooks and modes of thought can be made to sound extremely formidable: and it probably was so at one stage. The solution of such a problem as this is perhaps not a matter of new machinery so much as of time and of education. Interesting statements on this subject will be found in the Debates of the House of Commons for March 21st, 1934.

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For the rest, the story of the post-war years is a tale of growing complexity. It is not just a matter of tanks and dragons, radio-telephony, air co-operation, faster transport, improved weapons, the inspection of metals by X-rays, or chemical defence requirements. It is true that these things add to the work on more than the scientific side—in new methods of training the troops, a wider scope for staff work, the organisation of new formations, and in complication of rates of pay as tradesman-ranks become more predominant: but all this forms only one part of the picture. Administration becomes more complex as life in general is more “administered,” and this in turn tends to centralisation. Much new legislation reacts on the War Office, even Town Planning Acts and Income Tax law. The machinery of the Whitley Councils is a big addition to post-war business. The League of Nations has brought its burdens. Advance in civil standards of housing and increased attention to sanitation call for improvements in barrack amenities. The Army requires better education.

Vocational training has come to stay. And superimposed on all other demands is the need pressed home by the lesson of the war for a new standard of preparation for the possible requirements of national emergency. The reality of all this increased complexity can be seen in the volume of in-coming correspondence and the volume of War Office contract work as compared with the figures for pre-war days. To the patient reader of preceding chapters the fact can hardly require to be stressed.

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Of domestic details there is little to tell.

The War Office building is not commonplace. The principal front facing Whitehall gives little impression of its great size, being but half the length of its longest side which stretches back to Whitehall Court. The irregularity of its actual shape, which architects call a "trapezium," is masked in the design by the use of cupolas, each supported by a square sub-tower which takes up the line of the street which it faces. The groups of sculpture at the angles of the building are the work of Mr. Alfred Drury, and represent Peace and War, Truth and Justice, Fame and Victory. Great pains were taken by the architects that the lines of the structure should accord with those of its neighbour to the south, the Banqueting House of the Palace of Whitehall, that masterpiece of Inigo Jones which on January 30th, 1649, was the scene of the beheading of King Charles I, and which now houses the historic treasures of the Royal United Service Institution.

The War Office is built of Portland stone. The foundations were laid in 1899, the entire site being excavated and the building erected in a tank of concrete thirty feet below the level of the road. The work was completed in November 1906. The principal feature is the main hall. From a vast mantel on the left-hand side the Duke of Wellington looks down: on the right-hand side, Lord Herbert of Lea. At the head of the first flight of the staircase stands a pedestal-bust of Lord Kitchener. The steps are of Piastracchia marble, the balusters of alabaster. The principal rooms are on the second floor which is reached direct by the main staircase, the Secretary of State's overlooking Whitehall.

In this modern "sanctuary of the God of War" there is very little of the antique. About a dozen eighteenth-century mantelpieces were carefully removed from the Pall Mall building and refixed in some of the chief rooms. There is also some very fine old silver, inherited from the Board of Ordnance, some of it dating from William III. Two pairs of candlesticks and a snuffer-tray bear the marks of 1696. An anonymous gift of recent years is a taper-box of 1794 originally presented by George III to William Windham, Secretary-at-War. One relic of particular interest hangs in the Army Council room. This is the regimental colour of the Bombay European Regiment, which was raised in 1662 and sent to India for the defence of Bombay, the latter possession having come to the King by the treaty for his marriage with Catherine of Portugal. Handed over to the Honourable East India Company (1668) and later transferred to the

Queen's Army (1861), the unit finally, in 1881, became the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

At the entrance to the quadrangle court stand four very fine torch-head lamps, marked with the arms of the Board of Ordnance, which originally adorned the old Pall Mall building. In the court itself are four guns: two German pieces from the Great War, and two which were part of a battery of four raised for the purpose of the South African War and manned by the City Imperial Volunteers. Opposite the entrance in Whitehall stands a mounted statue of the Duke of Cambridge. The old War Office in Pall Mall possessed a sentry of its own, provided by the King's Guard. The new is content with the statuesque figures of the troopers of the Household Cavalry who protect the Horse Guards over the way.

The subject of the recruitment of the staff can be dealt with in a few words. Appointments to the military staff of the War Office are normally made by selection of officers who have graduated at the Staff College. The main permanent civilian staff is recruited through the examinations which are common to the whole of the home Civil Service. An excellent result of the late war is that fifty per cent of this permanent staff has had experience of military service. The ex-soldier clerks in the military departments are not included in this figure. The *War Office List*, an official publication which is on sale, gives exhaustive and detailed information of the staff and duties of all branches.

The War Office possesses a Luncheon Club, a Sports Club of many flourishing sections, an

amateur Dramatic Society, and a Magazine of recent growth which gives scope for the military and civil pen to blossom in "Unofficial Minutes."

\* \* \* \*

Viewed from the bridge in St. James's Park on a misty morning of Spring the distant domes of the War Office roof are touched by the magic of sun and haze with the grace of the turrets of tall white castles, soaring up most royally from the streets of some city of high adventure. On closer approach the illusion is shattered. No atmosphere of romantic days lingers about this modern Department. The War Office leaves romance and tradition to the safe keeping of the British Army. It broke with the past when it left Pall Mall.

Once upon a time, not so long ago, the War Office was the butt of Press and Stage as the home of all ineptitude. Possibly, to many a regimental officer it is still at the best the *fons et origo* of an incredible mass of unnecessary rules. It remains, maybe, to the public at large no more than a vaguely conceived embodiment of military highhandedness, which in times of stress reaps vicarious importance from the stoic achievements of the British soldier and in times of peace has no obvious reason for continuing its existence at all. However untrue such conceptions may be, the War Office can be philosophic, so long as the public appreciates the need for preserving its Army unimpaired and equal to any duty assigned to it. If an efficient Navy and an efficient Air Force are necessities of the Empire, so also is an efficient Army. If the protection of this

country is obviously essential, so also is the protection of India or Egypt. The constant task of "policing the Empire" is a vital requirement of peace and security; but this primary rôle, quite distinct from that of the armies of continental Powers, is carried out so quietly that it stands in some danger of being forgotten.

The policy governing the amount of money which the nation affords for Army services is not determined by the War Office; though it has an important function of advice to those who decide these major questions. Policy, in the words of Lord Haldane, "does not rest with the War Office, which is only an instrument in the hands of the Government of the nation for carrying out policy." The Army of 1934 is a smaller but more scientific force, and definitely of a more expensive quality, than it was in the year 1914; while the money available for Army purposes is definitely a smaller sum. The latter statement may sound unconvincing, for the Army Estimates for 1914 (excluding the provision for the Flying Corps) was just under £28,000,000; while the Army Estimates for 1934 were £39,600,000; but allowing for the change in purchasing value the current provision for the Army is smaller. Accordingly the ideal of the modern War Office is to be businesslike and much alive; for its task, apart from anything else, is to extract from the means provided by the nation the last sixpennyworth of value for the Army which it is proud to administer. Possibly it can also fulfil a function even more important than this in providing lessons from its own history for those who determine the policy of Defence.



## APPENDICES



## I

## LIST OF SECRETARIES OF STATE

## SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR

1794      Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas (afterwards Baron Duneira and Viscount Melville).

## SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR WAR AND THE COLONIES

1801      Robert, Lord Hobart (afterwards fourth Earl of Buckinghamshire).

1804      John, Earl (afterwards first Marquess) Camden.

1805      Robert, Viscount Castlereagh (afterwards first Marquess of Londonderry).

1806      Rt. Hon. William Windham.

1807      Robert, Viscount Castlereagh (afterwards first Marquess of Londonderry).

1809      Robert, Earl of Liverpool.

1812      Henry, Earl Bathurst.

1827 April      Frederick, Viscount Goderich (afterwards first Earl of Ripon).

1827 Aug.      Rt. Hon. William Huskisson.

1828      Lieutenant-General the Rt. Hon. Sir George Murray.

1830      Frederick, Viscount Goderich (afterwards first Earl of Ripon).

1833      Rt. Hon. Edward Geoffrey Stanley (afterwards successively Lord Stanley, Lord Stanley of Bickerstaffe, and Earl of Derby).

1834 June      Rt. Hon. Thomas Spring-Rice (afterwards first Lord Monteagle).

1834 Dec.      Rt. Hon. George, Earl of Aberdeen.

1835      Rt. Hon. Charles Grant (afterwards first Lord Glenelg).

1839 Feb.      Constantine, Marquess of Normanby.

1839 Aug. Rt. Hon. Lord John Russell (afterwards first Earl Russell and Viscount Amberley).  
 1841 Rt. Hon. Lord Stanley (afterwards Lord Stanley of Bickerstaffe and Earl of Derby).  
 1845 Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone.  
 1846 Henry, Earl Grey.  
 1852 March Rt. Hon. Sir John Somerset Pakington, Bt.  
 1852 Dec. Henry, Duke of Newcastle.

## SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR WAR

1854 Henry, Duke of Newcastle.  
 1855 Fox, Lord Panmure (afterwards eleventh Earl of Dalhousie).  
 1858 Major-General the Rt. Hon. Jonathan Peel.  
 1859 Rt. Hon. Sidney Herbert (afterwards Lord Herbert of Lea).  
 1861 Rt. Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Bt.  
 1863 George, Earl de Grey and Ripon (afterwards first Marquess of Ripon).  
 1866 Feb. Rt. Hon. Spencer, Marquess of Hartington (afterwards eighth Duke of Devonshire).  
 1866 July Lieutenant-General the Rt. Hon. Jonathan Peel.  
 1867 Rt. Hon. Sir John Somerset Pakington, Bt. (afterwards first Lord Hampton).  
 1868 Rt. Hon. Edward Cardwell (afterwards Viscount Cardwell of Ellerbeck).  
 1874 Rt. Hon. Gathorne Hardy (afterwards Viscount and Earl of Cranbrook).  
 1878 Colonel the Rt. Hon. Frederick Arthur Stanley (afterwards Lord Stanley of Preston and Earl of Derby).  
 1880 Rt. Hon. Hugh Culling Eardley Childers.  
 1882 Rt. Hon. Spencer, Marquess of Hartington (afterwards eighth Duke of Devonshire).  
 1885 Rt. Hon. William Henry Smith.  
 1886 Feb. Rt. Hon. Henry Campbell-Bannerman.  
 1886 Aug. Rt. Hon. William Henry Smith.  
 1887 Rt. Hon. Edward Stanhope.  
 1892 Rt. Hon. Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

1875	Most Hon. Henry, Marquess of Lansdowne.
1900	Rt. Hon. St. John Brodrick (afterwards Earl of Midleton).
1903	Rt. Hon. H. O. Arnold-Forster.
1905	Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane (afterwards Viscount Haldane of Cloan).
1912	Colonel the Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely (afterwards Lord Mottistone).
1914 March	Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith (afterwards Earl of Oxford and Asquith).
1914 Aug.	Field Marshal the Rt. Hon. Horatio Herbert, Earl Kitchener of Khartoum.
1916 July	Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George.
1916 Dec.	Rt. Hon. Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby.
1918	Rt. Hon. Alfred, Viscount Milner.
1919	Rt. Hon. Winston L. Spencer Churchill.
1921	Rt. Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Bt.
1922	Rt. Hon. Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby.
1924 Jan.	Rt. Hon. Stephen Walsh.
1924 Nov.	Rt. Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Bt.
1929	Rt. Hon. Thomas Shaw.
1931 Aug.	Hon. Colonel the Rt. Hon. Robert Offley Ashburton, Marquess of Crewe.
1931 Nov.	Hon. Captain the Rt. Hon. Douglas McGarel, Viscount Hailsham.

## II

TABLE OF PRECEDENCE OF THE CORPS,  
Etc., OF THE ARMY

- 1 The Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards.
- 2 Royal Horse Artillery.
- 3 Regiments of Cavalry of the Line.
- 4 Royal Regiment of Artillery (other than Royal Horse Artillery and Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery).
- 5 Corps of Royal Engineers.
- 6 Royal Corps of Signals.
- 7 Regiments of Foot Guards.
- 8 Regiments of Infantry of the Line.
- 9 Royal Tank Corps.
- 10 Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery.
- 11 Royal Malta Artillery.
- 12 Royal Army Chaplains' Department.
- 13 Royal Army Service Corps.
- 14 Royal Army Medical Corps.
- 15 Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
- 16 Royal Army Pay Corps.
- 17 Royal Army Veterinary Corps.
- 18 Army Educational Corps.
- 19 The Army Dental Corps.
- 20 Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service.
- 21 Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia) Supplementary Reserve.
- 22 Supplementary Reserve (other than 21).
- 23 Militia\*.
- 24 Honourable Artillery Company (Territorial Army).
- 25 Territorial Army (other than 24).
- 26 Territorial Army Nursing Service.
- 27 Militia units in Bermuda, Channel Islands and Malta.
- 28 Officers Training Corps.

\* By the Territorial Army and Militia Act, 1921, the title "the Militia" was substituted for "the Special Reserve." With the exception of certain officers who were commissioned before August 5th, 1914, and are still retained, this force is not at present maintained in Great Britain or Northern Ireland.

## III

## NOTES

**Note 1** (page 7). The most recent Order in Council is dated 17th December, 1931. The actual text is as follows:—

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 17th day of December, 1931.

*Present:*

THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL.

WHEREAS His Majesty has been pleased to approve a change in the Constitution of the Army Council.

Now, THEREFORE, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

1. The Secretary of State is to be responsible to His Majesty and Parliament for all the business of the Army Council. All business other than business which the Secretary of State specially reserves to himself is to be transacted in the following principal sub-divisions:—

(a) The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for the administration of business affecting the Territorial Army Associations and War Department Lands, and for so much of the other business of the Army Council as may be assigned to him, from time to time, by the Secretary of State.

(b) The First Military Member of the Army Council (the Chief of the Imperial General Staff), the Second Military Member of the Army Council (the Adjutant-General to the Forces), the Third Military Member of the Army Council (the Quarter-Master-General to the Forces), and the Fourth Military Member of the Army Council (the Master-General of the Ordnance) shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for the administration of so much of the business relating to the organisation, disposition, personnel, armament, and maintenance

of the Army, as may be assigned to them, or each of them, from time to time, by the Secretary of State.

- (c) The Finance Member of the Army Council (Financial Secretary of the War Office) shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for the finance of the Army and for so much of the other business of the Army Council as may be assigned to him, from time to time, by the Secretary of State.
- (d) The Permanent Under-Secretary of State shall be a Member, and Secretary, of the Army Council and responsible to the Secretary of State for the preparation of all official communications of the Council and for the interior economy of the War Office: he shall also be responsible, on his appointment as Accounting Officer of Army Votes, Funds and Accounts, for the control of Expenditure and for advising the Secretary of State and the Administrative Officers at the War Office and in Commands on all questions of Army expenditure.

He shall further be charged with such other duties as may be assigned to him, from time to time, by the Secretary of State.

2. This Order in Council shall be substituted for the Order in Council dated 1st day of October, 1931.

M. P. A. HANKEY

**Note 2** (page 16). Addressed by King Charles II to the Duke of Monmouth on 7th September, 1676. Contained in the Calendar of State Papers (Domestic) for that year.

**Note 3** (page 18). The Secretary-at-War at this time was William Blathwayt. His complicated position in relation to William III, who insisted on taking him abroad on campaigns, is dealt with in great detail in a biography entitled *William Blathwayt*, by G. A. Jacobsen, published by the Yale University Press, 1932.

**Note 4** (page 29).

- (1) The preamble to the Army and Air Force Annual Act refers to the numbers required for the Army in the following words: "Whereas it is adjudged necessary by His Majesty and this present Parliament that a body

of land forces should be continued . . . and that the whole number of such forces should consist of (the number mentioned in the 'Vote A' Resolution—see 2 below)."

- (a) An estimate of the numbers required for the Regular Army is presented each year to the Committee of Supply of the House of Commons and is voted by that Committee before the end of March. In what is known as the "Vote A" Resolution the House resolves "that a number of land forces, not exceeding (a figure) be maintained" during the coming financial year. But this is a Resolution of the House of Commons alone.
- (3) The money required for the Army is voted annually by the Committee of Supply, partly in March and partly in July. The part of the Supply that is voted in March is included in the 1st Consolidated Fund Act which is duly passed before March 31st. The remaining Supply is not voted until July, and the total Supply is included in the Appropriation Act which is passed by both Houses after that date. The total grant thus made for the Army is shown out separately in the Schedule to this Act, which also includes the numbers contained in the "Vote A" Resolution of March. But this is not passed before the beginning of the financial year.

**Note 5** (page 37). The history of the office of Secretary of State will be found in greater detail in the Home Office volume of this series.

**Note 6** (page 39). Author of *The Law and Custom of the Constitution*.

**Note 7** (page 42). *The Military Forces of the Crown* by Charles M. Clode, and *The History of the British Army* by Hon. Sir John Fortescue, are two standard works on Army history. The former, dealing with the constitutional history of the forces, was published in 1869, and should be supplemented by the books of modern authorities on this subject.

**Note 8** (page 56). This passage is quoted from Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, Vol. IV, p. 20. The other authorities used in this chapter, apart from War Office documents, are

*The Letters of Queen Victoria, The Life of Lord Wolseley*, by Sir Frederick Maurice and Sir George Arthur, and *Lord Cardwell at the War Office* by Sir Robert Biddulph. *Parliament and the Army, 1642-1904*, by Lt.-Col. J. S. Omond (1933), is an excellent exposition of the political attitude; and many details concerning the personalities of the period will be found in *The War Office Past and Present* by Capt. Owen Wheeler (1914).

**Note 9** (page 81). The text of His Majesty's Letters Patent constituting the first Army Council is as follows:—

EDWARD THE SEVENTH, BY THE GRACE OF GOD, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India—

To Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster, Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Neville Gerald Lyttelton, commonly called the Honourable Sir Neville Gerald Lyttelton, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant-General in Our Army, Charles Whittingham Horsley Douglas, Esquire, Herbert Charles Onslow Plumer, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Sir James Wolfe Murray, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Major-Generals in Our Army, Our right trusty and right well-beloved Cousin Richard Walter John, Earl of Donoughmore, Our trusty and well-beloved William Bromley Davenport, Esquire, Companion of Our Distinguished Service Order, Greeting:

Know ye that We, trusting in your wisdom and fidelity of Our special grace, do by these presents constitute and appoint you to be Our Army Council for the administration of matters pertaining to Our military forces and the defence of Our Dominions, with such power and authority for the purpose as has hitherto been exercised under Our prerogative by Our Secretary of State for War, Our Commander-in-Chief or other Our principal officers who have under Our Secretary of State for War been charged with the administration of the Departments of the Army.

And We do command all Our officers of Our military forces and all others in any department of Our Military Service, that they may be attendant on you and observe and execute all such orders as you may give in the exercise of your power and authority.

And know ye that We do grant unto you full power and authority from time to time to appoint such officers for conducting the business of the civil departments of Our Military Service entrusted to you as shall seem necessary to you, and to revoke the appointment of any such officers as you shall see fit, and appoint others in their place, and We enjoin all such officers and all others whom it may concern to be obedient unto you in all things as becometh.

And We grant unto you full power in relation to any power and authority for the time being vested in you under these Our Letters Patent to make such contracts and do all such other things as you may find necessary in your discretion for the better carrying on of Our Military Service, and generally to execute and to do every power and thing which formerly appertained to Our Secretary of State for War or to Our Commander-in-Chief or other principal officers as aforesaid.

And know ye that your powers may be exercised and your duties performed by any three of your number, that Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster shall be your President, and that any document may be signed on your behalf by any two of you or by any one of you and such person as you may appoint to be your Secretary.

In witness whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

Witness Ourselv<sup>t</sup> at *Westminster*, the sixth day of *February*, in the fourth year of Our Reign.

By Warrant under the King's Sign Manual.

MUIR MACKENZIE

**Note 10** (page 91). *The Foundations of Reform* by the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, 1908, contains a critique of the Haldane reforms by a first-class writer.

**Note 11** (page 93). The number of officers and men landed in France between 9th and 23rd August, 1914, was 111,804. As regards Waterloo the authorities differ as to the size of the Army commanded by Wellington; but several agree in giving it as 67,700 men with 156 to 174 guns. Fortescue puts the figure as low as 63,000, and some foreign writers have put it as high as 93,601. The numbers of the British troops in that Army were between 24,000 and 26,000.

**Note 12** (page 119). The reference is to the 11th Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, presented to the House of Commons on February 26th, 1810. This was an exhaustive enquiry into the existing machinery for administering the forces. Nineteen reports were issued between March 1806 and March 1812.

**Note 13** (page 129). The subject is dealt with clearly in the Manual of Military Law issued by command of the Army Council and published by H.M. Stationery Office.

**Note 14** (page 136). For the following division of Honorary Distinctions the writer is indebted to Major T. J. Edwards.

(1) Battle Honours. These are either the name of an action, e.g. "Salamanca" or "Mons," or the name of a campaign, e.g. "Peninsula," "South Africa, 1899-1902." The only battle honour for a place in Great Britain is "Fishguard." A small French force landed at Fishguard on February 23rd, 1797, and was captured by the Pembrokeshire Militia. The honour was borne by the Castle Martin Yeomanry, which was converted after the Great War into the 102nd (Pembroke and Cardigan) Brigade, Royal Artillery.

(2) Badges, of which there is a great variety, e.g., "The Lion of Nassau," "The Sphinx, superscribed 'Egypt,'" "An Elephant superscribed 'Assaye,'" "The Royal Tiger superscribed 'India,'" "The Dragon superscribed 'China,'" "The Castle and Key superscribed 'Gibraltar,'" "The White (Roussillon) Plume," etc.

(3) Commemorative Mottoes borne upon Colours. "Primus in Indis" (the old 39th Foot, now the Dorsetshire Regiment) and "Celer et Audax" (The King's Royal Rifle Corps, for service under Wolfe in North America).

(4) Regimental Titles, e.g., the 1st Guards were granted the title "1st or Grenadier Regiment of Foot Guards" in commemoration of their having defeated the Grenadiers of the French Imperial Guards at Waterloo.

(5) Clothing Badge; a unique distinction. A Sphinx badge at the back of the head-dress was granted to the old 28th Foot (The Gloucestershire Regt.) to commemorate the fact that they fought back to back at the battle of Alexandria, March 21st, 1801.

(6) Silver Wreath borne on the Colour Pike, granted by Queen Victoria to the 24th Foot (The South Wales Borderers), to commemorate the rescue of the Queen's Colour at Isandhlwana and the defence of Rorke's Drift in the Zulu War of 1879.

(7) Commemorative Regiments. The Irish Guards were formed to commemorate the bravery shown by the Irish regiments in the South African War, 1899-1902.

(8) Dress Distinctions, e.g., The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons) wear a bearskin cap to commemorate their bravery at Ramillies.

(9) The Truncheon awarded to the Sirmoor battalion of the Bengal Native Army for service at the relief of Delhi, 1857. The battalion is now the 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles. The Battle Axe awarded to a company of the Royal Artillery at Martinique in 1809. This company is now the 25th Medium Battery, R.A.

**Note 15** (page 140). *Notes on Matters affecting the Health, Efficiency and Hospital Administration of the British Army, founded chiefly on the experience of the late War* by Florence Nightingale; written between February and August, 1857, and published privately in 1858. The sentence from the private notes is quoted from *The Life of Florence Nightingale* by Sir Edward Cook (1914).

**Note 16** (page 156). *R.A.S.C. History of Transport and Supply in the British Army*. The first volume by Fortescue ends in 1902. The second by Col. R. H. Beadon carries the story to 1920.

**Note 17** (page 181). The reader who is interested in the development of weapons and of military dress will find much interesting information in the *History of the Army Ordnance Services* by Major-General A. Forbes (1929). For the history of the R.A. see Duncan's *Royal Regiment of Artillery* (1872), and the *History of the Royal Artillery*, Vol. I, by Major-Gen. Sir Charles Caldwell and Major-General Sir John Headlam.

**Note 18** (page 234). The office of the Paymaster-General must be distinguished from the military Royal Army Pay Corps. The functions of the Paymaster-General, who, like the old Paymaster-General of the Forces, is a political officer, are set out in the Treasury volume of this series.

**Note 19** (page 247). The complete list of the Votes of the Army Estimates are: Vote A, Numbers; Vote 1, Pay, etc., of the Army; Vote 2, Territorial Army and Reserve Forces; Vote 3, Medical Services; Vote 4, Educational Establishments; Vote 5, Quartering and Movements; Vote 6, Supplies, Road Transport and Remounts; Vote 7, Clothing; Vote 8, General Stores; Vote 9, Warlike Stores; Vote 10, Works, Buildings and Lands; Vote 11, Miscellaneous Effective Services; Vote 12, War Office; Vote 13, Half-Pay, Retired Pay and other Non-Effective Charges for Officers; Vote 14, Pensions, &c., for Warrant Officers, N.C.O.s, Men and others; Vote 15, Civil Superannuation, Compensation and Gratuities.

**Note 20** (page 250). Army Agents. By the time of King James II the Colonel's Clerk, who acted on behalf of the Colonel of each regiment in connection with pay, clothing, etc. (see p. 255), had come to be termed the Regimental Agent. He was employed by the Colonel, and a deduction of 2d. in the £ on the whole pay of the regiment was made for his remuneration. The post was often sold to the highest bidder, and the prevalence of corruption among the agents called for parliamentary enquiry as early as 1695. The cost of agency was made a charge on public funds by Burke's Act of 1783. The captains of companies paid the men and various other regimental charges, but the agents alone accounted to the Secretary-at-War for the aggregate disbursements on account of the regiments. This was changed in 1798 by the establishment of regimental paymasters, and from that date onward

the agency system was considered by several Commissions and Committees. In 1827 there were 13 agents in all. In 1850, when the charge to the public for agency services was £28,508, a Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure found that in the Cavalry and Infantry the agent (1), in his public capacity, received and distributed for the Colonel the funds allowed for the subsistence and other services of the regiment; carried out remittances made by soldiers, distributed "effects," regulated the supply of clothing, arranged for the payment of tradesmen, and conducted the business of sale and purchase of commissions, etc.; while (2), in his private capacity, he acted without charge as banker for the individual officer, attended to his purchase of promotion, bought and forwarded any article which he might require when on service and so on. The public allowance for these combined duties amounted at this date to £234 15s. 9d. for a regiment of Infantry of 750 rank and file. In 1878 the agency system, now much narrowed in its public duties, was extended to the Staff and the Departments (e.g. Medical, Commissariat, Ordnance, etc.); and in 1881 it was decided that in future the agent through whom the regimental officers drew their pay should be appointed by the Secretary of State. In 1890 the three firms of Cox & Co., Holt, Laurie & Co. and McGrigor & Co. made an agreement to undertake the duties of agency free of charge to the public for twenty years from 1892: and this was renewed in 1909 for twenty years ending 31st December, 1931. The change to the present position was made in 1922. Para. 141 of the King's Regulations, 1928, lays down that the Army Council exercise no control over, and accept no responsibility for, the banking business conducted by firms appointed to act as Army Agents.

**Note 21** (page 291). Lord Riddell in his War Diary, 1914-1918. During those years Lord, then Sir George, Riddell was in close touch with the War Office as Vice-Chairman of the Newspaper Proprietors Association and a member of the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee.



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